Stage 1 Roles and Requirements

Table of Contents

• Overview
• Definitions
  • Withdrawal Liveness
  • Withdrawal Safety
  • Proxy Admin Owner
  • Guardian
  • Pause Deputy
  • Pause Mechanism
  • Pause Identifier
  • Stage 1 Rollup
• OP Stack Stage 1 Design
  • Permissionless Fault Proofs
  • Security Council
  • Proxy Admin Owner
  • Guardian
  • Pause Deputy
  • Architecture Diagram
• Invariants
  • iS1-001
  • Impact
  • iS1-002: The Pause Deputy can only cause a temporary Withdrawal Liveness failure
    • Impact
  • iS1-003: The Guardian can revoke the Pause Deputy role at any time
    • Impact

Overview

This document describes the requirements necessary for an OP Stack implementation to satisfy the Stage 1 decentralization requirements as defined by L2BEAT. It also defines the specific roles and capabilities for an OP Stack chain in the standard configuration that will satisfy these requirements.

Definitions

Withdrawal Liveness

Withdrawal Liveness is the ability for users to execute valid withdrawals out of any contract that stores ETH or tokens within an OP Chain's set of smart contracts. We tend to refer to Withdrawal Liveness in the context of the OptimismPortal and the rest of the Standard Bridge system (i.e., the StandardBridge and CrossDomainMessenger contracts) because this is where a majority of the ETH/tokens in the system live. However, this also applies to bonds deposited into dispute game contracts (and ultimately into the DelayedWETH contract).

Withdrawal Safety

Withdrawal Safety is the condition that users are not able to execute invalid withdrawals out of any contract that stores ETH or tokens within an OP Chain's set of smart contracts. Generally speaking "liveness" means nothing gets bricked and "safety" means nothing gets stolen.

Proxy Admin Owner

The Proxy Admin Owner is a dedicated role in the OP Stack that is permitted to upgrade the contracts that make up an OP Stack chain's onchain footprint. In the Superchain, the Upgrade Controller role is held jointly in a 2/2 of the Optimism Security Council and the Optimism Foundation.

Guardian

The Guardian is a dedicated role in the OP Stack that is permitted to trigger certain actions to maintain the security of an OP Chain or set of OP Chains in case of a bug in the protocol. In the Superchain, the Guardian role is held by the Optimism Security Council.

Pause Deputy

The Pause Deputy is a dedicated role managed by the Guardian that can execute the Pause Mechanism. An OP Chain does not necessarily need to assign a Pause Deputy. The Pause Deputy is capable of triggering the Pause Mechanism but does not have the ability to reset the mechanism or unpause the system.

The Pause Deputy is an optional role within an OP Chain and can be configured if the Guardian is a Safe that installs the Deputy Pause Module.

Pause Mechanism

The Pause Mechanism is a tool that permits the Guardian or the Pause Deputy to pause the execution of certain actions on one or more OP Chains. Broadly speaking, the Pause Mechanism is designed to impact the liveness of the system such that an attack on the system is unable to actually remove ETH or ERC-20 tokens from the bridge or any other contract that stores ETH and/or tokens.

The Pause Mechanism is temporary and is active up to a fixed maximum amount of time before expiring. A pause cannot be triggered again unless the mechanism is explicitly reset by the Guardian. That is, if the Pause Mechanism is triggered and not reset by the Guardian, it will expire, the system will automatically become unpaused, and the system cannot be paused again.

The Pause Mechanism can be applied globally or to individual systems. Which level the pause applies to is determined by the Pause Identifier provided when executing or checking pause status.

Chains using the Standard Configuration of the OP Stack use a pause expiry of 3 months. Because the Pause Mechanism can be applied to both local and global scopes, the pause could be chained to, for instance, pause the local system first and then the global system shortly before the local pause expires. The total potential pause time is therefore double the expiry period (6 months).

The Guardian may explicitly unpause the system rather than waiting for the pause to expire. If this happens, the pause is automatically reset such that it can be used again. The Guardian can reset the pause at any time so that it can be used again, even if the pause is currently active. If the pause is reset when it is currently active, the pause can be triggered again, thereby resetting the 6 month expiry timer (on a per address identifier basis).

Pause Identifier

The Pause Identifier is an address parameter used to specify the scope of a pause action. This identifier determines which systems or chains are affected by the pause:

• When the identifier is the zero address (0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000), the pause applies globally to all chains sharing the SuperchainConfig contract.
• When the identifier is a non-zero address, the pause applies specifically to the chain or set of chains associated with that identifier.

The identifier must be an ETHLockbox address or address(0). This allows for targeted pausing of either specific chains, the interop set (which shares an ETHLockbox contract), or the all chains that share the same SuperchainConfig when address(0) is used as the identifier.

OP Chains are expected to integrate with the SuperchainConfig via their SystemConfig contract, which will check for the status of the pause by passing along the address of the ETHLockbox being used within that system as the Pause Identifier.

Stage 1 Rollup

L2BEAT defines that a system can be considered a "Stage 1 Rollup" system if it has the following property:

• If the System has a Security Council (as defined by L2BEAT) the only way (excluding bugs) for the System to experience an indefinite Withdrawal Liveness failure or any Withdrawal Safety failure is through a malicious majority of at least 75% of the Security Council.

OP Stack Stage 1 Design

The above definitions and requirements have a number of concrete implications for the Standard Configuration of the OP Stack. We therefore specify the following architecture for a Stage 1 OP Stack chain.

Permissionless Fault Proofs

A Stage 1 OP Stack chain must operate a permissionless Fault Proof system.

Security Council

A Stage 1 OP Stack chain must have a Security Council.

Proxy Admin Owner

The Proxy Admin Owner role in the OP Stack is a privileged role that is allowed to upgrade the smart contracts that make up an OP Stack chain's onchain footprint. This role must require sign-off from the Security Council. This specifically means that the role can either be entirely held by the Security Council or by some other configuration as long as the Security Council is a required signatory (e.g., a 2/2 multisig).

In addition to the ability to upgrade all smart contracts, the Proxy Admin Owner is the only address authorized to perform the following actions:

• DisputeGameFactory.setImplementation
• DisputeGameFactory.setInitBond
• DelayedWETH.hold
• DelayedWETH.recover

The Proxy Admin Owner can theoretically cause an indefinite Withdrawal Liveness failure as well as Withdrawal Safety failures. This is aligned with the Stage 1 definition because the Security Council is a required signatory on this role.

Guardian

The Guardian role in the OP Stack is a privileged role that is allowed to execute certain safety-net actions in the case that a bug exists in the OP Stack smart contracts. This role must be held by the Security Council in the form of a 1/1 Safe owned by the Security Council.

The Guardian is the only address that is permitted to execute the following actions:

• SuperchainConfig.pause()
• SuperchainConfig.unpause()
• SuperchainConfig.reset()
• AnchorStateRegistry.setRespectedGameType()
• AnchorStateRegistry.updateRetirementTimestamp()
• AnchorStateRegistry.blacklistDisputeGame()

The Guardian can theoretically cause an indefinite Withdrawal Liveness failure as well as Withdrawal Safety failures. This is aligned with the Stage 1 definition because the Security Council holds this role.

Pause Deputy

The Pause Deputy is a role that can be assigned by the Guardian. The Pause Deputy is explicitly permitted to cause a temporary Withdrawal Liveness failure. Because the Pause Deputy can only cause a temporary Withdrawal Liveness failure, the Guardian can assign this role to any actor it deems fit to utilize the role without violating any invariants.

Architecture Diagram

The following diagram outlines the control relationships between the contracts in the system:

Note: in the diagram above, the ProtocolVersionscontract is listed as "Out of Protocol", because the decision to follow the version signals in the contract is optional. It is included here for completeness, but it does not impact Withdrawal Safety or Withdrawal Liveness.

Invariants

iS1-001

A permanent Withdrawal Liveness or Withdrawal Safety failure requires 75% of the Security Council (w/o bugs).

This is the core invariant for Stage 1 and aligns with the definition by L2BEAT from January 2025. We can define additional properties about roles specific to the OP Stack as long as they align with this invariant. Note that this invariant does NOT consider the impact of bugs in smart contracts on the rest of the protocol. That is, this invariant only holds strongly under the assumption that no such bugs exist.

Impact

Severity: High/Critical

If broken, it must be assumed that some other actor has the ability to cause a permanent Withdrawal Liveness or Withdrawal Safety failure. We consider any violation of this invariant to be a High severity issue, but this issue potentially becomes Critical if the actor that has this ability is not another reasonably trusted entity.

iS1-002: The Pause Deputy can only cause a temporary Withdrawal Liveness failure

We require that any action that the Pause Deputy can take in the system can only cause a temporary Withdrawal Liveness failure. This is required because the Security Council must explicitly trigger any action that results either an indefinite Withdrawal Liveness failure or a Withdrawal Safety failure.

Impact

Severity: High

If this invariant were broken, the Pause Deputy could be able to cause either a Withdrawal Safety failure or a permanent Withdrawal Liveness failure. Either failure mode would be a violation of the definition of Stage 1 as of January 2025.

iS1-003: The Guardian can revoke the Pause Deputy role at any time

We require that the Guardian be able to revoke the Pause Deputy role at any time. This condition is necessary to prevent a misbehaving Pause Deputy from continuing to trigger the Pause Mechanism when this would not be desired by the Guardian itself.

Impact

Severity: High

If this invariant were broken, assuming that iS1-002 the Pause Deputy would potentially be able to repeatedly trigger the Pause Mechanism even if the Guardian does not want this to happen. We consider this to be a High severity condition because the Guardian can choose not to renew the pause to allow the system to operate if truly necessary.