OP Stack Specs

This directory contains the plain english specs for Optimism, a minimal optimistic rollup protocol that maintains 1:1 compatibility with Ethereum.

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Table of Contents

Specification Contents


Specifications of new features in active development.

Design Goals

The aim is to design a protocol specification that is:

  • Fast: When sending transactions, rollup clients return reliable confirmations with low-latency. For example when swapping on Uniswap you should see that your transaction succeeds in less than 2 seconds.
  • Scalable: It should be possible to handle an enormous number of transactions per second which will enable the system to charge low fees. The gas limit should scale up to and even past the gas limit on L1.
  • Modular: Components are modular, reducing complexity and enable parallel contributions. Robust conceptual frameworks and composable atoms of software enables complex protocol design that exceeds the knowledge base of any single contributor.
  • Minimal: Rollups should be minimal by using Ethereum’s battle-tested infrastructure. An ideal optimistic rollup design should be representable as a diff against Ethereum client software.
  • Developer Driven: Designs are driven by technical contributors so developers are stakeholders. There should be a tight feedback loop between protocol design and developer use.
  • Clear and Readable: The specs are articulated well. Iterative technical feedback is key!
  • Secure: Every component of the system is incredibly secure and highly redundant. Assets are at stake, so the design must be robust to mitigate risk.
  • Decentralizable: Designed to avail the protocol of the security and censorship-resistant guarantees achieved by a decentralized system. Currently centralized components of the system should have a clear path towards decentralization. Already decentralized components of the system should be protected and preserved.


Optimism is an EVM equivalent, optimistic rollup protocol designed to scale Ethereum while remaining maximally compatible with existing Ethereum infrastructure. This document provides an overview of the protocol to provide context for the rest of the specification.

Table of Contents


What is Ethereum scalability?

Scaling Ethereum means increasing the number of useful transactions the Ethereum network can process. Ethereum's limited resources, specifically bandwidth, computation, and storage, constrain the number of transactions which can be processed on the network. Of the three resources, computation and storage are currently the most significant bottlenecks. These bottlenecks limit the supply of transactions, leading to extremely high fees. Scaling ethereum and reducing fees can be achieved by better utilizing bandwidth, computation and storage.

What is an Optimistic Rollup?

Optimistic rollup is a layer 2 scalability technique which increases the computation & storage capacity of Ethereum without sacrificing security or decentralization. Transaction data is submitted on-chain but executed off-chain. If there is an error in the off-chain execution, a fault proof can be submitted on-chain to correct the error and protect user funds. In the same way you don't go to court unless there is a dispute, you don't execute transactions on on-chain unless there is an error.

What is EVM Equivalence?

EVM Equivalence is complete compliance with the state transition function described in the Ethereum yellow paper, the formal definition of the protocol. By conforming to the Ethereum standard across EVM equivalent rollups, smart contract developers can write once and deploy anywhere.

🎢 All together now 🎢

Optimism is an EVM equivalent, optimistic rollup protocol designed to scale Ethereum.

Protocol Guarantees

In order to scale Ethereum without sacrificing security, we must preserve 3 critical properties of Ethereum layer 1: liveness, availability, and validity.

  1. Liveness
    • Anyone must be able to extend the rollup chain by sending transactions at any time.
    • There are two ways transactions can be sent to the rollup chain: 1) via the sequencer, and 2) directly on layer 1. The sequencer provides low latency & low cost transactions, while sending transactions directly to layer 1 provides censorship resistance.
  2. Availability
    • Anyone must be able to download the rollup chain.
    • All information required to derive the chain is embedded into layer 1 blocks. That way as long as the layer 1 chain is available, so is the rollup.
  3. Validity
    • All transactions must be correctly executed and all withdrawals correctly processed.
    • The rollup state and withdrawals are managed on an L1 contract called the L2OutputOracle. This oracle is guaranteed to only finalize correct (ie. valid) rollup block hashes given a single honest verifier assumption. If there is ever an invalid block hash asserted on layer 1, an honest verifier will prove it is invalid and win a bond.

Footnote: There are two main ways to enforce validity of a rollup: fault proofs (optimistic rollup) and validity proofs (zkRollup). For the purposes of this spec we only focus on fault proofs but it is worth noting that validity proofs can also be plugged in once they have been made feasible.

Network Participants

There are three actors in Optimism: users, sequencers, and verifiers.

Network Overview


At the heart of the network are users (us!). Users can:

  1. Deposit or withdraw arbitrary transactions on L2 by sending data to a contract on Ethereum mainnet.
  2. Use EVM smart contracts on layer 2 by sending transactions to the sequencers.
  3. View the status of transactions using block explorers provided by network verifiers.


The sequencer is the primary block producer. There may be one sequencer or many using a consensus protocol. For 1.0.0, there is just one sequencer (currently operated under the oversight of the Optimism Foundation). In general, specifications may use "the sequencer" to be a stand-in term for the consensus protocol operated by multiple sequencers.

The sequencer:

  1. Accepts user off-chain transactions
  2. Observes on-chain transactions (primarily, deposit events coming from L1)
  3. Consolidates both kinds of transactions into L2 blocks with a specific ordering.
  4. Propagates consolidated L2 blocks to L1, by submitting two things as calldata to L1:
    • The pending off-chain transactions accepted in step 1.
    • Sufficient information about the ordering of the on-chain transactions to successfully reconstruct the blocks from step 3., purely by watching L1.

The sequencer also provides access to block data as early as step 3., so that users may access real-time state in advance of L1 confirmation if they so choose.


Verifiers serve two purposes:

  1. Serving rollup data to users; and
  2. Verifying rollup integrity and disputing invalid assertions.

In order for the network to remain secure there must be at least one honest verifier who is able to verify the integrity of the rollup chain & serve blockchain data to users.

Key Interaction Diagrams

The following diagrams demonstrate how protocol components are utilized during key user interactions in order to provide context when diving into any particular component specification.

Depositing and Sending Transactions

Users will often begin their L2 journey by depositing ETH from L1. Once they have ETH to pay fees, they'll start sending transactions on L2. The following diagram demonstrates this interaction and all key Optimism components which are or should be utilized:

Diagram of Depositing and Sending Transactions

Links to components mentioned in this diagram:


Just as important as depositing, it is critical that users can withdraw from the rollup. Withdrawals are initiated by normal transactions on L2, but then completed using a transaction on L1 after the dispute period has elapsed.

Diagram of Withdrawing

Links to components mentioned in this diagram:

Next Steps

This is a choose your own adventure. Are you interested in how a verifier works under the hood? Maybe you want to dive deep into the bit flippin' Fault Proof VM? All key components have been linked at least once in this doc, so you should now have the context you need to dive in deeper. The world is yours!

Optimism Overview

Table of Contents

This document is a high-level technical overview of the Optimism protocol. It aims to explain how the protocol works in an informal manner, and direct readers to other parts of the specification so that they may learn more.

This document assumes you've read the background.

Architecture Design Goals

  • Execution-Level EVM Equivalence: The developer experience should be identical to L1 except where L2 introduces a fundamental difference.
    • No special compiler.
    • No unexpected gas costs.
    • Transaction traces work out-of-the-box.
    • All existing Ethereum tooling works - all you have to do is change the chain ID.
  • Maximal compatibility with ETH1 nodes: The implementation should minimize any differences with a vanilla Geth node, and leverage as many existing L1 standards as possible.
    • The execution engine/rollup node uses the ETH2 Engine API to build the canonical L2 chain.
    • The execution engine leverages Geth's existing mempool and sync implementations, including snap sync.
  • Minimize state and complexity:
    • Whenever possible, services contributing to the rollup infrastructure are stateless.
    • Stateful services can recover to full operation from a fresh DB using the peer-to-peer network and on-chain sync mechanisms.
    • Running a replica is as simple as running a Geth node.



L1 Components

  • OptimismPortal: A feed of L2 transactions which originated as smart contract calls in the L1 state.

    • The OptimismPortal contract emits TransactionDeposited events, which the rollup driver reads in order to process deposits.
    • Deposits are guaranteed to be reflected in the L2 state within the sequencing window.
    • Beware that transactions are deposited, not tokens. However deposited transactions are a key part of implementing token deposits (tokens are locked on L1, then minted on L2 via a deposited transaction).
  • BatchInbox: An L1 address to which the Batch Submitter submits transaction batches.

    • Transaction batches include L2 transaction calldata, timestamps, and ordering information.
    • The BatchInbox is a regular EOA address. This lets us pass on gas cost savings by not executing any EVM code.
  • L2OutputOracle: A smart contract that stores L2 output roots for use with withdrawals and fault proofs.

L2 Components

  • Rollup Node:
    • A standalone, stateless binary.
    • Receives L2 transactions from users.
    • Syncs and verifies rollup data on L1.
    • Applies rollup-specific block production rules to synthesize blocks from L1.
    • Appends blocks to the L2 chain using the Engine API.
    • Handles L1 reorgs.
    • Distributes unsubmitted blocks to other rollup nodes.
  • Execution Engine (EE):
    • A vanilla Geth node with minor modifications to support Optimism.
    • Maintains L2 state.
    • Sync state to other L2 nodes for fast onboarding.
    • Serves the Engine API to the rollup node.
  • Batch Submitter
  • Output Submitter
    • A background process that submits L2 output commitments to the L2OutputOracle.

Transaction/Block Propagation

Spec links:

Since the EE uses Geth under the hood, Optimism uses Geth's built-in peer-to-peer network and transaction pool to propagate transactions. The same network can also be used to propagate submitted blocks and support snap-sync.

Unsubmitted blocks, however, are propagated using a separate peer-to-peer network of Rollup Nodes. This is optional, however, and is provided as a convenience to lower latency for verifiers and their JSON-RPC clients.

The below diagram illustrates how the sequencer and verifiers fit together:


Key Interactions In Depth


Spec links:

Optimism supports two types of deposits: user deposits, and L1 attributes deposits. To perform a user deposit, users call the depositTransaction method on the OptimismPortal contract. This in turn emits TransactionDeposited events, which the rollup node reads during block derivation.

L1 attributes deposits are used to register L1 block attributes (number, timestamp, etc.) on L2 via a call to the L1 Attributes Predeploy. They cannot be initiated by users, and are instead added to L2 blocks automatically by the rollup node.

Both deposit types are represented by a single custom EIP-2718 transaction type on L2.

Block Derivation


The rollup chain can be deterministically derived given an L1 Ethereum chain. The fact that the entire rollup chain can be derived based on L1 blocks is what makes Optimism a rollup. This process can be represented as:

derive_rollup_chain(l1_blockchain) -> rollup_blockchain

Optimism's block derivation function is designed such that it:

  • Requires no state other than what is easily accessible using L1 and L2 execution engine APIs.
  • Supports sequencers and sequencer consensus.
  • Is resilient to sequencer censorship.

Epochs and the Sequencing Window

The rollup chain is subdivided into epochs. There is a 1:1 correspondence between L1 block numbers and epoch numbers.

For L1 block number n, there is a corresponding rollup epoch n which can only be derived after a sequencing window worth of blocks has passed, i.e. after L1 block number n + SEQUENCING_WINDOW_SIZE is added to the L1 chain.

Each epoch contains at least one block. Every block in the epoch contains an L1 info transaction which contains contextual information about L1 such as the block hash and timestamp. The first block in the epoch also contains all deposits initiated via the OptimismPortal contract on L1. All L2 blocks can also contain sequenced transactions, i.e. transactions submitted directly to the sequencer.

Whenever the sequencer creates a new L2 block for a given epoch, it must submit it to L1 as part of a batch, within the epoch's sequencing window (i.e. the batch must land before L1 block n + SEQUENCING_WINDOW_SIZE). These batches are (along with the TransactionDeposited L1 events) what allows the derivation of the L2 chain from the L1 chain.

The sequencer does not need for a L2 block to be batch-submitted to L1 in order to build on top of it. In fact, batches typically contain multiple L2 blocks worth of sequenced transactions. This is what enables fast transaction confirmations on the sequencer.

Since transaction batches for a given epoch can be submitted anywhere within the sequencing window, verifiers must search all blocks within the window for transaction batches. This protects against the uncertainty of transaction inclusion of L1. This uncertainty is also why we need the sequencing window in the first place: otherwise the sequencer could retroactively add blocks to an old epoch, and validators wouldn't know when they can finalize an epoch.

The sequencing window also prevents censorship by the sequencer: deposits made on a given L1 block will be included in the L2 chain at worst after SEQUENCING_WINDOW_SIZE L1 blocks have passed.

The following diagram describes this relationship, and how L2 blocks are derived from L1 blocks (L1 info transactions have been elided):

Epochs and Sequencing Windows

Block Derivation Loop

A sub-component of the rollup node called the rollup driver is actually responsible for performing block derivation. The rollup driver is essentially an infinite loop that runs the block derivation function. For each epoch, the block derivation function performs the following steps:

  1. Downloads deposit and transaction batch data for each block in the sequencing window.
  2. Converts the deposit and transaction batch data into payload attributes for the Engine API.
  3. Submits the payload attributes to the Engine API, where they are converted into blocks and added to the canonical chain.

This process is then repeated with incrementing epochs until the tip of L1 is reached.

Engine API

The rollup driver doesn't actually create blocks. Instead, it directs the execution engine to do so via the Engine API. For each iteration of the block derivation loop described above, the rollup driver will craft a payload attributes object and send it to the execution engine. The execution engine will then convert the payload attributes object into a block, and add it to the chain. The basic sequence of the rollup driver is as follows:

  1. Call fork choice updated with the payload attributes object. We'll skip over the details of the fork choice state parameter for now - just know that one of its fields is the L2 chain's headBlockHash, and that it is set to the block hash of the tip of the L2 chain. The Engine API returns a payload ID.
  2. Call get payload with the payload ID returned in step 1. The engine API returns a payload object that includes a block hash as one of its fields.
  3. Call new payload with the payload returned in step 2. (Ectone blocks, must use V3, pre-Ecotone blocks MUST use the V2 version)
  4. Call fork choice updated with the fork choice parameter's headBlockHash set to the block hash returned in step 2. The tip of the L2 chain is now the block created in step 1.

The swimlane diagram below visualizes the process:

Engine API


Table of Contents


The Regolith upgrade, named after a material best described as "deposited dust on top of a layer of bedrock", implements minor changes to deposit processing, based on reports of the Sherlock Audit-contest and findings in the Bedrock Optimism Goerli testnet.

Summary of changes:

  • The isSystemTx boolean is disabled, system transactions now use the same gas accounting rules as regular deposits.
  • The actual deposit gas-usage is recorded in the receipt of the deposit transaction, and subtracted from the L2 block gas-pool. Unused gas of deposits is not refunded with ETH however, as it is burned on L1.
  • The nonce value of the deposit sender account, before the transaction state-transition, is recorded in a new optional field (depositNonce), extending the transaction receipt (i.e. not present in pre-Regolith receipts).
  • The recorded deposit nonce is used to correct the transaction and receipt metadata in RPC responses, including the contractAddress field of deposits that deploy contracts.
  • The gas and depositNonce data is committed to as part of the consensus-representation of the receipt, enabling the data to be safely synced between independent L2 nodes.
  • The L1-cost function was corrected to more closely match pre-Bedrock behavior.

The deposit specification specifies the deposit changes of the Regolith upgrade in more detail. The execution engine specification specifies the L1 cost function difference.

The Regolith upgrade uses a L2 block-timestamp activation-rule, and is specified in both the rollup-node (regolith_time) and execution engine (config.regolithTime).


Table of Contents

The Canyon upgrade contains the Shapella upgrade from L1 and some minor protocol fixes. The Canyon upgrade uses a L2 block-timestamp activation-rule, and is specified in both the rollup-node (canyon_time) and execution engine (config.canyonTime). Shanghai time in the execution engine should be set to the same time as the Canyon time.

Execution Layer

Consensus Layer


Table of Contents

The Delta upgrade uses a L2 block-timestamp activation-rule, and is specified only in the rollup-node (delta_time).

Consensus Layer

The Delta upgrade consists of a single consensus-layer feature: Span Batches.


Table of Contents


Span-batch is a new batching spec that reduces overhead of OP-stack chains, introduced in Delta network upgrade. This enables sparse and low-throughput OP-stack chains.

The overhead is reduced by representing a span of consecutive L2 blocks in a more efficient manner, while preserving the same consistency checks as regular batch data.

Note that the channel and frame formats stay the same: data slicing, packing and multi-transaction transport is already optimized.

The overhead in the V0 batch format comes from:

  • The meta-data attributes are repeated for every L2 block, while these are mostly implied already:
    • parent hash (32 bytes)
    • L1 epoch: blockhash (32 bytes) and block number (~4 bytes)
    • timestamp (~4 bytes)
  • The organization of block data is inefficient:
    • Similar attributes are far apart, diminishing any chances of effective compression.
    • Random data like hashes are positioned in-between the more compressible application data.
  • The RLP encoding of the data adds unnecessary overhead
    • The outer list does not have to be length encoded, the attributes are known
    • Fixed-length attributes do not need any encoding
    • The batch-format is static and can be optimized further
  • Remaining meta-data for consistency checks can be optimized further:
    • The metadata only needs to be secure for consistency checks. E.g. 20 bytes of a hash may be enough.

Span-batches address these inefficiencies, with a new batch format version.

Span batch format

Note that span-batches, unlike previous singular batches, encode a range of consecutive L2 blocks at the same time.

Introduce version 1 to the batch-format table:

1prefix ++ payload


  • ++: concatenation of byte-strings
  • span_start: first L2 block in the span
  • span_end: last L2 block in the span
  • uvarint: unsigned Base128 varint, as defined in protobuf spec
  • rlp_encode: a function that encodes a batch according to the RLP format, and [x, y, z] denotes a list containing items x, y and z

Standard bitlists, in the context of span-batches, are encoded as big-endian integers, left-padded with zeroes to the next multiple of 8 bits.


  • prefix = rel_timestamp ++ l1_origin_num ++ parent_check ++ l1_origin_check
    • rel_timestamp: uvarint relative timestamp since L2 genesis, i.e. span_start.timestamp - config.genesis.timestamp.
    • l1_origin_num: uvarint number of last l1 origin number. i.e. span_end.l1_origin.number
    • parent_check: first 20 bytes of parent hash, the hash is truncated to 20 bytes for efficiency, i.e. span_start.parent_hash[:20].
    • l1_origin_check: the block hash of the last L1 origin is referenced. The hash is truncated to 20 bytes for efficiency, i.e. span_end.l1_origin.hash[:20].
  • payload = block_count ++ origin_bits ++ block_tx_counts ++ txs:
    • block_count: uvarint number of L2 blocks. This is at least 1, empty span batches are invalid.
    • origin_bits: standard bitlist of block_count bits: 1 bit per L2 block, indicating if the L1 origin changed this L2 block.
    • block_tx_counts: for each block, a uvarint of len(block.transactions).
    • txs: L2 transactions which is reorganized and encoded as below.
  • txs = contract_creation_bits ++ y_parity_bits ++ tx_sigs ++ tx_tos ++ tx_datas ++ tx_nonces ++ tx_gases ++ protected_bits
    • contract_creation_bits: standard bitlist of sum(block_tx_counts) bits: 1 bit per L2 transactions, indicating if transaction is a contract creation transaction.
    • y_parity_bits: standard bitlist of sum(block_tx_counts) bits: 1 bit per L2 transactions, indicating the y parity value when recovering transaction sender address.
    • tx_sigs: concatenated list of transaction signatures
      • r is encoded as big-endian uint256
      • s is encoded as big-endian uint256
    • tx_tos: concatenated list of to field. to field in contract creation transaction will be nil and ignored.
    • tx_datas: concatenated list of variable length rlp encoded data, matching the encoding of the fields as in the EIP-2718 format of the TransactionType.
      • legacy: rlp_encode(value, gasPrice, data)
      • 1: (EIP-2930): 0x01 ++ rlp_encode(value, gasPrice, data, accessList)
      • 2: (EIP-1559): 0x02 ++ rlp_encode(value, max_priority_fee_per_gas, max_fee_per_gas, data, access_list)
    • tx_nonces: concatenated list of uvarint of nonce field.
    • tx_gases: concatenated list of uvarint of gas limits.
    • protected_bits: standard bitlist of length of number of legacy transactions: 1 bit per L2 legacy transactions, indicating if transaction is protected(EIP-155) or not.

Span Batch Size Limits

The total size of an encoded span batch is limited to MAX_RLP_BYTES_PER_CHANNEL, which is defined in the Protocol Parameters table. This is done at the channel level rather than at the span batch level.

In addition to the byte limit, the number of blocks, and total transactions is limited to MAX_SPAN_BATCH_ELEMENT_COUNT. This does imply that the max number of transactions per block is also MAX_SPAN_BATCH_ELEMENT_COUNT. MAX_SPAN_BATCH_ELEMENT_COUNT is defined in Protocol Parameters table.

Future batch-format extension

This is an experimental extension of the span-batch format, and not activated with the Delta upgrade yet.

Introduce version 2 to the batch-format table:

2prefix ++ payload


  • prefix = rel_timestamp ++ l1_origin_num ++ parent_check ++ l1_origin_check:
    • Identical to batch_version 1
  • payload = block_count ++ origin_bits ++ block_tx_counts ++ txs ++ fee_recipients:
    • An empty span-batch, i.e. with block_count == 0, is invalid and must not be processed.
    • Every field definition identical to batch_version 1 except that fee_recipients is added to support more decentralized sequencing.
    • fee_recipients = fee_recipients_idxs + fee_recipients_set
      • fee_recipients_set: concatenated list of unique L2 fee recipient address.
      • fee_recipients_idxs: for each block, uvarint number of index to decode fee recipients from fee_recipients_set.

Span Batch Activation Rule

The span batch upgrade is activated based on timestamp.

Activation Rule: upgradeTime != null && span_start.l1_origin.timestamp >= upgradeTime

span_start.l1_origin.timestamp is the L1 origin block timestamp of the first block in the span batch. This rule ensures that every chain activity regarding this span batch is done after the hard fork. i.e. Every block in the span is created, submitted to the L1, and derived from the L1 after the hard fork.

Optimization Strategies

Truncating information and storing only necessary data

The following fields stores truncated data:

  • rel_timestamp: We can save two bytes by storing rel_timestamp instead of the full span_start.timestamp.
  • parent_check and l1_origin_check: We can save twelve bytes by truncating twelve bytes from the full hash, while having enough safety.

tx_data_headers removal from initial specs

We do not need to store length per each tx_datas elements even if those are variable length, because the elements itself is RLP encoded, containing their length in RLP prefix.

Chain ID removal from initial specs

Every transaction has chain id. We do not need to include chain id in span batch because L2 already knows its chain id, and use its own value for processing span batches while derivation.

Reorganization of constant length transaction fields

signature, nonce, gaslimit, to field are constant size, so these were split up completely and are grouped into individual arrays. This adds more complexity, but organizes data for improved compression by grouping data with similar data pattern.

RLP encoding for only variable length fields

Further size optimization can be done by packing variable length fields, such as access_list. However, doing this will introduce much more code complexity, compared to benefiting from size reduction.

Our goal is to find the sweet spot on code complexity - span batch size tradeoff. I decided that using RLP for all variable length fields will be the best option, not risking codebase with gnarly custom encoding/decoding implementations.

Store y_parity and protected_bit instead of v

Only legacy type transactions can be optionally protected. If protected(EIP-155), v = 2 * ChainID + 35 + y_parity. Else, v = 27 + y_parity. For other types of transactions, v = y_parity. We store y_parity, which is single bit per L2 transaction. We store protected_bit, which is single bit per L2 legacy type transactions to indicate that tx is protected.

This optimization will benefit more when ratio between number of legacy type transactions over number of transactions excluding deposit tx is higher. Deposit transactions are excluded in batches and are never written at L1 so excluded while analyzing.

Adjust txs Data Layout for Better Compression

There are (8 choose 2) * 6! = 20160 permutations of ordering fields of txs. It is not 8! because contract_creation_bits must be first decoded in order to decode tx_tos. We experimented with different data layouts and found that segregating random data (tx_sigs, tx_tos, tx_datas) from the rest most improved the zlib compression ratio.

fee_recipients Encoding Scheme

Let K := number of unique fee recipients(cardinality) per span batch. Let N := number of L2 blocks. If we naively encode each fee recipients by concatenating every fee recipients, it will need 20 * N bytes. If we manage fee_recipients_idxs and fee_recipients_set, It will need at most max uvarint size * N = 8 * N, 20 * K bytes each. If 20 * N > 8 * N + 20 * K then maintaining an index of fee recipients is reduces the size.

we thought sequencer rotation happens not much often, so assumed that K will be much lesser than N. The assumption makes upper inequality to hold. Therefore, we decided to manage fee_recipients_idxs and fee_recipients_set separately. This adds complexity but reduces data.

How Derivation works with Span Batches

  • Block Timestamp
    • The first L2 block's block timestamp is rel_timestamp + L2Genesis.Timestamp.
    • Then we can derive other blocks timestamp by adding L2 block time for each.
  • L1 Origin Number
    • The parent of the first L2 block's L1 origin number is l1_origin_num - sum(origin_bits)
    • Then we can derive other blocks' L1 origin number with origin_bits
    • ith block's L1 origin number = (i-1)th block's L1 origin number + (origin_bits[i] ? 1 : 0)
  • L1 Origin Hash
    • We only need the l1_origin_check, the truncated L1 origin hash of the last L2 block of Span Batch.
    • If the last block references canonical L1 chain as its origin, we can ensure the all other blocks' origins are consistent with the canonical L1 chain.
  • Parent hash
    • In V0 Batch spec, we need batch's parent hash to validate if batch's parent is consistent with current L2 safe head.
    • But in the case of Span Batch, because it contains consecutive L2 blocks in the span, we do not need to validate all blocks' parent hash except the first block.
  • Transactions
    • Deposit transactions can be derived from its L1 origin, identical with V0 batch.
    • User transactions can be derived by following way:
      • Recover V value of TX signature from y_parity_bits and L2 chain id, as described in optimization strategies.
      • When parsing tx_tos, contract_creation_bits is used to determine if the TX has to value or not.


Channel Reader (Batch Decoding)

The Channel Reader decodes the span-batch, as described in the span-batch format.

A set of derived attributes is computed as described above. Then cached with the decoded result:

Batch Queue

A span-batch is buffered as a singular large batch, by its starting timestamp (transformed rel_timestamp).

Span-batches share the same queue with v0 batches: batches are processed in L1 inclusion order.

A set of modified validation rules apply to the span-batches.

Rules are enforced with the contextual definitions as v0-batch validation: epoch, inclusion_block_number, next_timestamp


  • batch as defined in the Span batch format section.
  • prev_l2_block is the L2 block from the current safe chain, whose timestamp is at span_start.timestamp - l2_block_time

Span-batch rules, in validation order:

  • batch_origin is determined like with singular batches:
    • batch.epoch_num == epoch.number+1:
      • If next_epoch is not known -> undecided: i.e. a batch that changes the L1 origin cannot be processed until we have the L1 origin data.
      • If known, then define batch_origin as next_epoch
  • batch_origin.timestamp < span_batch_upgrade_timestamp -> drop: i.e. enforce the span batch upgrade activation rule.
  • span_start.timestamp > next_timestamp -> future: i.e. the batch must be ready to process, but does not have to start exactly at the next_timestamp, since it can overlap with previously processed blocks,
  • span_end.timestamp < next_timestamp -> drop: i.e. the batch must have at least one new block to process.
  • If there's no prev_l2_block in the current safe chain -> drop: i.e. the timestamp must be aligned.
  • batch.parent_check != prev_l2_block.hash[:20] -> drop: i.e. the checked part of the parent hash must be equal to the same part of the corresponding L2 block hash.
  • Sequencing-window checks:
    • Note: The sequencing window is enforced for the batch as a whole: if the batch was partially invalid instead, it would drop the oldest L2 blocks, which makes the later L2 blocks invalid.
    • Variables:
      • origin_changed_bit = origin_bits[0]: true if the first L2 block changed its L1 origin, false otherwise.
      • start_epoch_num = batch.l1_origin_num - sum(origin_bits) + (origin_changed_bit ? 1 : 0)
      • end_epoch_num = batch.l1_origin_num
    • Rules:
      • start_epoch_num + sequence_window_size < inclusion_block_number -> drop: i.e. the batch must be included timely.
      • start_epoch_num > prev_l2_block.l1_origin.number + 1 -> drop: i.e. the L1 origin cannot change by more than one L1 block per L2 block.
      • If batch.l1_origin_check does not match the canonical L1 chain at end_epoch_num -> drop: verify the batch is intended for this L1 chain.
        • After upper l1_origin_check check is passed, we don't need to check if the origin is past inclusion_block_number because of the following invariant.
        • Invariant: the epoch-num in the batch is always less than the inclusion block number, if and only if the L1 epoch hash is correct.
      • start_epoch_num < prev_l2_block.l1_origin.number -> drop: epoch number cannot be older than the origin of parent block
  • Max Sequencer time-drift checks:
    • Note: The max time-drift is enforced for the batch as a whole, to keep the possible output variants small.
    • Variables:
      • block_input: an L2 block from the span-batch, with L1 origin as derived from the origin_bits and now established canonical L1 chain.
      • next_epoch: block_input.origin's next L1 block. It may reach to the next origin outside the L1 origins of the span.
    • Rules:
      • For each block_input whose timestamp is greater than safe_head.timestamp:
        • block_input.timestamp < block_input.origin.time -> drop: enforce the min L2 timestamp rule.
        • block_input.timestamp > block_input.origin.time + max_sequencer_drift: enforce the L2 timestamp drift rule, but with exceptions to preserve above min L2 timestamp invariant:
          • len(block_input.transactions) == 0:
            • origin_bits[i] == 0: i is the index of block_input in the span batch. So this implies the block_input did not advance the L1 origin, and must thus be checked against next_epoch.
              • If next_epoch is not known -> undecided: without the next L1 origin we cannot yet determine if time invariant could have been kept.
              • If block_input.timestamp >= next_epoch.time -> drop: the batch could have adopted the next L1 origin without breaking the L2 time >= L1 time invariant.
          • len(block_input.transactions) > 0: -> drop: when exceeding the sequencer time drift, never allow the sequencer to include transactions.
  • And for all transactions:
    • drop if the batch.tx_datas list contains a transaction that is invalid or derived by other means exclusively:
      • any transaction that is empty (zero length tx_data)
      • any deposited transactions (identified by the transaction type prefix byte in tx_data)
  • Overlapped blocks checks:
    • Note: If the span batch overlaps the current L2 safe chain, we must validate all overlapped blocks.
    • Variables:
      • block_input: an L2 block derived from the span-batch.
      • safe_block: an L2 block from the current L2 safe chain, at same timestamp as block_input
    • Rules:
      • For each block_input, whose timestamp is less than next_timestamp:
        • block_input.l1_origin.number != safe_block.l1_origin.number -> drop
        • block_input.transactions != safe_block.transactions -> drop
          • compare excluding deposit transactions

Once validated, the batch-queue then emits a block-input for each of the blocks included in the span-batch. The next derivation stage is thus only aware of individual block inputs, similar to the previous V0 batch, although not strictly a "v0 batch" anymore.


Instead of transforming L2 blocks into batches, the blocks should be buffered to form a span-batch.

Ideally the L2 blocks are buffered as block-inputs, to maximize the span of blocks covered by the span-batch: span-batches of single L2 blocks do not increase efficiency as much as with larger spans.

This means that the (c *channelBuilder) AddBlock function is changed to not directly call (co *ChannelOut) AddBatch but defer that until a minimum number of blocks have been buffered.

Output-size estimation of the queued up blocks is not possible until the span-batch is written to the channel. Past a given number of blocks, the channel may be written for estimation, and then re-written if more blocks arrive.

The batcher functionality stays the same otherwise: unsafe blocks are transformed into batches, encoded in compressed channels, and then split into frames for submission to L1. Batcher implementations can implement different heuristics and re-attempts to build the most gas-efficient data-txs.

Ecotone Network Upgrade

Table of Contents

The Ecotone upgrade contains the Dencun upgrade from L1, and adopts EIP-4844 blobs for data-availability.

Execution Layer

Consensus Layer

Fjord Network Upgrade

Table of Contents

This document is not finalized and should be considered experimental.

Execution Layer

Consensus Layer

L2 Execution Engine

Table of Contents


L1-Cost fees (L1 Fee Vault)

Fjord L1-Cost fee changes (FastLZ estimator)

Fjord updates the L1 cost calculation function to use a FastLZ-based compression estimator. The L1 cost is computed as:

l1FeeScaled = baseFeeScalar*l1BaseFee*16 + blobFeeScalar*l1BlobBaseFee
estimatedSizeScaled = max(minTransactionSize * 1e6, intercept + fastlzCoef*fastlzSize)
l1Cost = estimatedSizeScaled * l1FeeScaled / 1e12

The final l1Cost computation is an unlimited precision unsigned integer computation, with the result in Wei and having uint256 range. The values in this computation, are as follows:

Input argTypeDescriptionValue
l1BaseFeeuint256L1 base fee of the latest L1 origin registered in the L2 chainvaries, L1 fee
l1BlobBaseFeeuint256Blob gas price of the latest L1 origin registered in the L2 chainvaries, L1 fee
fastlzSizeuint256Size of the FastLZ-compressed RLP-encoded signed txvaries, per transaction
baseFeeScalaruint32L1 base fee scalar, scaled by 1e6varies, L2 configuration
blobFeeScalaruint32L1 blob fee scalar, scaled by 1e6varies, L2 configuration
interceptint32Intercept constant, scaled by 1e6 (can be negative)-42_585_600
fastlzCoefuint32FastLZ coefficient, scaled by 1e6836_500
minTransactionSizeuint32A lower bound on transaction size, in bytes100

Previously, baseFeeScalar and blobFeeScalar were used to encode the compression ratio, due to the inaccuracy of the L1 cost function. However, the new cost function takes into account the compression ratio, so these scalars should be adjusted to account for any previous compression ratio they encoded.

FastLZ Implementation

All compression algorithms must be implemented equivalently to the fastlz_compress function in fastlz.c at the following commit.

L1-Cost linear regression details

The intercept and fastlzCoef constants are calculated by linear regression using a dataset of previous L2 transactions. The dataset is generated by iterating over all transactions in a given time range, and performing the following actions. For each transaction:

  1. Compress the payload using FastLZ. Record the size of the compressed payload as fastlzSize.
  2. Emulate the change in batch size adding the transaction to a batch, compressed with Brotli 10. Record the change in batch size as bestEstimateSize.

Once this dataset is generated, a linear regression can be calculated using the bestEstimateSize as the dependent variable and fastlzSize as the independent variable.

We generated a dataset from two weeks of post-Ecotone transactions on Optimism Mainnet, as we found that was the most representative of performance across multiple chains and time periods. More details on the linear regression and datasets used can be found in this repository.

L1 Gas Usage Estimation

The L1GasUsed property on the transaction receipt is updated to take into account the improvement in compression estimation accuracy. The value will be calculated by multiplying the estimatedSizeScaled of the transaction from the above L1 cost formula by 16. The value of 16 assumes most of the bytes in the compressed data are non-zero.

The L1GasUsed property is deprecated due to it not capturing the L1 blob gas used by a transaction, and will be removed in a future network upgrade. Users can continue to use the L1Fee field to retrieve the L1 fee for a given transaction.

Fjord L2 Chain Derivation Changes

Table of Contents

Protocol Parameter Changes

The following table gives an overview of the changes in parameters.

ParameterPre-Fjord (default) valueFjord valueNotes
max_sequencer_drift6001800Was a protocol parameter since Bedrock. Now becomes a constant.
MAX_RLP_BYTES_PER_CHANNEL10,000,000100,000,000Protocol Constant is increasing.
MAX_CHANNEL_BANK_SIZE100,000,0001,000,000,000Protocol Constant is increasing.

Timestamp Activation

Fjord, like other network upgrades, is activated at a timestamp. Changes to the L2 Block execution rules are applied when the L2 Timestamp >= activation time. Changes to derivation are applied when it is considering data from a L1 Block whose timestamp is greater than or equal to the activation timestamp. The change of the max_sequencer_drift parameter activates with the L1 origin block timestamp.

If Fjord is not activated at genesis, it must be activated at least one block after the Ecotone activation block. This ensures that the network upgrade transactions don't conflict.

Constant Maximum Sequencer Drift

With Fjord, the max_sequencer_drift parameter becomes a constant of value 1800 seconds, translating to a fixed maximum sequencer drift of 30 minutes.

Before Fjord, this was a chain parameter that was set once at chain creation, with a default value of 600 seconds, i.e., 10 minutes. Most chains use this value currently.


Discussions amongst chain operators came to the unilateral conclusion that a larger value than the current default would be easier to work with. If a sequencer's L1 connection breaks, this drift value determines how long it can still produce blocks without violating the timestamp drift derivation rules.

It was furthermore agreed that configurability after this increase is not important. So it is being made a constant. An alternative idea that is being considered for a future hardfork is to make this an L1-configurable protocol parameter via the SystemConfig update mechanism.

Security Considerations

The rules around the activation time are deliberately being kept simple, so no other logic needs to be applied other than to change the parameter to a constant. The first Fjord block would in theory accept older L1-origin timestamps than its predecessor. However, since the L1 origin timestamp must also increase, the only noteworthy scenario that can happen is that the first few Fjord blocks will be in the same epoch as the the last pre-Fjord blocks, even if these blocks would not be allowed to have these L1-origin timestamps according to pre-Fjord rules. So the same L1 timestamp would be shared within a pre- and post-Fjord mixed epoch. This is considered a feature and is not considered a security issue.


With Fjord, MAX_RLP_BYTES_PER_CHANNEL will be increased from 10,000,000 bytes to 100,000,000 bytes, and MAX_CHANNEL_BANK_SIZE will be increased from 100,000,000 bytes to 1,000,000,000 bytes.

The usage of MAX_RLP_BYTES_PER_CHANNEL is defined in Channel Format. The usage of MAX_CHANNEL_BANK_SIZE is defined in Channel Bank Pruning.

Span Batches previously had a limit MAX_SPAN_BATCH_SIZE which was equal to MAX_RLP_BYTES_PER_CHANNEL. Fjord creates a new constant MAX_SPAN_BATCH_ELEMENT_COUNT for the element count limit & removes MAX_SPAN_BATCH_SIZE. The size of the channel is still checked with MAX_RLP_BYTES_PER_CHANNEL.

The new value will be used when the timestamp of the L1 origin of the derivation pipeline >= the Fjord activation timestamp.


A block with a gas limit of 30 Million gas has a maximum theoretical size of 7.5 Megabytes by being filled up with transactions have only zeroes. Currently, a byte with the value 0 consumes 4 gas. If the block gas limit is raised above 40 Million gas, it is possible to create a block that is large than MAX_RLP_BYTES_PER_CHANNEL. L2 blocks cannot be split across channels which means that a block that is larger than MAX_RLP_BYTES_PER_CHANNEL cannot be batch submitted. By raising this limit to 100,000,000 bytes, we can batch submit blocks with a gas limit of up to 400 Million Gas. In addition, we are able to improve compression ratios by increasing the amount of data that can be inserted into a single channel. With 33% compression ratio over 6 blobs, we are currently submitting 2.2 MB of compressed data & 0.77 MB of uncompressed data per channel. This will allow use to use up to approximately 275 blobs per channel.

Raising MAX_CHANNEL_BANK_SIZE is helpful to ensure that we are able to process these larger channels. We retain the same ratio of 10 between MAX_RLP_BYTES_PER_CHANNEL and MAX_CHANNEL_BANK_SIZE.

Security Considerations

Raising the these limits increases the amount of resources a rollup node would require. Specifically nodes may have to allocate large chunks of memory for a channel and will have to potentially allocate more memory to the channel bank. MAX_RLP_BYTES_PER_CHANNEL was originally added to avoid zip bomb attacks. The system is still exposed to these attacks, but these limits are straightforward to handle in a node.

The Fault Proof environment is more constrained than a typical node and increasing these limits will require more resources than are currently required. The change in MAX_CHANNEL_BANK_SIZE is not relevant to the first implementation of Fault Proofs because this limit only tells the node when to start pruning & once memory is allocated in the FPVM, it is not garbage collected. This means that increasing MAX_CHANNEL_BANK_SIZE does not increase the maximum resource usage of the FPP.

Increasing MAX_RLP_BYTES_PER_CHANNEL could cause more resource usage in FPVM; however, we consider this increase reasonable because this increase is in the amount of data handled at once rather than the total amount of data handled in the program. Instead of using a single channel, the batcher could submit 10 channels prior to this change which would cause the Fault Proof Program to consume a very similar amount of resources.

Brotli Channel Compression

Fjord introduces a new versioned channel encoding format to support alternate compression algorithms, with the legacy channel format remaining supported. The versioned format is as follows:

channel_encoding = `channel_version_byte ++ compress(rlp_batches)`

The channel_version_byte must never have its 4 lower order bits set to 0b1000 = 8 or 0b1111 = 15, which are reserved for usage by the header byte of zlib encoded data (see page 5 of RFC-1950). This allows a channel decoder to determine if a channel encoding is legacy or versioned format by testing for these bit values. If the channel encoding is determined to be versioned format, the only valid channel_version_byte is 1, which indicates compress() is the Brotli compression algorithm (as specified in RFC-7932) with no custom dictionary.

Network upgrade automation transactions

The Fjord hardfork activation block contains the following transactions, in this order:

  • L1 Attributes Transaction
  • User deposits from L1
  • Network Upgrade Transactions
    • GasPriceOracle deployment
    • Update GasPriceOracle Proxy ERC-1967 Implementation Slot
    • GasPriceOracle Enable Fjord

To not modify or interrupt the system behavior around gas computation, this block will not include any sequenced transactions by setting noTxPool: true.

GasPriceOracle Deployment

The GasPriceOracle contract is upgraded to support the new Fjord L1 data fee computation. Post fork this contract will use FastLZ to compute the L1 data fee.

To perform this upgrade, a deposit transaction is derived with the following attributes:

  • from: 0x4210000000000000000000000000000000000002
  • to: null,
  • mint: 0
  • value: 0
  • gasLimit: 1,450,000
  • data: 0x60806040523... (full bytecode)
  • sourceHash: 0x86122c533fdcb89b16d8713174625e44578a89751d96c098ec19ab40a51a8ea3 computed with the "Upgrade-deposited" type, with `intent = "Fjord: Gas Price Oracle Deployment"

This results in the Fjord GasPriceOracle contract being deployed to 0xa919894851548179A0750865e7974DA599C0Fac7, to verify:

cast compute-address --nonce=0 0x4210000000000000000000000000000000000002
Computed Address: 0xa919894851548179A0750865e7974DA599C0Fac7

Verify sourceHash:

cast keccak $(cast concat-hex 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 $(cast keccak "Fjord: Gas Price Oracle Deployment"))
# 0x86122c533fdcb89b16d8713174625e44578a89751d96c098ec19ab40a51a8ea3

Verify data:

git checkout 52abfb507342191ae1f960b443ae8aec7598755c
pnpm clean && pnpm install && pnpm build
jq -r ".bytecode.object" packages/contracts-bedrock/forge-artifacts/GasPriceOracle.sol/GasPriceOracle.json

This transaction MUST deploy a contract with the following code hash 0xa88fa50a2745b15e6794247614b5298483070661adacb8d32d716434ed24c6b2.

GasPriceOracle Proxy Update

This transaction updates the GasPriceOracle Proxy ERC-1967 implementation slot to point to the new GasPriceOracle deployment.

A deposit transaction is derived with the following attributes:

  • from: 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
  • to: 0x420000000000000000000000000000000000000F (Gas Price Oracle Proxy)
  • mint: 0
  • value: 0
  • gasLimit: 50,000
  • data: 0x3659cfe6000000000000000000000000a919894851548179a0750865e7974da599c0fac7
  • sourceHash: 0x1e6bb0c28bfab3dc9b36ffb0f721f00d6937f33577606325692db0965a7d58c6 computed with the "Upgrade-deposited" type, with intent = "Fjord: Gas Price Oracle Proxy Update"

Verify data:

cast concat-hex $(cast sig "upgradeTo(address)") $(cast abi-encode "upgradeTo(address)" 0xa919894851548179A0750865e7974DA599C0Fac7)
# 0x3659cfe6000000000000000000000000a919894851548179a0750865e7974da599c0fac7

Verify sourceHash:

cast keccak $(cast concat-hex 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 $(cast keccak "Fjord: Gas Price Oracle Proxy Update"))
# 0x1e6bb0c28bfab3dc9b36ffb0f721f00d6937f33577606325692db0965a7d58c6

GasPriceOracle Enable Fjord

This transaction informs the GasPriceOracle to start using the Fjord gas calculation formula.

A deposit transaction is derived with the following attributes:

  • from: 0xDeaDDEaDDeAdDeAdDEAdDEaddeAddEAdDEAd0001 (Depositer Account)
  • to: 0x420000000000000000000000000000000000000F (Gas Price Oracle Proxy)
  • mint: 0
  • value: 0
  • gasLimit: 90,000
  • data: 0x8e98b106
  • sourceHash: 0xbac7bb0d5961cad209a345408b0280a0d4686b1b20665e1b0f9cdafd73b19b6b, computed with the "Upgrade-deposited" type, with `intent = "Fjord: Gas Price Oracle Set Fjord"

Verify data:

cast sig "setFjord()"

Verify sourceHash:

cast keccak $(cast concat-hex 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 $(cast keccak "Fjord: Gas Price Oracle Set Fjord"))
# 0xbac7bb0d5961cad209a345408b0280a0d4686b1b20665e1b0f9cdafd73b19b6b


Table of Contents


Following the Fjord upgrade, three additional values used for L1 fee computation are:

  • costIntercept
  • costFastlzCoef
  • minTransactionSize

These values are hard-coded constants in the GasPriceOracle contract. The calculation follows the same formula outlined in the Fjord L1-Cost fee changes (FastLZ estimator) section.

A new method is introduced: getL1FeeUpperBound(uint256). This method returns an upper bound for the L1 fee for a given transaction size. It is provided for callers who wish to estimate L1 transaction costs in the write path, and is much more gas efficient than getL1Fee.

The upper limit overhead is assumed to be original/255+16, borrowed from LZ4. According to historical data, this approach can encompass more than 99.99% of transactions.

This is implemented as follows:

function getL1FeeUpperBound(uint256 unsignedTxSize) external view returns (uint256) {
    // Add 68 to account for unsigned tx
    uint256 txSize = unsignedTxSize + 68;
    // txSize / 255 + 16 is the pratical fastlz upper-bound covers 99.99% txs.
    uint256 flzUpperBound = txSize + txSize / 255 + 16;

    int256 estimatedSize = costIntercept + costFastlzCoef * flzUpperBound;
    if (estimatedSize < minTransactionSize) {
        estimatedSize = minTransactionSize;
    uint256 l1FeeScaled = baseFeeScalar() * l1BaseFee() * 16 + blobBaseFeeScalar() * blobBaseFee();
    return uint256(estimatedSize) * feeScaled / (10 ** (DECIMALS * 2));

L1 Gas Usage Estimation

The getL1GasUsed method is updated to take into account the improved compression estimation accuracy as part of the Fjord upgrade.

function getL1GasUsed(bytes memory _data) public view returns (uint256) {
    if (isFjord) {
      // Add 68 to the size to account for the unsigned tx
      int256 flzSize = LibZip.flzCompress(_data).length + 68;

      int256 estimatedSize = costIntercept + costFastlzCoef * flzSize;
      if (estimatedSize < minTransactionSize) {
        estimatedSize = minTransactionSize;

      // Assume the compressed data is mostly non-zero, and would pay 16 gas per calldata byte
      return estimatedSize * 16;
    // ...

The getL1GasUsed method is deprecated as of Fjord because it does not capture that there are two kinds of gas being consumed due to the introduction of blobs. This function will revert when called in a future upgrade.

Users can continue to use the getL1Fee method to estimate the L1 fee for a given transaction, or the new getL1FeeUpperBound method introduced by Fjord as a lower gas alternative.

Standard Bridges

Table of Contents


The standard bridges are responsible for allowing cross domain ETH and ERC20 token transfers. They are built on top of the cross domain messenger contracts and give a standard interface for depositing tokens.

The bridge works for both L1 native tokens and L2 native tokens. The legacy API is preserved to ensure that existing applications will not experience any problems with the Bedrock StandardBridge contracts.

The L2StandardBridge is a predeploy contract located at 0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000010.

interface StandardBridge {
    event ERC20BridgeFinalized(address indexed localToken, address indexed remoteToken, address indexed from, address to, uint256 amount, bytes extraData);
    event ERC20BridgeInitiated(address indexed localToken, address indexed remoteToken, address indexed from, address to, uint256 amount, bytes extraData);
    event ETHBridgeFinalized(address indexed from, address indexed to, uint256 amount, bytes extraData);
    event ETHBridgeInitiated(address indexed from, address indexed to, uint256 amount, bytes extraData);

    function bridgeERC20(address _localToken, address _remoteToken, uint256 _amount, uint32 _minGasLimit, bytes memory _extraData) external;
    function bridgeERC20To(address _localToken, address _remoteToken, address _to, uint256 _amount, uint32 _minGasLimit, bytes memory _extraData) external;
    function bridgeETH(uint32 _minGasLimit, bytes memory _extraData) payable external;
    function bridgeETHTo(address _to, uint32 _minGasLimit, bytes memory _extraData) payable external;
    function deposits(address, address) view external returns (uint256);
    function finalizeBridgeERC20(address _localToken, address _remoteToken, address _from, address _to, uint256 _amount, bytes memory _extraData) external;
    function finalizeBridgeETH(address _from, address _to, uint256 _amount, bytes memory _extraData) payable external;
    function messenger() view external returns (address);
    function OTHER_BRIDGE() view external returns (address);

Token Depositing

The bridgeERC20 function is used to send a token from one domain to another domain. An OptimismMintableERC20 token contract must exist on the remote domain to be able to deposit tokens to that domain. One of these tokens can be deployed using the OptimismMintableERC20Factory contract.


Both the L1 and L2 standard bridges should be behind upgradable proxies.

Cross Domain Messengers

Table of Contents


The cross domain messengers are responsible for providing a higher level API for developers who are interested in sending cross domain messages. They allow for the ability to replay cross domain messages and sit directly on top of the lower level system contracts responsible for cross domain messaging on L1 and L2.

The CrossDomainMessenger is extended to create both an L1CrossDomainMessenger as well as a L2CrossDomainMessenger. These contracts are then extended with their legacy APIs to provide backwards compatibility for applications that integrated before the Bedrock system upgrade.

The L2CrossDomainMessenger is a predeploy contract located at 0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000007.

The base CrossDomainMessenger interface is:

interface CrossDomainMessenger {
    event FailedRelayedMessage(bytes32 indexed msgHash);
    event RelayedMessage(bytes32 indexed msgHash);
    event SentMessage(address indexed target, address sender, bytes message, uint256 messageNonce, uint256 gasLimit);
    event SentMessageExtension1(address indexed sender, uint256 value);

    function MESSAGE_VERSION() external view returns (uint16);
    function MIN_GAS_CALLDATA_OVERHEAD() external view returns (uint64);
    function MIN_GAS_CONSTANT_OVERHEAD() external view returns (uint64);
    function MIN_GAS_DYNAMIC_OVERHEAD_DENOMINATOR() external view returns (uint64);
    function MIN_GAS_DYNAMIC_OVERHEAD_NUMERATOR() external view returns (uint64);
    function OTHER_MESSENGER() external view returns (address);
    function baseGas(bytes memory _message, uint32 _minGasLimit) external pure returns (uint64);
    function failedMessages(bytes32) external view returns (bool);
    function messageNonce() external view returns (uint256);
    function relayMessage(
        uint256 _nonce,
        address _sender,
        address _target,
        uint256 _value,
        uint256 _minGasLimit,
        bytes memory _message
    ) external payable;
    function sendMessage(address _target, bytes memory _message, uint32 _minGasLimit) external payable;
    function successfulMessages(bytes32) external view returns (bool);
    function xDomainMessageSender() external view returns (address);

Message Passing

The sendMessage function is used to send a cross domain message. To trigger the execution on the other side, the relayMessage function is called. Successful messages have their hash stored in the successfulMessages mapping while unsuccessful messages have their hash stored in the failedMessages mapping.

The user experience when sending from L1 to L2 is a bit different than when sending a transaction from L2 to L1. When going into L1 from L2, the user does not need to call relayMessage on L2 themselves. The user pays for L2 gas on L1 and the transaction is automatically pulled into L2 where it is executed on L2. When going from L2 into L1, the user proves their withdrawal on OptimismPortal, then waits for the finalization window to pass, and then finalizes the withdrawal on the OptimismPortal, which calls relayMessage on the L1CrossDomainMessenger to finalize the withdrawal.


The L1 and L2 cross domain messengers should be deployed behind upgradable proxies. This will allow for updating the message version.

Message Versioning

Messages are versioned based on the first 2 bytes of their nonce. Depending on the version, messages can have a different serialization and hashing scheme. The first two bytes of the nonce are reserved for version metadata because a version field was not originally included in the messages themselves, but a uint256 nonce is so large that we can very easily pack additional data into that field.

Message Version 0


Message Version 1


Backwards Compatibility Notes

An older version of the messenger contracts had the concept of blocked messages in a blockedMessages mapping. This functionality was removed from the messengers because a smart attacker could get around any message blocking attempts. It also saves gas on finalizing withdrawals.

The concept of a "relay id" and the relayedMessages mapping was removed. It was built as a way to be able to fund third parties who relayed messages on the behalf of users, but it was improperly implemented as it was impossible to know if the relayed message actually succeeded.


Table of Contents


Deposited transactions, also known as deposits are transactions which are initiated on L1, and executed on L2. This document outlines a new transaction type for deposits. It also describes how deposits are initiated on L1, along with the authorization and validation conditions on L2.

Vocabulary note: deposited transaction refers specifically to an L2 transaction, while deposit can refer to the transaction at various stages (for instance when it is deposited on L1).

The Deposited Transaction Type

Deposited transactions have the following notable distinctions from existing transaction types:

  1. They are derived from Layer 1 blocks, and must be included as part of the protocol.
  2. They do not include signature validation (see User-Deposited Transactions for the rationale).
  3. They buy their L2 gas on L1 and, as such, the L2 gas is not refundable.

We define a new EIP-2718 compatible transaction type with the prefix 0x7E to represent a deposit transaction.

A deposit has the following fields (rlp encoded in the order they appear here):

  • bytes32 sourceHash: the source-hash, uniquely identifies the origin of the deposit.
  • address from: The address of the sender account.
  • address to: The address of the recipient account, or the null (zero-length) address if the deposited transaction is a contract creation.
  • uint256 mint: The ETH value to mint on L2.
  • uint256 value: The ETH value to send to the recipient account.
  • uint64 gas: The gas limit for the L2 transaction.
  • bool isSystemTx: If true, the transaction does not interact with the L2 block gas pool.
    • Note: boolean is disabled (enforced to be false) starting from the Regolith upgrade.
  • bytes data: The calldata.

In contrast to EIP-155 transactions, this transaction type:

  • Does not include a nonce, since it is identified by the sourceHash. API responses still include a nonce attribute:
    • Before Regolith: the nonce is always 0
    • With Regolith: the nonce is set to the depositNonce attribute of the corresponding transaction receipt.
  • Does not include signature information, and makes the from address explicit. API responses contain zeroed signature v, r, s values for backwards compatibility.
  • Includes new sourceHash, from, mint, and isSystemTx attributes. API responses contain these as additional fields.

We select 0x7E because transaction type identifiers are currently allowed to go up to 0x7F. Picking a high identifier minimizes the risk that the identifier will be used by another transaction type on the L1 chain in the future. We don't pick 0x7F itself in case it becomes used for a variable-length encoding scheme.

Source hash computation

The sourceHash of a deposit transaction is computed based on the origin:

  • User-deposited: keccak256(bytes32(uint256(0)), keccak256(l1BlockHash, bytes32(uint256(l1LogIndex)))). Where the l1BlockHash, and l1LogIndex all refer to the inclusion of the deposit log event on L1. l1LogIndex is the index of the deposit event log in the combined list of log events of the block.
  • L1 attributes deposited: keccak256(bytes32(uint256(1)), keccak256(l1BlockHash, bytes32(uint256(seqNumber)))). Where l1BlockHash refers to the L1 block hash of which the info attributes are deposited. And seqNumber = l2BlockNum - l2EpochStartBlockNum, where l2BlockNum is the L2 block number of the inclusion of the deposit tx in L2, and l2EpochStartBlockNum is the L2 block number of the first L2 block in the epoch.
  • Upgrade-deposited: keccak256(bytes32(uint256(2)), keccak256(intent)). Where intent is a UTF-8 byte string, identifying the upgrade intent.

Without a sourceHash in a deposit, two different deposited transactions could have the same exact hash.

The outer keccak256 hashes the actual uniquely identifying information with a domain, to avoid collisions between different types of sources.

We do not use the sender's nonce to ensure uniqueness because this would require an extra L2 EVM state read from the execution engine during block-derivation.

Kinds of Deposited Transactions

Although we define only one new transaction type, we can distinguish between two kinds of deposited transactions, based on their positioning in the L2 block:

  1. The first transaction MUST be a L1 attributes deposited transaction, followed by
  2. an array of zero-or-more user-deposited transactions submitted to the deposit feed contract on L1 (called OptimismPortal). User-deposited transactions are only present in the first block of a L2 epoch.

We only define a single new transaction type in order to minimize modifications to L1 client software, and complexity in general.

Validation and Authorization of Deposited Transactions

As noted above, the deposited transaction type does not include a signature for validation. Rather, authorization is handled by the L2 chain derivation process, which when correctly applied will only derive transactions with a from address attested to by the logs of the L1 deposit contract.


In order to execute a deposited transaction:

First, the balance of the from account MUST be increased by the amount of mint. This is unconditional, and does not revert on deposit failure.

Then, the execution environment for a deposited transaction is initialized based on the transaction's attributes, in exactly the same manner as it would be for an EIP-155 transaction.

The deposit transaction is processed exactly like a type-3 (EIP-1559) transaction, with the exception of:

  • No fee fields are verified: the deposit does not have any, as it pays for gas on L1.
  • No nonce field is verified: the deposit does not have any, it's uniquely identified by its sourceHash.
  • No access-list is processed: the deposit has no access-list, and it is thus processed as if the access-list is empty.
  • No check if from is an Externally Owner Account (EOA): the deposit is ensured not to be an EOA through L1 address masking, this may change in future L1 contract-deployments to e.g. enable an account-abstraction like mechanism.
  • Before the Regolith upgrade:
    • The execution output states a non-standard gas usage:
      • If isSystemTx is false: execution output states it uses gasLimit gas.
      • If isSystemTx is true: execution output states it uses 0 gas.
  • No gas is refunded as ETH. (either by not refunding or utilizing the fact the gas-price of the deposit is 0)
  • No transaction priority fee is charged. No payment is made to the block fee-recipient.
  • No L1-cost fee is charged, as deposits are derived from L1 and do not have to be submitted as data back to it.
  • No base fee is charged. The total base fee accounting does not change.

Note that this includes contract-deployment behavior like with regular transactions, and gas metering is the same (with the exception of fee related changes above), including metering of intrinsic gas.

Any non-EVM state-transition error emitted by the EVM execution is processed in a special way:

  • It is transformed into an EVM-error: i.e. the deposit will always be included, but its receipt will indicate a failure if it runs into a non-EVM state-transition error, e.g. failure to transfer the specified value amount of ETH due to insufficient account-balance.
  • The world state is rolled back to the start of the EVM processing, after the minting part of the deposit.
  • The nonce of from in the world state is incremented by 1, making the error equivalent to a native EVM failure. Note that a previous nonce increment may have happened during EVM processing, but this would be rolled back first.

Finally, after the above processing, the execution post-processing runs the same: i.e. the gas pool and receipt are processed identical to a regular transaction. Starting with the Regolith upgrade however, the receipt of deposit transactions is extended with an additional depositNonce value, storing the nonce value of the from sender as registered before the EVM processing.

Note that the gas used as stated by the execution output is subtracted from the gas pool, but this execution output value has special edge cases before the Regolith upgrade.

Note for application developers: because CALLER and ORIGIN are set to from, the semantics of using the tx.origin == msg.sender check will not work to determine whether or not a caller is an EOA during a deposit transaction. Instead, the check could only be useful for identifying the first call in the L2 deposit transaction. However this check does still satisfy the common case in which developers are using this check to ensure that the CALLER is unable to execute code before and after the call.

Nonce Handling

Despite the lack of signature validation, we still increment the nonce of the from account when a deposit transaction is executed. In the context of a deposit-only roll up, this is not necessary for transaction ordering or replay prevention, however it maintains consistency with the use of nonces during contract creation. It may also simplify integration with downstream tooling (such as wallets and block explorers).

Deposit Receipt

Transaction receipts use standard typing as per EIP-2718. The Deposit transaction receipt type is equal to a regular receipt, but extended with an optional depositNonce field.

The RLP-encoded consensus-enforced fields are:

  • postStateOrStatus (standard): this contains the transaction status, see EIP-658.
  • cumulativeGasUsed (standard): gas used in the block thus far, including this transaction.
    • The actual gas used is derived from the difference in CumulativeGasUsed with the previous transaction.
    • Starting with Regolith, this accounts for the actual gas usage by the deposit, like regular transactions.
  • bloom (standard): bloom filter of the transaction logs.
  • logs (standard): log events emitted by the EVM processing.
  • depositNonce (unique extension): Optional field. The deposit transaction persists the nonce used during execution.
  • depositNonceVersion (unique extension): Optional field. The value must be 1 if the field is present
    • Before Canyon, these depositNonce & depositNonceVersion fields must always be omitted.
    • With Canyon, these depositNonce & depositNonceVersion fields must always be included.

Starting with Regolith, the receipt API responses utilize the receipt changes for more accurate response data:

  • The depositNonce is included in the receipt JSON data in API responses
  • For contract-deployments (when to == null), the depositNonce helps derive the correct contractAddress meta-data, instead of assuming the nonce was zero.
  • The cumulativeGasUsed accounts for the actual gas usage, as metered in the EVM processing.

L1 Attributes Deposited Transaction

An L1 attributes deposited transaction is a deposit transaction sent to the L1 attributes predeployed contract.

This transaction MUST have the following values:

  1. from is 0xdeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddead0001 (the address of the L1 Attributes depositor account)
  2. to is 0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000015 (the address of the L1 attributes predeployed contract).
  3. mint is 0
  4. value is 0
  5. gasLimit is set to 150,000,000 prior to the Regolith upgrade, and 1,000,000 after.
  6. isSystemTx is set to true prior to the Regolith upgrade, and false after.
  7. data is an encoded call to the L1 attributes predeployed contract that depends on the upgrades that are active (see below).

This system-initiated transaction for L1 attributes is not charged any ETH for its allocated gasLimit, as it is considered part of state-transition processing.

L1 Attributes Deposited Transaction Calldata

L1 Attributes - Bedrock, Canyon, Delta

The data field of the L1 attributes deposited transaction is an ABI encoded call to the setL1BlockValues() function with correct values associated with the corresponding L1 block (cf. reference implementation).

Special Accounts on L2

The L1 attributes deposit transaction involves two special purpose accounts:

  1. The L1 attributes depositor account
  2. The L1 attributes predeployed contract

L1 Attributes Depositor Account

The depositor account is an EOA with no known private key. It has the address 0xdeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddead0001. Its value is returned by the CALLER and ORIGIN opcodes during execution of the L1 attributes deposited transaction.

L1 Attributes Predeployed Contract

A predeployed contract on L2 at address 0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000015, which holds certain block variables from the corresponding L1 block in storage, so that they may be accessed during the execution of the subsequent deposited transactions.

The predeploy stores the following values:

  • L1 block attributes:
    • number (uint64)
    • timestamp (uint64)
    • basefee (uint256)
    • hash (bytes32)
  • sequenceNumber (uint64): This equals the L2 block number relative to the start of the epoch, i.e. the L2 block distance to the L2 block height that the L1 attributes last changed, and reset to 0 at the start of a new epoch.
  • System configurables tied to the L1 block, see System configuration specification:
    • batcherHash (bytes32): A versioned commitment to the batch-submitter(s) currently operating.
    • overhead (uint256): The L1 fee overhead to apply to L1 cost computation of transactions in this L2 block.
    • scalar (uint256): The L1 fee scalar to apply to L1 cost computation of transactions in this L2 block.

The contract implements an authorization scheme, such that it only accepts state-changing calls from the depositor account.

The contract has the following solidity interface, and can be interacted with according to the contract ABI specification.

L1 Attributes Predeployed Contract: Reference Implementation

A reference implementation of the L1 Attributes predeploy contract can be found in L1Block.sol.

User-Deposited Transactions

User-deposited transactions are deposited transactions generated by the L2 Chain Derivation process. The content of each user-deposited transaction are determined by the corresponding TransactionDeposited event emitted by the deposit contract on L1.

  1. from is unchanged from the emitted value (though it may have been transformed to an alias in OptimismPortal, the deposit feed contract).
  2. to is any 20-byte address (including the zero address)
    • In case of a contract creation (cf. isCreation), this address is set to null.
  3. mint is set to the emitted value.
  4. value is set to the emitted value.
  5. gaslimit is unchanged from the emitted value. It must be at least 21000.
  6. isCreation is set to true if the transaction is a contract creation, false otherwise.
  7. data is unchanged from the emitted value. Depending on the value of isCreation it is handled as either calldata or contract initialization code.
  8. isSystemTx is set by the rollup node for certain transactions that have unmetered execution. It is false for user deposited transactions

Deposit Contract

The deposit contract is deployed to L1. Deposited transactions are derived from the values in the TransactionDeposited event(s) emitted by the deposit contract.

The deposit contract is responsible for maintaining the guaranteed gas market, charging deposits for gas to be used on L2, and ensuring that the total amount of guaranteed gas in a single L1 block does not exceed the L2 block gas limit.

The deposit contract handles two special cases:

  1. A contract creation deposit, which is indicated by setting the isCreation flag to true. In the event that the to address is non-zero, the contract will revert.
  2. A call from a contract account, in which case the from value is transformed to its L2 alias.

Address Aliasing

If the caller is a contract, the address will be transformed by adding 0x1111000000000000000000000000000000001111 to it. The math is unchecked and done on a Solidity uint160 so the value will overflow. This prevents attacks in which a contract on L1 has the same address as a contract on L2 but doesn't have the same code. We can safely ignore this for EOAs because they're guaranteed to have the same "code" (i.e. no code at all). This also makes it possible for users to interact with contracts on L2 even when the Sequencer is down.

Deposit Contract Implementation: Optimism Portal

A reference implementation of the deposit contract can be found in OptimismPortal.sol.


Table of Contents


Withdrawals are cross domain transactions which are initiated on L2, and finalized by a transaction executed on L1. Notably, withdrawals may be used by an L2 account to call an L1 contract, or to transfer ETH from an L2 account to an L1 account.

Vocabulary note: withdrawal can refer to the transaction at various stages of the process, but we introduce more specific terms to differentiate:

  • A withdrawal initiating transaction refers specifically to a transaction on L2 sent to the Withdrawals predeploy.
  • A withdrawal proving transaction refers specifically to an L1 transaction which proves the withdrawal is correct (that it has been included in a merkle tree whose root is available on L1).
  • A withdrawal finalizing transaction refers specifically to an L1 transaction which finalizes and relays the withdrawal.

Withdrawals are initiated on L2 via a call to the Message Passer predeploy contract, which records the important properties of the message in its storage. Withdrawals are proven on L1 via a call to the OptimismPortal, which proves the inclusion of this withdrawal message. Withdrawals are finalized on L1 via a call to the OptimismPortal contract, which verifies that the fault challenge period has passed since the withdrawal message has been proved.

In this way, withdrawals are different from deposits which make use of a special transaction type in the execution engine client. Rather, withdrawals transaction must use smart contracts on L1 for finalization.

Withdrawal Flow

We first describe the end to end flow of initiating and finalizing a withdrawal:

On L2

An L2 account sends a withdrawal message (and possibly also ETH) to the L2ToL1MessagePasser predeploy contract. This is a very simple contract that stores the hash of the withdrawal data.

On L1

  1. A relayer submits a withdrawal proving transaction with the required inputs to the OptimismPortal contract. The relayer is not necessarily the same entity which initiated the withdrawal on L2. These inputs include the withdrawal transaction data, inclusion proofs, and a block number. The block number must be one for which an L2 output root exists, which commits to the withdrawal as registered on L2.
  2. The OptimismPortal contract retrieves the output root for the given block number from the L2OutputOracle's getL2Output() function, and performs the remainder of the verification process internally.
  3. If proof verification fails, the call reverts. Otherwise the hash is recorded to prevent it from being re-proven. Note that the withdrawal can be proven more than once if the corresponding output root changes.
  4. After the withdrawal is proven, it enters a 7 day challenge period, allowing time for other network participants to challenge the integrity of the corresponding output root.
  5. Once the challenge period has passed, a relayer submits a withdrawal finalizing transaction to the OptimismPortal contract. The relayer doesn't need to be the same entity that initiated the withdrawal on L2.
  6. The OptimismPortal contract receives the withdrawal transaction data and verifies that the withdrawal has both been proven and passed the challenge period.
  7. If the requirements are not met, the call reverts. Otherwise the call is forwarded, and the hash is recorded to prevent it from being replayed.

The L2ToL1MessagePasser Contract

A withdrawal is initiated by calling the L2ToL1MessagePasser contract's initiateWithdrawal function. The L2ToL1MessagePasser is a simple predeploy contract at 0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000016 which stores messages to be withdrawn.

interface L2ToL1MessagePasser {
    event MessagePassed(
        uint256 indexed nonce, // this is a global nonce value for all withdrawal messages
        address indexed sender,
        address indexed target,
        uint256 value,
        uint256 gasLimit,
        bytes data,
        bytes32 withdrawalHash

    event WithdrawerBalanceBurnt(uint256 indexed amount);

    function burn() external;

    function initiateWithdrawal(address _target, uint256 _gasLimit, bytes memory _data) payable external;

    function messageNonce() public view returns (uint256);

    function sentMessages(bytes32) view external returns (bool);

The MessagePassed event includes all of the data that is hashed and stored in the sentMessages mapping, as well as the hash itself.

Addresses are not Aliased on Withdrawals

When a contract makes a deposit, the sender's address is aliased. The same is not true of withdrawals, which do not modify the sender's address. The difference is that:

  • on L2, the deposit sender's address is returned by the CALLER opcode, meaning a contract cannot easily tell if the call originated on L1 or L2, whereas
  • on L1, the withdrawal sender's address is accessed by calling the l2Sender() function on the OptimismPortal contract.

Calling l2Sender() removes any ambiguity about which domain the call originated from. Still, developers will need to recognize that having the same address does not imply that a contract on L2 will behave the same as a contract on L1.

The Optimism Portal Contract

The Optimism Portal serves as both the entry and exit point to the Optimism L2. It is a contract which inherits from the OptimismPortal contract, and in addition provides the following interface for withdrawals:

interface OptimismPortal {

    event WithdrawalFinalized(bytes32 indexed withdrawalHash, bool success);

    function l2Sender() returns(address) external;

    function proveWithdrawalTransaction(
        Types.WithdrawalTransaction memory _tx,
        uint256 _l2OutputIndex,
        Types.OutputRootProof calldata _outputRootProof,
        bytes[] calldata _withdrawalProof
    ) external;

    function finalizeWithdrawalTransaction(
        Types.WithdrawalTransaction memory _tx
    ) external;

Withdrawal Verification and Finalization

The following inputs are required to prove and finalize a withdrawal:

  • Withdrawal transaction data:
    • nonce: Nonce for the provided message.
    • sender: Message sender address on L2.
    • target: Target address on L1.
    • value: ETH to send to the target.
    • data: Data to send to the target.
    • gasLimit: Gas to be forwarded to the target.
  • Proof and verification data:
    • l2OutputIndex: The index in the L2 outputs where the applicable output root may be found.
    • outputRootProof: Four bytes32 values which are used to derive the output root.
    • withdrawalProof: An inclusion proof for the given withdrawal in the L2ToL1MessagePasser contract.

These inputs must satisfy the following conditions:

  1. The l2OutputIndex must be the index in the L2 outputs that contains the applicable output root.
  2. L2OutputOracle.getL2Output(l2OutputIndex) returns a non-zero OutputProposal.
  3. The keccak256 hash of the outputRootProof values is equal to the outputRoot.
  4. The withdrawalProof is a valid inclusion proof demonstrating that a hash of the Withdrawal transaction data is contained in the storage of the L2ToL1MessagePasser contract on L2.

Security Considerations

Key Properties of Withdrawal Verification

  1. It should not be possible to 'double spend' a withdrawal, ie. to relay a withdrawal on L1 which does not correspond to a message initiated on L2. For reference, see this writeup of a vulnerability of this type found on Polygon.

  2. For each withdrawal initiated on L2 (i.e. with a unique messageNonce()), the following properties must hold:

    1. It should only be possible to prove the withdrawal once, unless the outputRoot for the withdrawal has changed.
    2. It should only be possible to finalize the withdrawal once.
    3. It should not be possible to relay the message with any of its fields modified, ie.
      1. Modifying the sender field would enable a 'spoofing' attack.
      2. Modifying the target, data, or value fields would enable an attacker to dangerously change the intended outcome of the withdrawal.
      3. Modifying the gasLimit could make the cost of relaying too high, or allow the relayer to cause execution to fail (out of gas) in the target.

Handling Successfully Verified Messages That Fail When Relayed

If the execution of the relayed call fails in the target contract, it is unfortunately not possible to determine whether or not it was 'supposed' to fail, and whether or not it should be 'replayable'. For this reason, and to minimize complexity, we have not provided any replay functionality, this may be implemented in external utility contracts if desired.

OptimismPortal can send arbitrary messages on L1

The L2ToL1MessagePasser contract's initiateWithdrawal function accepts a _target address and _data bytes, which is passed to a CALL opcode on L1 when finalizeWithdrawalTransaction is called after the challenge period. This means that, by design, the OptimismPortal contract can be used to send arbitrary transactions on the L1, with the OptimismPortal as the msg.sender.

This means users of the OptimismPortal contract should be careful what permissions they grant to the portal. For example, any ERC20 tokens mistakenly sent to the OptimismPortal contract are essentially lost, as they can be claimed by anybody that pre-approves transfers of this token out of the portal, using the L2 to initiate the approval and the L1 to prove and finalize the approval (after the challenge period).

Guaranteed Gas Fee Market

Table of Contents


Deposited transactions are transactions on L2 that are initiated on L1. The gas that they use on L2 is bought on L1 via a gas burn (or a direct payment in the future). We maintain a fee market and hard cap on the amount of gas provided to all deposits in a single L1 block.

The gas provided to deposited transactions is sometimes called "guaranteed gas". The gas provided to deposited transactions is unique in the regard that it is not refundable. It cannot be refunded as it is sometimes paid for with a gas burn and there may not be any ETH left to refund.

The guaranteed gas is composed of a gas stipend, and of any guaranteed gas the user would like to purchase (on L1) on top of that.

Guaranteed gas on L2 is bought in the following manner. An L2 gas price is calculated via an EIP-1559-style algorithm. The total amount of ETH required to buy that gas is then calculated as (guaranteed gas * L2 deposit base fee). The contract then accepts that amount of ETH (in a future upgrade) or (only method right now), burns an amount of L1 gas that corresponds to the L2 cost (L2 cost / L1 base fee). The L2 gas price for guaranteed gas is not synchronized with the base fee on L2 and will likely be different.

Gas Stipend

To offset the gas spent on the deposit event, we credit gas spent * L1 base fee ETH to the cost of the L2 gas, where gas spent is the amount of L1 gas spent processing the deposit. If the ETH value of this credit is greater than the ETH value of the requested guaranteed gas (requested guaranteed gas * L2 gas price), no L1 gas is burnt.

Default Values


Limiting Guaranteed Gas

The total amount of guaranteed gas that can be bought in a single L1 block must be limited to prevent a denial of service attack against L2 as well as ensure the total amount of guaranteed gas stays below the L2 block gas limit.

We set a guaranteed gas limit of MAX_RESOURCE_LIMIT gas per L1 block and a target of MAX_RESOURCE_LIMIT / ELASTICITY_MULTIPLIER gas per L1 block. These numbers enabled occasional large transactions while staying within our target and maximum gas usage on L2.

Because the amount of guaranteed L2 gas that can be purchased in a single block is now limited, we implement an EIP-1559-style fee market to reduce congestion on deposits. By setting the limit at a multiple of the target, we enable deposits to temporarily use more L2 gas at a greater cost.

# Pseudocode to update the L2 deposit base fee and cap the amount of guaranteed gas
# bought in a block. Calling code must handle the gas burn and validity checks on
# the ability of the account to afford this gas.

# prev_base fee is a u128, prev_bought_gas and prev_num are u64s
prev_base_fee, prev_bought_gas, prev_num = <values from previous update>
now_num = block.number

# Clamp the full base fee to a specific range. The minimum value in the range should be around 100-1000
# to enable faster responses in the base fee. This replaces the `max` mechanism in the ethereum 1559
# implementation (it also serves to enable the base fee to increase if it is very small).
def clamp(v: i256, min: u128, max: u128) -> u128:
    if v < i256(min):
        return min
    elif v > i256(max):
        return max
        return u128(v)

# If this is a new block, update the base fee and reset the total gas
# If not, just update the total gas
if prev_num == now_num:
    now_base_fee = prev_base_fee
    now_bought_gas = prev_bought_gas + requested_gas
elif prev_num != now_num:
    # Width extension and conversion to signed integer math
    gas_used_delta = int128(prev_bought_gas) - int128(TARGET_RESOURCE_LIMIT)
    # Use truncating (round to 0) division - solidity's default.
    # Sign extend gas_used_delta & prev_base_fee to 256 bits to avoid overflows here.
    base_fee_per_gas_delta = prev_base_fee * gas_used_delta / TARGET_RESOURCE_LIMIT / BASE_FEE_MAX_CHANGE_DENOMINATOR
    now_base_fee_wide = prev_base_fee + base_fee_per_gas_delta

    now_base_fee = clamp(now_base_fee_wide, min=MINIMUM_BASE_FEE, max=UINT_128_MAX_VALUE)
    now_bought_gas =  requested_gas

    # If we skipped multiple blocks between the previous block and now update the base fee again.
    # This is not exactly the same as iterating the above function, but quite close for reasonable
    # gas target values. It is also constant time wrt the number of missed blocks which is important
    # for keeping gas usage stable.
    if prev_num + 1 < now_num:
        n = now_num - prev_num - 1
        # Apply 7/8 reduction to prev_base_fee for the n empty blocks in a row.
        now_base_fee_wide = now_base_fee * pow(1-(1/BASE_FEE_MAX_CHANGE_DENOMINATOR), n)
        now_base_fee = clamp(now_base_fee_wide, min=MINIMUM_BASE_FEE, max=type(uint128).max)

require(now_bought_gas < MAX_RESOURCE_LIMIT)

store_values(now_base_fee, now_bought_gas, now_num)

Rationale for burning L1 Gas

There must be a sybil resistance mechanism for usage of the network. If it is very cheap to get guaranteed gas on L2, then it would be possible to spam the network. Burning a dynamic amount of gas on L1 acts as a sybil resistance mechanism as it becomes more expensive with more demand.

If we collect ETH directly to pay for L2 gas, every (indirect) caller of the deposit function will need to be marked with the payable selector. This won't be possible for many existing projects. Unfortunately this is quite wasteful. As such, we will provide two options to buy L2 gas:

  1. Burn L1 Gas
  2. Send ETH to the Optimism Portal (Not yet supported)

The payable version (Option 2) will likely have discount applied to it (or conversely, #1 has a premium applied to it).

For the initial release of bedrock, only #1 is supported.

On Preventing Griefing Attacks

The cost of purchasing all of the deposit gas in every block must be expensive enough to prevent attackers from griefing all deposits to the network. An attacker would observe a deposit in the mempool and frontrun it with a deposit that purchases enough gas such that the other deposit reverts. The smaller the max resource limit is, the easier this attack is to pull off. This attack is mitigated by having a large resource limit as well as a large elasticity multiplier. This means that the target resource usage is kept small, giving a lot of room for the deposit base fee to rise when the max resource limit is being purchased.

This attack should be too expensive to pull off in practice, but if an extremely wealthy adversary does decide to grief network deposits for an extended period of time, efforts will be placed to ensure that deposits are able to be processed on the network.

L2 Output Root Proposals Specification

Table of Contents


After processing one or more blocks the outputs will need to be synchronized with the settlement layer (L1) for trustless execution of L2-to-L1 messaging, such as withdrawals. These output proposals act as the bridge's view into the L2 state. Actors called "Proposers" submit the output roots to the settlement layer (L1) and can be contested with a fault proof, with a bond at stake if the proof is wrong. The op-proposer in one such implementation of a proposer.

Note: Fault proofs on Optimism are not fully specified at this time. Although fault proof construction and verification is implemented in Cannon, the fault proof game specification and integration of a output-root challenger into the rollup-node are part of later specification milestones.

Proposing L2 Output Commitments

The proposer's role is to construct and submit output roots, which are commitments to the L2's state, to the L2OutputOracle contract on L1 (the settlement layer). To do this, the proposer periodically queries the rollup node for the latest output root derived from the latest finalized L1 block. It then takes the output root and submits it to the L2OutputOracle contract on the settlement layer (L1).

L2OutputOracle v1.0.0

The submission of output proposals is permissioned to a single account. It is expected that this account will continue to submit output proposals over time to ensure that user withdrawals do not halt.

The L2 output proposer is expected to submit output roots on a deterministic interval based on the configured SUBMISSION_INTERVAL in the L2OutputOracle. The larger the SUBMISSION_INTERVAL, the less often L1 transactions need to be sent to the L2OutputOracle contract, but L2 users will need to wait a bit longer for an output root to be included in L1 (the settlement layer) that includes their intention to withdraw from the system.

The honest op-proposer algorithm assumes a connection to the L2OutputOracle contract to know the L2 block number that corresponds to the next output proposal that must be submitted. It also assumes a connection to an op-node to be able to query the optimism_syncStatus RPC endpoint.

import time

while True:
    next_checkpoint_block = L2OutputOracle.nextBlockNumber()
    rollup_status = op_node_client.sync_status()
    if rollup_status.finalized_l2.number >= next_checkpoint_block:
        output = op_node_client.output_at_block(next_checkpoint_block)
        tx = send_transaction(output)

A CHALLENGER account can delete multiple output roots by calling the deleteL2Outputs() function and specifying the index of the first output to delete, this will also delete all subsequent outputs.

L2 Output Commitment Construction

The output_root is a 32 byte string, which is derived based on the a versioned scheme:

output_root = keccak256(version_byte || payload)


  1. version_byte (bytes32) a simple version string which increments anytime the construction of the output root is changed.

  2. payload (bytes) is a byte string of arbitrary length.

In the initial version of the output commitment construction, the version is bytes32(0), and the payload is defined as:

payload = state_root || withdrawal_storage_root || latest_block_hash


  1. The latest_block_hash (bytes32) is the block hash for the latest L2 block.

  2. The state_root (bytes32) is the Merkle-Patricia-Trie (MPT) root of all execution-layer accounts. This value is frequently used and thus elevated closer to the L2 output root, which removes the need to prove its inclusion in the pre-image of the latest_block_hash. This reduces the merkle proof depth and cost of accessing the L2 state root on L1.

  3. The withdrawal_storage_root (bytes32) elevates the Merkle-Patricia-Trie (MPT) root of the Message Passer contract storage. Instead of making an MPT proof for a withdrawal against the state root (proving first the storage root of the L2toL1MessagePasser against the state root, then the withdrawal against that storage root), we can prove against the L2toL1MessagePasser's storage root directly, thus reducing the verification cost of withdrawals on L1.

L2 Output Oracle Smart Contract

L2 blocks are produced at a constant rate of L2_BLOCK_TIME (2 seconds). A new L2 output MUST be appended to the chain once per SUBMISSION_INTERVAL which is based on a number of blocks. The exact number is yet to be determined, and will depend on the design of the fault proving game.

The L2 Output Oracle contract implements the following interface:

 * @notice The number of the first L2 block recorded in this contract.
uint256 public startingBlockNumber;

 * @notice The timestamp of the first L2 block recorded in this contract.
uint256 public startingTimestamp;

 * @notice Accepts an L2 outputRoot and the timestamp of the corresponding L2 block. The
 * timestamp must be equal to the current value returned by `nextTimestamp()` in order to be
 * accepted.
 * This function may only be called by the Proposer.
 * @param _l2Output      The L2 output of the checkpoint block.
 * @param _l2BlockNumber The L2 block number that resulted in _l2Output.
 * @param _l1Blockhash   A block hash which must be included in the current chain.
 * @param _l1BlockNumber The block number with the specified block hash.
  function proposeL2Output(
      bytes32 _l2Output,
      uint256 _l2BlockNumber,
      bytes32 _l1Blockhash,
      uint256 _l1BlockNumber

 * @notice Deletes all output proposals after and including the proposal that corresponds to
 *         the given output index. Only the challenger address can delete outputs.
 * @param _l2OutputIndex Index of the first L2 output to be deleted. All outputs after this
 *                       output will also be deleted.
function deleteL2Outputs(uint256 _l2OutputIndex) external

 * @notice Computes the block number of the next L2 block that needs to be checkpointed.
function nextBlockNumber() public view returns (uint256)


The startingBlockNumber must be at least the number of the first Bedrock block. The startingTimestamp MUST be the same as the timestamp of the start block.

The first outputRoot proposed will thus be at height startingBlockNumber + SUBMISSION_INTERVAL

Security Considerations

L1 Reorgs

If the L1 has a reorg after an output has been generated and submitted, the L2 state and correct output may change leading to a faulty proposal. This is mitigated against by allowing the proposer to submit an L1 block number and hash to the Output Oracle when appending a new output; in the event of a reorg, the block hash will not match that of the block with that number and the call will revert.

L2 Execution Engine

Table of Contents

This document outlines the modifications, configuration and usage of a L1 execution engine for L2.

1559 Parameters

The execution engine must be able to take a per chain configuration which specifies the EIP-1559 Denominator and EIP-1559 elasticity. After Canyon it should also take a new value EIP1559DenominatorCanyon and use that as the denominator in the 1559 formula rather than the prior denominator.

The formula for EIP-1559 is not otherwise modified.

Deposited transaction processing

The Engine interfaces abstract away transaction types with EIP-2718.

To support rollup functionality, processing of a new Deposit TransactionType is implemented by the engine, see the deposits specification.

This type of transaction can mint L2 ETH, run EVM, and introduce L1 information to enshrined contracts in the execution state.

Deposited transaction boundaries

Transactions cannot be blindly trusted, trust is established through authentication. Unlike other transaction types deposits are not authenticated by a signature: the rollup node authenticates them, outside of the engine.

To process deposited transactions safely, the deposits MUST be authenticated first:

  • Ingest directly through trusted Engine API
  • Part of sync towards a trusted block hash (trusted through previous Engine API instruction)

Deposited transactions MUST never be consumed from the transaction pool. The transaction pool can be disabled in a deposits-only rollup


Sequenced transactions (i.e. not applicable to deposits) are charged with 3 types of fees: priority fees, base fees, and L1-cost fees.

Fee Vaults

The three types of fees are collected in 3 distinct L2 fee-vault deployments for accounting purposes: fee payments are not registered as internal EVM calls, and thus distinguished better this way.

These are hardcoded addresses, pointing at pre-deployed proxy contracts. The proxies are backed by vault contract deployments, based on FeeVault, to route vault funds to L1 securely.

Vault NamePredeploy
Sequencer Fee VaultSequencerFeeVault
Base Fee VaultBaseFeeVault
L1 Fee VaultL1FeeVault

Priority fees (Sequencer Fee Vault)

Priority fees follow the eip-1559 specification, and are collected by the fee-recipient of the L2 block. The block fee-recipient (a.k.a. coinbase address) is set to the Sequencer Fee Vault address.

Base fees (Base Fee Vault)

Base fees largely follow the eip-1559 specification, with the exception that base fees are not burned, but add up to the Base Fee Vault ETH account balance.

L1-Cost fees (L1 Fee Vault)

The protocol funds batch-submission of sequenced L2 transactions by charging L2 users an additional fee based on the estimated batch-submission costs. This fee is charged from the L2 transaction-sender ETH balance, and collected into the L1 Fee Vault.

The exact L1 cost function to determine the L1-cost fee component of a L2 transaction depends on the upgrades that are active.


Before Ecotone activation, L1 cost is calculated as: (rollupDataGas + l1FeeOverhead) * l1BaseFee * l1FeeScalar / 1e6 (big-int computation, result in Wei and uint256 range) Where:

  • rollupDataGas is determined from the full encoded transaction (standard EIP-2718 transaction encoding, including signature fields):
    • Before Regolith fork: rollupDataGas = zeroes * 4 + (ones + 68) * 16
      • The addition of 68 non-zero bytes is a remnant of a pre-Bedrock L1-cost accounting function, which accounted for the worst-case non-zero bytes addition to complement unsigned transactions, unlike Bedrock.
    • With Regolith fork: rollupDataGas = zeroes * 4 + ones * 16
  • l1FeeOverhead is the Gas Price Oracle overhead value.
  • l1FeeScalar is the Gas Price Oracle scalar value.
  • l1BaseFee is the L1 base fee of the latest L1 origin registered in the L2 chain.

Note that the rollupDataGas uses the same byte cost accounting as defined in eip-2028, except the full L2 transaction now counts towards the bytes charged in the L1 calldata. This behavior matches pre-Bedrock L1-cost estimation of L2 transactions.

Compression, batching, and intrinsic gas costs of the batch transactions are accounted for by the protocol with the Gas Price Oracle overhead and scalar parameters.

The Gas Price Oracle l1FeeOverhead and l1FeeScalar, as well as the l1BaseFee of the L1 origin, can be accessed in two interchangeable ways:

  • read from the deposited L1 attributes (l1FeeOverhead, l1FeeScalar, basefee) of the current L2 block
  • read from the L1 Block Info contract (0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000015)
    • using the respective solidity uint256-getter functions (l1FeeOverhead, l1FeeScalar, basefee)
    • using direct storage-reads:
      • L1 basefee as big-endian uint256 in slot 1
      • Overhead as big-endian uint256 in slot 5
      • Scalar as big-endian uint256 in slot 6

Ecotone L1-Cost fee changes (EIP-4844 DA)

Ecotone allows posting batches via Blobs which are subject to a new fee market. To account for this feature, L1 cost is computed as:

(zeroes*4 + ones*16) * (16*l1BaseFee*l1BaseFeeScalar + l1BlobBaseFee*l1BlobBaseFeeScalar) / 16e6


  • the computation is an unlimited precision integer computation, with the result in Wei and having uint256 range.

  • zeroes and ones are the count of zero and non-zero bytes respectively in the full encoded signed transaction.

  • l1BaseFee is the L1 base fee of the latest L1 origin registered in the L2 chain.

  • l1BlobBaseFee is the blob gas price, computed as described in EIP-4844 from the header of the latest registered L1 origin block.

Conceptually what the above function captures is the formula below, where compressedTxSize = (zeroes*4 + ones*16) / 16 can be thought of as a rough approximation of how many bytes the transaction occupies in a compressed batch.

(compressedTxSize) * (16*l1BaseFee*lBaseFeeScalar + l1BlobBaseFee*l1BlobBaseFeeScalar) / 1e6

The precise cost function used by Ecotone at the top of this section preserves precision under integer arithmetic by postponing the inner division by 16 until the very end.

The two base fee values and their respective scalars can be accessed in two interchangeable ways:

  • read from the deposited L1 attributes (l1BaseFeeScalar, l1BlobBaseFeeScalar, basefee, blobBaseFee) of the current L2 block
  • read from the L1 Block Info contract (0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000015)
    • using the respective solidity getter functions
    • using direct storage-reads:
      • basefee uint256 in slot 1
      • blobBaseFee uint256 in slot 7
      • l1BaseFeeScalar big-endian uint32 slot 3 at offset 12
      • l1BlobBaseFeeScalar big-endian uint32 in slot 3 at offset 8

Engine API


This updates which L2 blocks the engine considers to be canonical (forkchoiceState argument), and optionally initiates block production (payloadAttributes argument).

Within the rollup, the types of forkchoice updates translate as:

  • headBlockHash: block hash of the head of the canonical chain. Labeled "unsafe" in user JSON-RPC. Nodes may apply L2 blocks out of band ahead of time, and then reorg when L1 data conflicts.
  • safeBlockHash: block hash of the canonical chain, derived from L1 data, unlikely to reorg.
  • finalizedBlockHash: irreversible block hash, matches lower boundary of the dispute period.

To support rollup functionality, one backwards-compatible change is introduced to engine_forkchoiceUpdatedV2: the extended PayloadAttributesV2

Extended PayloadAttributesV2

PayloadAttributesV2 is extended to:

PayloadAttributesV2: {
    timestamp: QUANTITY
    random: DATA (32 bytes)
    suggestedFeeRecipient: DATA (20 bytes)
    withdrawals: array of WithdrawalV1
    transactions: array of DATA
    noTxPool: bool
    gasLimit: QUANTITY or null

The type notation used here refers to the HEX value encoding used by the Ethereum JSON-RPC API specification, as this structure will need to be sent over JSON-RPC. array refers to a JSON array.

Each item of the transactions array is a byte list encoding a transaction: TransactionType || TransactionPayload or LegacyTransaction, as defined in EIP-2718. This is equivalent to the transactions field in ExecutionPayloadV2

The transactions field is optional:

  • If empty or missing: no changes to engine behavior. The sequencers will (if enabled) build a block by consuming transactions from the transaction pool.
  • If present and non-empty: the payload MUST be produced starting with this exact list of transactions. The rollup driver determines the transaction list based on deterministic L1 inputs.

The noTxPool is optional as well, and extends the transactions meaning:

  • If false, the execution engine is free to pack additional transactions from external sources like the tx pool into the payload, after any of the transactions. This is the default behavior a L1 node implements.
  • If true, the execution engine must not change anything about the given list of transactions.

If the transactions field is present, the engine must execute the transactions in order and return STATUS_INVALID if there is an error processing the transactions. It must return STATUS_VALID if all of the transactions could be executed without error. Note: The state transition rules have been modified such that deposits will never fail so if engine_forkchoiceUpdatedV2 returns STATUS_INVALID it is because a batched transaction is invalid.

The gasLimit is optional w.r.t. compatibility with L1, but required when used as rollup. This field overrides the gas limit used during block-building. If not specified as rollup, a STATUS_INVALID is returned.


See engine_forkchoiceUpdatedV2 for a description of the forkchoice updated method. engine_forkchoiceUpdatedV3 must only be called with Ecotone payload.

To support rollup functionality, one backwards-compatible change is introduced to engine_forkchoiceUpdatedV3: the extended PayloadAttributesV3

Extended PayloadAttributesV3

PayloadAttributesV3 is extended to:

PayloadAttributesV3: {
    timestamp: QUANTITY
    random: DATA (32 bytes)
    suggestedFeeRecipient: DATA (20 bytes)
    withdrawals: array of WithdrawalV1
    parentBeaconBlockRoot: DATA (32 bytes)
    transactions: array of DATA
    noTxPool: bool
    gasLimit: QUANTITY or null

The requirements of this object are the same as extended PayloadAttributesV2 with the addition of parentBeaconBlockRoot which is the parent beacon block root from the L1 origin block of the L2 block.

Starting at Ecotone, the parentBeaconBlockRoot must be set to the L1 origin parentBeaconBlockRoot, or a zero bytes32 if the Dencun functionality with parentBeaconBlockRoot is not active on L1.


No modifications to engine_newPayloadV2. Applies a L2 block to the engine state.


engine_newPayloadV3 applies an Ecotone L2 block to the engine state. There are no modifications to this API. engine_newPayloadV3 must only be called with Ecotone payload.

The additional parameters should be set as follows:

  • expectedBlobVersionedHashes MUST be an empty array.
  • parentBeaconBlockRoot MUST be the parent beacon block root from the L1 origin block of the L2 block.


No modifications to engine_getPayloadV2. Retrieves a payload by ID, prepared by engine_forkchoiceUpdatedV2 when called with payloadAttributes.


engine_getPayloadV3 retrieves a payload by ID, prepared by engine_forkchoiceUpdatedV3 when called with payloadAttributes. engine_getPayloadV3 must only be called with Ecotone payload.

Extended Response

The response is extended to:

    executionPayload: ExecutionPayload
    blockValue: QUANTITY
    blobsBundle: BlobsBundle
    shouldOverrideBuilder: BOOLEAN
    parentBeaconBlockRoot: DATA (32 bytes)

In Ecotone it MUST be set to the parentBeaconBlockRoot from the L1 Origin block of the L2 block.


Optional extension to the Engine API. Signals superchain information to the Engine: V1 signals which protocol version is recommended and required.


SuperchainSignal: {
  recommended: ProtocolVersion;
  required: ProtocolVersion;

ProtocolVersion: encoded for RPC as defined in Protocol Version format specification.


  • signal: SuperchainSignal, the signaled superchain information.


  • ProtocolVersion: the latest supported OP-Stack protocol version of the execution engine.

The execution engine SHOULD warn the user when the recommended version is newer than the current version supported by the execution engine.

The execution engine SHOULD take safety precautions if it does not meet the required protocol version. This may include halting the engine, with consent of the execution engine operator.


The execution engine can acquire all data through the rollup node, as derived from L1: P2P networking is strictly optional.

However, to not bottleneck on L1 data retrieval speed, the P2P network functionality SHOULD be enabled, serving:

  • Peer discovery (Disc v5)
  • eth/66:
    • Transaction pool (consumed by sequencer nodes)
    • State sync (happy-path for fast trustless db replication)
    • Historical block header and body retrieval
    • New blocks are acquired through the consensus layer instead (rollup node)

No modifications to L1 network functionality are required, except configuration:

  • networkID: Distinguishes the L2 network from L1 and testnets. Equal to the chainID of the rollup network.
  • Activate Merge fork: Enables Engine API and disables propagation of blocks, as block headers cannot be authenticated without consensus layer.
  • Bootnode list: DiscV5 is a shared network, bootstrap is faster through connecting with L2 nodes first.


The execution engine can operate sync in different ways:

  • Happy-path: rollup node informs engine of the desired chain head as determined by L1, completes through engine P2P.
  • Worst-case: rollup node detects stalled engine, completes sync purely from L1 data, no peers required.

The happy-path is more suitable to bring new nodes online quickly, as the engine implementation can sync state faster through methods like snap-sync.

Happy-path sync

  1. The rollup node informs the engine of the L2 chain head, unconditionally (part of regular node operation):
  2. The engine requests headers from peers, in reverse till the parent hash matches the local chain
  3. The engine catches up: a) A form of state sync is activated towards the finalized or head block hash b) A form of block sync pulls block bodies and processes towards head block hash

The exact P2P based sync is out of scope for the L2 specification: the operation within the engine is the exact same as with L1 (although with an EVM that supports deposits).

Worst-case sync

  1. Engine is out of sync, not peered and/or stalled due other reasons.
  2. The rollup node maintains latest head from engine (poll eth_getBlockByNumber and/or maintain a header subscription)
  3. The rollup node activates sync if the engine is out of sync but not syncing through P2P (eth_syncing)
  4. The rollup node inserts blocks, derived from L1, one by one, potentially adapting to L1 reorg(s), as outlined in the rollup node spec.

Ecotone: disable Blob-transactions

EIP-4844 introduces Blob transactions: featuring all the functionality of an EIP-1559 transaction, plus a list of "blobs": "Binary Large Object", i.e. a dedicated data type for serving Data-Availability as base-layer.

With the Ecotone upgrade, all Cancun L1 execution features are enabled, with EIP-4844 as exception: as a L2, the OP-Stack does not serve blobs, and thus disables this new transaction type.

EIP-4844 is disabled as following:

  • Transaction network-layer announcements, announcing blob-type transactions, are ignored.
  • Transactions of the blob-type, through the RPC or otherwise, are not allowed into the transaction pool.
  • Block-building code does not select EIP-4844 transactions.
  • An L2 block state-transition with EIP-4844 transactions is invalid.

The BLOBBASEFEE opcode is present but its semantics are altered because there are no blobs processed by L2. The opcode will always push a value of 1 onto the stack.

Ecotone: Beacon Block Root

EIP-4788 introduces a "beacon block root" into the execution-layer block-header and EVM. This block root is an SSZ hash-tree-root of the consensus-layer contents of the previous consensus block.

With the adoption of EIP-4399 in the Bedrock upgrade the OP-Stack already includes the PREVRANDAO of L1. And thus with EIP-4788 the L1 beacon block root is made available.

For the Ecotone upgrade, this entails that:

  • The parent_beacon_block_root of the L1 origin is now embedded in the L2 block header.
  • The "Beacon roots contract" is deployed at Ecotone upgrade-time, or embedded at genesis if activated at genesis.
  • The block state-transition process now includes the same special beacon-block-root EVM processing as L1 ethereum.

P2P Modifications

The Ethereum Node Record (ENR) for an Optimism execution node must contain an opel key-value pair where the key is opel and the value is a EIP-2124 fork id. The EL uses a different key from the CL in order to stop EL and CL nodes from connecting to each other.

Rollup Node Specification

Table of Contents


The rollup node is the component responsible for deriving the L2 chain from L1 blocks (and their associated receipts).

The part of the rollup node that derives the L2 chain is called the rollup driver. This document is currently only concerned with the specification of the rollup driver.


The task of the driver in the rollup node is to manage the derivation process:

  • Keep track of L1 head block
  • Keep track of the L2 chain sync progress
  • Iterate over the derivation steps as new inputs become available


This process happens in three steps:

  1. Select inputs from the L1 chain, on top of the last L2 block: a list of blocks, with transactions and associated data and receipts.
  2. Read L1 information, deposits, and sequencing batches in order to generate payload attributes (essentially a block without output properties).
  3. Pass the payload attributes to the execution engine, so that the L2 block (including output block properties) may be computed.

While this process is conceptually a pure function from the L1 chain to the L2 chain, it is in practice incremental. The L2 chain is extended whenever new L1 blocks are added to the L1 chain. Similarly, the L2 chain re-organizes whenever the L1 chain re-organizes.

For a complete specification of the L2 block derivation, refer to the L2 block derivation document.

L2 Output RPC method

The Rollup node has its own RPC method, optimism_outputAtBlock which returns a 32 byte hash corresponding to the L2 output root.


These define the types used by rollup node API methods. The types defined here are extended from the engine API specs.


  • hash: DATA, 32 Bytes
  • number: QUANTITY, 64 Bits


  • hash: DATA, 32 Bytes
  • number: QUANTITY, 64 Bits
  • parentHash: DATA, 32 Bytes
  • timestamp: QUANTITY, 64 Bits


  • hash: DATA, 32 Bytes
  • number: QUANTITY, 64 Bits
  • parentHash: DATA, 32 Bytes
  • timestamp: QUANTITY, 64 Bits
  • l1origin: BlockID
  • sequenceNumber: QUANTITY, 64 Bits - distance to first block of epoch


Represents a snapshot of the rollup driver.

Output Method API

The input and return types here are as defined by the engine API specs.

  • method: optimism_outputAtBlock
  • params:
    1. blockNumber: QUANTITY, 64 bits - L2 integer block number.
  • returns:
    1. version: DATA, 32 Bytes - the output root version number, beginning with 0.
    2. outputRoot: DATA, 32 Bytes - the output root.
    3. blockRef: Object - instance of L2BlockRef.
    4. withdrawalStorageRoot: 32 bytes - storage root of the L2toL1MessagePasser contract.
    5. stateRoot: DATA: 32 bytes - the state root.
    6. syncStatus: Object - instance of SyncStatus.

Protocol Version tracking

The rollup-node should monitor the recommended and required protocol version by monitoring the Protocol Version contract on L1, as specified in the Superchain Version Signaling specifications.

This can be implemented through polling in the Driver loop. After polling the Protocol Version, the rollup node SHOULD communicate it with the execution-engine through an engine_signalSuperchainV1 call.

The rollup node SHOULD warn the user when the recommended version is newer than the current version supported by the rollup node.

The rollup node SHOULD take safety precautions if it does not meet the required protocol version. This may include halting the engine, with consent of the rollup node operator.

Rollup-node P2P interface

Table of Contents


The rollup node has an optional peer-to-peer (P2P) network service to improve the latency between the view of sequencers and the rest of the network by bypassing the L1 in the happy case, without relying on a single centralized endpoint.

This also enables faster historical sync to be bootstrapped by providing block headers to sync towards, and only having to compare the L2 chain inputs to the L1 data as compared to processing everything one block at a time.

The rollup node will always prioritize L1 and reorganize to match the canonical chain. The L2 data retrieved via the P2P interface is strictly a speculative extension, also known as the "unsafe" chain, to improve the happy case performance.

This also means that P2P behavior is a soft-rule: nodes keep each other in check with scoring and eventual banning of malicious peers by identity or IP. Any behavior on the P2P layer does not affect the rollup security, at worst nodes rely on higher-latency data from L1 to serve.

In summary, the P2P stack looks like:

  • Discovery to find peers: Discv5
  • Connections, peering, transport security, multiplexing, gossip: LibP2P
  • Application-layer publishing and validation of gossiped messages like L2 blocks.

This document only specifies the composition and configuration of these network libraries. These components have their own standards, implementations in Go/Rust/Java/Nim/JS/more, and are adopted by several other blockchains, most notably the L1 consensus layer (Eth2).

P2P configuration


Nodes have a separate network- and consensus-identity. The network identity is a secp256k1 key, used for both discovery and active LibP2P connections.

Common representations of network identity:

  • PeerID: a LibP2P specific ID derived from the pubkey (through protobuf encoding, typing and hashing)
  • NodeID: a Discv5 specific ID derived from the pubkey (through hashing, used in the DHT)
  • Multi-address: an unsigned address, containing: IP, TCP port, PeerID
  • ENR: a signed record used for discovery, containing: IP, TCP port, UDP port, signature (pubkey can be derived) and L2 network identification. Generally encoded in base64.


Consesus Layer Structure

The Ethereum Node Record (ENR) for an Optimism rollup node must contain the following values, identified by unique keys:

  • An IPv4 address (ip field) and/or IPv6 address (ip6 field).
  • A TCP port (tcp field) representing the local libp2p listening port.
  • A UDP port (udp field) representing the local discv5 listening port.
  • An OpStack (opstack field) L2 network identifier

The opstack value is encoded as a single RLP bytes value, the concatenation of:

  • chain ID (unsigned varint)
  • fork ID (unsigned varint)

Note that DiscV5 is a shared DHT (Distributed Hash Table): the L1 consensus and execution nodes, as well as testnet nodes, and even external IOT nodes, all communicate records in this large common DHT. This makes it more difficult to censor the discovery of node records.

The discovery process in Optimism is a pipeline of node records:

  1. Fill the table with FINDNODES if necessary (Performed by Discv5 library)
  2. Pull additional records with searches to random Node IDs if necessary (e.g. iterate RandomNodes() in Go implementation)
  3. Pull records from the DiscV5 module when looking for peers
  4. Check if the record contains the opstack entry, verify it matches the chain ID and current or future fork number
  5. If not already connected, and not recently disconnected or put on deny-list, attempt to dial.



TCP transport. Additional transports are supported by LibP2P, but not required.


Nodes should be publicly dialable, not rely on relay extensions, and able to dial both IPv4 and IPv6.


The listening endpoint must be publicly facing, but may be configured behind a NAT. LibP2P will use PMP / UPNP based techniques to track the external IP of the node. It is recommended to disable the above if the external IP is static and configured manually.

Peer management

The default is to maintain a peer count with a tide-system based on active peer count:

  • At "low tide" the node starts to actively search for additional peer connections.
  • At "high tide" the node starts to prune active connections, except those that are marked as trusted or have a grace period.

Peers will have a grace period for a configurable amount of time after joining. In an emergency, when memory runs low, the node should start pruning more aggressively.

Peer records can be persisted to disk to quickly reconnect with known peers after restarting the rollup node.

The discovery process feeds the peerstore with peer records to connect to, tagged with a time-to-live (TTL). The current P2P processes do not require selective topic-specific peer connections, other than filtering for the basic network participation requirement.

Peers may be banned if their performance score is too low, or if an objectively malicious action was detected.

Banned peers will be persisted to the same data-store as the peerstore records.

TODO: the connection gater does currently not gate by IP address on the dial Accept-callback.

Transport security

Libp2p-noise, XX handshake, with the secp256k1 P2P identity, as popularized in Eth2. The TLS option is available as well, but noise should be prioritized in negotiation.

Protocol negotiation

Multistream-select 1.0 (/multistream/1.0.0) is an interactive protocol used to negotiate sub-protocols supported in LibP2P peers. Multistream-select 2.0 may be used in the future.


LibP2P offers a minimal identification module to share client version and programming language. This is optional and can be disabled for enhanced privacy. It also includes the same protocol negotiation information, which can speed up initial connections.


LibP2P includes a simple ping protocol to track latency between connections. This should be enabled to help provide insight into the network health.


For async communication over different channels over the same connection, multiplexing is used. mplex (/mplex/6.7.0) is required, and yamux (/yamux/1.0.0) is recommended but optional


GossipSub 1.1 (/meshsub/1.1.0, i.e. with peer-scoring extension) is a pubsub protocol for mesh-networks, deployed on L1 consensus (Eth2) and other protocols such as Filecoin, offering lots of customization options.

Content-based message identification

Messages are deduplicated, and filtered through application-layer signature verification. Thus origin-stamping is disabled and published messages must only contain application data, enforced through a StrictNoSign Signature Policy

This provides greater privacy, and allows sequencers (consensus identity) to maintain multiple network identities for redundancy.

Message compression and limits

The application contents are compressed with snappy single-block-compression (as opposed to frame-compression), and constrained to 10 MiB.

Message ID computation

Same as L1, with recognition of compression:

  • If message.data has a valid snappy decompression, set message-id to the first 20 bytes of the SHA256 hash of the concatenation of MESSAGE_DOMAIN_VALID_SNAPPY with the snappy decompressed message data, i.e. SHA256(MESSAGE_DOMAIN_VALID_SNAPPY + snappy_decompress(message.data))[:20].
  • Otherwise, set message-id to the first 20 bytes of the SHA256 hash of the concatenation of MESSAGE_DOMAIN_INVALID_SNAPPY with the raw message data, i.e. SHA256(MESSAGE_DOMAIN_INVALID_SNAPPY + message.data)[:20].

Heartbeat and parameters

GossipSub parameters:

  • D (topic stable mesh target count): 8
  • D_low (topic stable mesh low watermark): 6
  • D_high (topic stable mesh high watermark): 12
  • D_lazy (gossip target): 6
  • heartbeat_interval (interval of heartbeat, in seconds): 0.5
  • fanout_ttl (ttl for fanout maps for topics we are not subscribed to but have published to, in seconds): 24
  • mcache_len (number of windows to retain full messages in cache for IWANT responses): 12
  • mcache_gossip (number of windows to gossip about): 3
  • seen_ttl (number of heartbeat intervals to retain message IDs): 130 (= 65 seconds)

Notable differences from L1 consensus (Eth2):

  • seen_ttl does not need to cover a full L1 epoch (6.4 minutes), but rather just a small window covering latest blocks
  • fanout_ttl: adjusted to lower than seen_ttl
  • mcache_len: a larger number of heartbeats can be retained since the gossip is much less noisy.
  • heartbeat_interval: faster interval to reduce latency, bandwidth should still be reasonable since there are far fewer messages to gossip about each interval than on L1 which uses an interval of 0.7 seconds.

Topic configuration

Topics have string identifiers and are communicated with messages and subscriptions. /optimism/chain_id/hardfork_version/Name

  • chain_id: replace with decimal representation of chain ID
  • hardfork_version: replace with decimal representation of hardfork, starting at 0
  • Name: topic application-name

Note that the topic encoding depends on the topic, unlike L1, since there are less topics, and all are snappy-compressed.

Topic validation

To ensure only valid messages are relayed, and malicious peers get scored based on application behavior, an extended validator checks the message before it is relayed or processed. The extended validator emits one of the following validation signals:

  • ACCEPT valid, relayed to other peers and passed to local topic subscriber
  • IGNORE scored like inactivity, message is dropped and not processed
  • REJECT score penalties, message is dropped

Gossip Topics

There are three topics for distributing blocks to other nodes faster than proxying through L1 would. These are:


Pre-Canyon/Shanghai blocks are broadcast on /optimism/<chainId>/0/blocks.


Canyon/Delta blocks are broadcast on /optimism/<chainId>/1/blocks.


Ecotone blocks are broadcast on /optimism/<chainId>/2/blocks.

Block encoding

A block is structured as the concatenation of:

  • V1 and V2 topics
    • signature: A secp256k1 signature, always 65 bytes, r (uint256), s (uint256), y_parity (uint8)
    • payload: A SSZ-encoded ExecutionPayload, always the remaining bytes.
  • V3 topic
    • signature: A secp256k1 signature, always 65 bytes, r (uint256), s (uint256), y_parity (uint8)
    • parentBeaconBlockRoot: L1 origin parent beacon block root, always 32 bytes
    • payload: A SSZ-encoded ExecutionPayload, always the remaining bytes.

All topics use Snappy block-compression (i.e. no snappy frames): the above needs to be compressed after encoding, and decompressed before decoding.

Block signatures

The signature is a secp256k1 signature, and signs over a message: keccak256(domain ++ chain_id ++ payload_hash), where:

  • domain is 32 bytes, reserved for message types and versioning info. All zero for this signature.
  • chain_id is a big-endian encoded uint256.
  • payload_hash is keccak256(payload), where payload is the remaining bytes of the payload.

The secp256k1 signature must have y_parity = 1 or 0, the chain_id is already signed over.

Block validation

An extended-validator checks the incoming messages as follows, in order of operation:

  • [REJECT] if the compression is not valid
  • [REJECT] if the block encoding is not valid
  • [REJECT] if the payload.timestamp is older than 60 seconds in the past (graceful boundary for worst-case propagation and clock skew)
  • [REJECT] if the payload.timestamp is more than 5 seconds into the future
  • [REJECT] if the block_hash in the payload is not valid
  • [REJECT] if the block is on the V1 topic and has withdrawals
  • [REJECT] if the block is on the V1 topic and has a withdrawals list
  • [REJECT] if the block is on a topic >= V2 and does not have an empty withdrawals list
  • [REJECT] if the block is on a topic <= V2 and has a blob gas-used value set
  • [REJECT] if the block is on a topic <= V2 and has an excess blob gas value set
  • [REJECT] if the block is on a topic >= V3 and has a blob gas-used value that is not zero
  • [REJECT] if the block is on a topic >= V3 and has an excess blob gas value that is not zero
  • [REJECT] if the block is on a topic <= V2 and the parent beacon block root is not nil
  • [REJECT] if the block is on a topic >= V3 and the parent beacon block root is nil
  • [REJECT] if more than 5 different blocks have been seen with the same block height
  • [IGNORE] if the block has already been seen
  • [REJECT] if the signature by the sequencer is not valid
  • Mark the block as seen for the given block height

The block is signed by the corresponding sequencer, to filter malicious messages. The sequencer model is singular but may change to multiple sequencers in the future. A default sequencer pubkey is distributed with rollup nodes and should be configurable.

Note that blocks that a block may still be propagated even if the L1 already confirmed a different block. The local L1 view of the node may be wrong, and the time and signature validation will prevent spam. Hence, calling into the execution engine with a block lookup every propagation step is not worth the added delay.

Block processing

A node may apply the block to their local engine ahead of L1 availability, if it ensures that:

  • The application of the block is reversible, in case of a conflict with delayed L1 information
  • The subsequent forkchoice-update ensures this block is recognized as "unsafe" (see fork choice updated)

Block topic scoring parameters

TODO: GossipSub per-topic scoring to fine-tune incentives for ideal propagation delay and bandwidth usage.


The op-node implements a similar request-response encoding for its sync protocols as the L1 ethereum Beacon-Chain. See L1 P2P-interface req-resp specification and Altair P2P update.

However, the protocol is simplified, to avoid several issues seen in L1:

  • Error strings in responses, if there is any alternative response, should not need to be compressed or have an artificial global length limit.
  • Payload lengths should be fixed-length: byte-by-byte uvarint reading from the underlying stream is undesired.
  • <context-bytes> are relaxed to encode a uint32, rather than a beacon-chain ForkDigest.
  • Payload-encoding may change per hardfork, so is not part of the protocol-ID.
  • Usage of response-chunks is specific to the req-resp method: most basic req-resp does not need chunked responses.
  • Compression is encouraged to be part of the payload-encoding, specific to the req-resp method, where necessary: pings and such do not need streaming frame compression etc.

And the protocol ID format follows the same scheme as L1, except the trailing encoding schema part, which is now message-specific:


The req-resp protocols served by the op-node all have /ProtocolPrefix set to /opstack/req.

Individual methods may include the chain ID as part of the /MessageName segment, so it's immediately clear which chain the method applies to, if the communication is chain-specific. Other methods may include chain-information in the request and/or response data, such as the ForkDigest <context-bytes> in L1 beacon chain req-resp protocols.

Each segment starts with a /, and may contain multiple /, and the final protocol ID is suffixed with a /.


This is an optional chain syncing method, to request/serve execution payloads by number. This serves as a method to fill gaps upon missed gossip, and sync short to medium ranges of unsafe L2 blocks.

Protocol ID: /opstack/req/payload_by_number/<chain-id>/0/

  • /MessageName is /block_by_number/<chain-id> where <chain-id> is set to the op-node L2 chain ID.
  • /SchemaVersion is /0

Request format: <num>: a little-endian uint64 - the block number to request.

Response format: <response> = <res><version><payload>

  • <res> is a byte code describing the result.
    • 0 on success, <version><payload> should follow.
    • 1 if valid request, but unavailable payload.
    • 2 if invalid request
    • 3+ if other error
    • The >= 128 range is reserved for future use.
  • <version> is a little-endian uint32, identifying the response type (fork-specific)
  • <payload> is an encoded block, read till stream EOF.

The input of <response> should be limited, as well as any generated decompressed output, to avoid unexpected resource usage or zip-bomb type attacks. A 10 MB limit is recommended, to ensure all blocks may be synced. Implementations may opt for a different limit, since this sync method is optional.

<version> list:

  • 0: SSZ-encoded ExecutionPayload, with Snappy framing compression, matching the ExecutionPayload SSZ definition of the L1 Merge, L2 Bedrock and L2 Regolith, L2 Canyon versions.
  • 1: SSZ-encoded ExecutionPayloadEnvelope with Snappy framing compression, matching the ExecutionPayloadEnvelope SSZ definition of the L2 Ecotone version.

The request is by block-number, enabling parallel fetching of a chain across many peers.

A res = 0 response should be verified to:

  • Have a block-number matching the requested block number.
  • Have a consistent blockhash w.r.t. the other block contents.
  • Build towards a known canonical block.
    • This can be verified by checking if the parent-hash of a previous trusted canonical block matches that of the verified hash of the retrieved block.
    • For unsafe blocks this may be relaxed to verification against the parent-hash of any previously trusted block:
      • The gossip validation process limits the amount of blocks that may be trusted to sync towards.
      • The unsafe blocks should be queued for processing, the latest received L2 unsafe blocks should always override any previous chain, until the final L2 chain can be reproduced from L1 data.

A res > 0 response code should not be accepted. The result code is helpful for debugging, but the client should regard any error like any other unanswered request, as the responding peer cannot be trusted.

L2 Chain Derivation Specification

Table of Contents


Note the following assumes a single sequencer and batcher. In the future, the design will be adapted to accommodate multiple such entities.

L2 chain derivation β€” deriving L2 blocks from L1 data β€” is one of the main responsibilities of the rollup node, both in validator mode, and in sequencer mode (where derivation acts as a sanity check on sequencing, and enables detecting L1 chain re-organizations).

The L2 chain is derived from the L1 chain. In particular, each L1 block following L2 chain inception is mapped to a sequencing epoch comprising at least one L2 block. Each L2 block belongs to exactly one epoch, and we call the corresponding L1 block its L1 origin. The epoch's number equals that of its L1 origin block.

To derive the L2 blocks of epoch number E, we need the following inputs:

  • L1 blocks in the range [E, E + SWS), called the sequencing window of the epoch, and SWS the sequencing window size. (Note that sequencing windows overlap.)
  • Batcher transactions from blocks in the sequencing window.
    • These transactions allow us to reconstruct the epoch's sequencer batches, each of which will produce one L2 block. Note that:
      • The L1 origin will never contain any data needed to construct sequencer batches since each batch must contain the L1 origin hash.
      • An epoch may have no sequencer batches.
  • Deposits made in the L1 origin (in the form of events emitted by the deposit contract).
  • L1 block attributes from the L1 origin (to derive the L1 attributes deposited transaction).
  • The state of the L2 chain after the last L2 block of the previous epoch, or the L2 genesis state if E is the first epoch.

To derive the whole L2 chain from scratch, we start with the L2 genesis state and the L2 genesis block as the first L2 block. We then derive L2 blocks from each epoch in order, starting at the first L1 block following L2 chain inception. Refer to the Architecture section for more information on how we implement this in practice. The L2 chain may contain pre-Bedrock history, but the L2 genesis here refers to the Bedrock L2 genesis block.

Each L2 block with origin l1_origin is subject to the following constraints (whose values are denominated in seconds):

  • block.timestamp = prev_l2_timestamp + l2_block_time

    • prev_l2_timestamp is the timestamp of the L2 block immediately preceding this one. If there is no preceding block, then this is the genesis block, and its timestamp is explicitly specified.
    • l2_block_time is a configurable parameter of the time between L2 blocks (2s on Optimism).
  • l1_origin.timestamp <= block.timestamp <= max_l2_timestamp, where

    • max_l2_timestamp = max(l1_origin.timestamp + max_sequencer_drift, prev_l2_timestamp + l2_block_time)
      • max_sequencer_drift is a configurable parameter that bounds how far the sequencer can get ahead of the L1.

Finally, each epoch must have at least one L2 block.

The first constraint means there must be an L2 block every l2_block_time seconds following L2 chain inception.

The second constraint ensures that an L2 block timestamp never precedes its L1 origin timestamp, and is never more than max_sequencer_drift ahead of it, except only in the unusual case where it might prohibit an L2 block from being produced every l2_block_time seconds. (Such cases might arise for example under a proof-of-work L1 that sees a period of rapid L1 block production.) In either case, the sequencer enforces len(batch.transactions) == 0 while max_sequencer_drift is exceeded. See Batch Queue for more details.

The final requirement that each epoch must have at least one L2 block ensures that all relevant information from the L1 (e.g. deposits) is represented in the L2, even if it has no sequencer batches.

Post-merge, Ethereum has a fixed 12s block time, though some slots can be skipped. Under a 2s L2 block time, we thus expect each epoch to typically contain 12/2 = 6 L2 blocks. The sequencer will however produce bigger epochs in order to maintain liveness in case of either a skipped slot on the L1 or a temporary loss of connection to it. For the lost connection case, smaller epochs might be produced after the connection was restored to keep L2 timestamps from drifting further and further ahead.

Eager Block Derivation

Deriving an L2 block requires that we have constructed its sequencer batch and derived all L2 blocks and state updates prior to it. This means we can typically derive the L2 blocks of an epoch eagerly without waiting on the full sequencing window. The full sequencing window is required before derivation only in the very worst case where some portion of the sequencer batch for the first block of the epoch appears in the very last L1 block of the window. Note that this only applies to block derivation. Sequencer batches can still be derived and tentatively queued without deriving blocks from them.

Protocol Parameters

The following table gives an overview of some protocol parameters, and how they are affected by protocol upgrades.

ParameterBedrock (default) valueLatest (default) valueChangesNotes
max_sequencer_drift6001800FjordChanged from a chain parameter to a constant with Fjord.
MAX_RLP_BYTES_PER_CHANNEL10,000,000100,000,000FjordConstant increased with Fjord.
MAX_CHANNEL_BANK_SIZE100,000,0001,000,000,000FjordConstant increased with Fjord.
MAX_SPAN_BATCH_ELEMENT_COUNT10,000,00010,000,000Effectively introduced in FjordNumber of elements

Batch Submission

Sequencing & Batch Submission Overview

The sequencer accepts L2 transactions from users. It is responsible for building blocks out of these. For each such block, it also creates a corresponding sequencer batch. It is also responsible for submitting each batch to a data availability provider (e.g. Ethereum calldata), which it does via its batcher component.

The difference between an L2 block and a batch is subtle but important: the block includes an L2 state root, whereas the batch only commits to transactions at a given L2 timestamp (equivalently: L2 block number). A block also includes a reference to the previous block (*).

(*) This matters in some edge case where a L1 reorg would occur and a batch would be reposted to the L1 chain but not the preceding batch, whereas the predecessor of an L2 block cannot possibly change.

This means that even if the sequencer applies a state transition incorrectly, the transactions in the batch will still be considered part of the canonical L2 chain. Batches are still subject to validity checks (i.e. they have to be encoded correctly), and so are individual transactions within the batch (e.g. signatures have to be valid). Invalid batches and invalid individual transactions within an otherwise valid batch are discarded by correct nodes.

If the sequencer applies a state transition incorrectly and posts an output root, then this output root will be incorrect. The incorrect output root will be challenged by a fault proof, then replaced by a correct output root for the existing sequencer batches.

Refer to the Batch Submission specification for more information.

Batch Submission Wire Format

Batch submission is closely tied to L2 chain derivation because the derivation process must decode the batches that have been encoded for the purpose of batch submission.

The batcher submits batcher transactions to a data availability provider. These transactions contain one or multiple channel frames, which are chunks of data belonging to a channel.

A channel is a sequence of sequencer batches (for any L2 blocks) compressed together. The reason to group multiple batches together is simply to obtain a better compression rate, hence reducing data availability costs.

Channels might be too large to fit in a single batcher transaction, hence we need to split it into chunks known as channel frames. A single batcher transaction can also carry multiple frames (belonging to the same or to different channels).

This design gives use the maximum flexibility in how we aggregate batches into channels, and split channels over batcher transactions. It notably allows us to maximize data utilisation in a batcher transaction: for instance it allows us to pack the final (small) frame of a window with large frames from the next window.

In the future this channel identification feature also allows the batcher to employ multiple signers (private keys) to submit one or multiple channels in parallel (1).

(1) This helps alleviate issues where, because of transaction nonce values affecting the L2 tx-pool and thus inclusion: multiple transactions made by the same signer are stuck waiting on the inclusion of a previous transaction.

Also note that we use a streaming compression scheme, and we do not need to know how many blocks a channel will end up containing when we start a channel, or even as we send the first frames in the channel.

And by splitting channels across multiple data transactions, the L2 can have larger block data than the data-availability layer may support.

All of this is illustrated in the following diagram. Explanations below.

batch derivation chain diagram

The first line represents L1 blocks with their numbers. The boxes under the L1 blocks represent batcher transactions included within the block. The squiggles under the L1 blocks represent deposits (more specifically, events emitted by the deposit contract).

Each colored chunk within the boxes represents a channel frame. So A and B are channels whereas A0, A1, B0, B1, B2 are frames. Notice that:

  • multiple channels are interleaved
  • frames do not need to be transmitted in order
  • a single batcher transaction can carry frames from multiple channels

In the next line, the rounded boxes represent individual sequencer batches that were extracted from the channels. The four blue/purple/pink were derived from channel A while the other were derived from channel B. These batches are here represented in the order they were decoded from batches (in this case B is decoded first).

Note The caption here says "Channel B was seen first and will be decoded into batches first", but this is not a requirement. For instance, it would be equally acceptable for an implementation to peek into the channels and decode the one that contains the oldest batches first.

The rest of the diagram is conceptually distinct from the first part and illustrates L2 chain derivation after the channels have been reordered.

The first line shows batcher transactions. Note that in this case, there exists an ordering of the batches that makes all frames within the channels appear contiguously. This is not true in general. For instance, in the second transaction, the position of A1 and B0 could have been inverted for exactly the same result β€” no changes needed in the rest of the diagram.

The second line shows the reconstructed channels in proper order. The third line shows the batches extracted from the channel. Because the channels are ordered and the batches within a channel are sequential, this means the batches are ordered too. The fourth line shows the L2 block derived from each batch. Note that we have a 1-1 batch to block mapping here but, as we'll see later, empty blocks that do not map to batches can be inserted in cases where there are "gaps" in the batches posted on L1.

The fifth line shows the L1 attributes deposited transaction which, within each L2 block, records information about the L1 block that matches the L2 block's epoch. The first number denotes the epoch/L1x number, while the second number (the "sequence number") denotes the position within the epoch.

Finally, the sixth line shows user-deposited transactions derived from the deposit contract event mentioned earlier.

Note the 101-0 L1 attributes transaction on the bottom right of the diagram. Its presence there is only possible if frame B2 indicates that it is the last frame within the channel and (2) no empty blocks must be inserted.

The diagram does not specify the sequencing window size in use, but from this we can infer that it must be at least 4 blocks, because the last frame of channel A appears in block 102, but belong to epoch 99.

As for the comment on "security types", it explains the classification of blocks as used on L1 and L2.

These security levels map to the headBlockHash, safeBlockHash and finalizedBlockHash values transmitted when interacting with the execution-engine API.

Batcher Transaction Format

Batcher transactions are encoded as version_byte ++ rollup_payload (where ++ denotes concatenation).

0frame ... (one or more frames, concatenated)
1da_commitment (experimental, see alt-da)

Unknown versions make the batcher transaction invalid (it must be ignored by the rollup node). All frames in a batcher transaction must be parseable. If any one frame fails to parse, the all frames in the transaction are rejected.

Batch transactions are authenticated by verifying that the to address of the transaction matches the batch inbox address, and the from address matches the batch-sender address in the system configuration at the time of the L1 block that the transaction data is read from.

Frame Format

A channel frame is encoded as:

frame = channel_id ++ frame_number ++ frame_data_length ++ frame_data ++ is_last

channel_id        = bytes16
frame_number      = uint16
frame_data_length = uint32
frame_data        = bytes
is_last           = bool

Where uint32 and uint16 are all big-endian unsigned integers. Type names should be interpreted to and encoded according to the Solidity ABI.

All data in a frame is fixed-size, except the frame_data. The fixed overhead is 16 + 2 + 4 + 1 = 23 bytes. Fixed-size frame metadata avoids a circular dependency with the target total data length, to simplify packing of frames with varying content length.


  • channel_id is an opaque identifier for the channel. It should not be reused and is suggested to be random; however, outside of timeout rules, it is not checked for validity
  • frame_number identifies the index of the frame within the channel
  • frame_data_length is the length of frame_data in bytes. It is capped to 1,000,000 bytes.
  • frame_data is a sequence of bytes belonging to the channel, logically after the bytes from the previous frames
  • is_last is a single byte with a value of 1 if the frame is the last in the channel, 0 if there are frames in the channel. Any other value makes the frame invalid (it must be ignored by the rollup node).

Channel Format

A channel is encoded by applying a streaming compression algorithm to a list of batches:

rlp_batches = []
for batch in batches:


  • batches is the input, a sequence of batches byte-encoded as per the next section ("Batch Encoding")
  • rlp_batches is the concatenation of the RLP-encoded batches
channel_encoding = zlib_compress(rlp_batches)

where zlib_compress is the ZLIB algorithm (as specified in RFC-1950) with no dictionary.

The Fjord upgrade introduces an additional versioned channel encoding format to support alternate compression algorithms.

When decompressing a channel, we limit the amount of decompressed data to MAX_RLP_BYTES_PER_CHANNEL (defined in the Protocol Parameters table), in order to avoid "zip-bomb" types of attack (where a small compressed input decompresses to a humongous amount of data). If the decompressed data exceeds the limit, things proceeds as though the channel contained only the first MAX_RLP_BYTES_PER_CHANNEL decompressed bytes. The limit is set on RLP decoding, so all batches that can be decoded in MAX_RLP_BYTES_PER_CHANNEL will be accepted even if the size of the channel is greater than MAX_RLP_BYTES_PER_CHANNEL. The exact requirement is that length(input) <= MAX_RLP_BYTES_PER_CHANNEL.

While the above pseudocode implies that all batches are known in advance, it is possible to perform streaming compression and decompression of RLP-encoded batches. This means it is possible to start including channel frames in a batcher transaction before we know how many batches (and how many frames) the channel will contain.

Batch Format

Recall that a batch contains a list of transactions to be included in a specific L2 block.

A batch is encoded as batch_version ++ content, where content depends on the batch_version. Prior to the Delta upgrade, batches all have batch_version 0 and are encoded as described below.

0rlp_encode([parent_hash, epoch_number, epoch_hash, timestamp, transaction_list])


  • batch_version is a single byte, prefixed before the RLP contents, alike to transaction typing.
  • rlp_encode is a function that encodes a batch according to the RLP format, and [x, y, z] denotes a list containing items x, y and z
  • parent_hash is the block hash of the previous L2 block
  • epoch_number and epoch_hash are the number and hash of the L1 block corresponding to the sequencing epoch of the L2 block
  • timestamp is the timestamp of the L2 block
  • transaction_list is an RLP-encoded list of EIP-2718 encoded transactions.

The Delta upgrade introduced an additional batch type, span batches.

Unknown versions make the batch invalid (it must be ignored by the rollup node), as do malformed contents.

The epoch_number and the timestamp must also respect the constraints listed in the Batch Queue section, otherwise the batch is considered invalid and will be ignored.


The above primarily describes the general encodings used in L2 chain derivation, primarily how batches are encoded within batcher transactions.

This section describes how the L2 chain is produced from the L1 batches using a pipeline architecture.

A verifier may implement this differently, but must be semantically equivalent to not diverge from the L2 chain.

L2 Chain Derivation Pipeline

Our architecture decomposes the derivation process into a pipeline made up of the following stages:

  1. L1 Traversal
  2. L1 Retrieval
  3. Frame Queue
  4. Channel Bank
  5. Channel Reader (Batch Decoding)
  6. Batch Queue
  7. Payload Attributes Derivation
  8. Engine Queue

The data flows from the start (outer) of the pipeline towards the end (inner). From the innermost stage the data is pulled from the outermost stage.

However, data is processed in reverse order. Meaning that if there is any data to be processed in the last stage, it will be processed first. Processing proceeds in "steps" that can be taken at each stage. We try to take as many steps as possible in the last (most inner) stage before taking any steps in its outer stage, etc.

This ensures that we use the data we already have before pulling more data and minimizes the latency of data traversing the derivation pipeline.

Each stage can maintain its own inner state as necessary. In particular, each stage maintains a L1 block reference (number + hash) to the latest L1 block such that all data originating from previous blocks has been fully processed, and the data from that block is being or has been processed. This allows the innermost stage to account for finalization of the L1 data-availability used to produce the L2 chain, to reflect in the L2 chain forkchoice when the L2 chain inputs become irreversible.

Let's briefly describe each stage of the pipeline.

L1 Traversal

In the L1 Traversal stage, we simply read the header of the next L1 block. In normal operations, these will be new L1 blocks as they get created, though we can also read old blocks while syncing, or in case of an L1 re-org.

Upon traversal of the L1 block, the system configuration copy used by the L1 retrieval stage is updated, such that the batch-sender authentication is always accurate to the exact L1 block that is read by the stage.

L1 Retrieval

In the L1 Retrieval stage, we read the block we get from the outer stage (L1 traversal), and extract data from its batcher transactions. A batcher transaction is one with the following properties:

  • The to field is equal to the configured batcher inbox address.

  • The sender, as recovered from the transaction signature (v, r, and s), is the batcher address loaded from the system config matching the L1 block of the data.

Each batcher transaction is versioned and contains a series of channel frames to be read by the Frame Queue, see Batch Submission Wire Format. Each batcher transaction in the block is processed in the order they appear in the block by passing its calldata on to the next phase.

Frame Queue

The Frame Queue buffers one data-transaction at a time, decoded into channel frames, to be consumed by the next stage. See Batcher transaction format and Frame format specifications.

Channel Bank

The Channel Bank stage is responsible for managing buffering from the channel bank that was written to by the L1 retrieval stage. A step in the channel bank stage tries to read data from channels that are "ready".

Channels are currently fully buffered until read or dropped, streaming channels may be supported in a future version of the ChannelBank.

To bound resource usage, the Channel Bank prunes based on channel size, and times out old channels.

Channels are recorded in FIFO order in a structure called the channel queue. A channel is added to the channel queue the first time a frame belonging to the channel is seen.


After successfully inserting a new frame, the ChannelBank is pruned: channels are dropped in FIFO order, until total_size <= MAX_CHANNEL_BANK_SIZE, where:

  • total_size is the sum of the sizes of each channel, which is the sum of all buffered frame data of the channel, with an additional frame-overhead of 200 bytes per frame.
  • MAX_CHANNEL_BANK_SIZE is a protocol constant defined in the Protocol Parameters table.


The L1 origin that the channel was opened in is tracked with the channel as channel.open_l1_block, and determines the maximum span of L1 blocks that the channel data is retained for, before being pruned.

A channel is timed out if: current_l1_block.number > channel.open_l1_block.number + CHANNEL_TIMEOUT, where:

  • current_l1_block is the L1 origin that the stage is currently traversing.
  • CHANNEL_TIMEOUT is a rollup-configurable, expressed in number of L1 blocks.

New frames for timed-out channels are dropped instead of buffered.


Upon reading, while the first opened channel is timed-out, remove it from the channel-bank.

Prior to the Canyon network upgrade, once the first opened channel, if any, is not timed-out and is ready, then it is read and removed from the channel-bank. After the Canyon network upgrade, the entire channel bank is scanned in FIFO order (by open time) & the first ready (i.e. not timed-out) channel will be returned.

The canyon behavior will activate when frames from a L1 block whose timestamp is greater than or equal to the canyon time first enter the channel queue.

A channel is ready if:

  • The channel is closed
  • The channel has a contiguous sequence of frames until the closing frame

If no channel is ready, the next frame is read and ingested into the channel bank.

Loading frames

When a channel ID referenced by a frame is not already present in the Channel Bank, a new channel is opened, tagged with the current L1 block, and appended to the channel-queue.

Frame insertion conditions:

  • New frames matching timed-out channels that have not yet been pruned from the channel-bank are dropped.
  • Duplicate frames (by frame number) for frames that have not been pruned from the channel-bank are dropped.
  • Duplicate closes (new frame is_last == 1, but the channel has already seen a closing frame and has not yet been pruned from the channel-bank) are dropped.

If a frame is closing (is_last == 1) any existing higher-numbered frames are removed from the channel.

Note that while this allows channel IDs to be reused once they have been pruned from the channel-bank, it is recommended that batcher implementations use unique channel IDs.

Channel Reader (Batch Decoding)

In this stage, we decompress the channel we pull from the last stage, and then parse batches from the decompressed byte stream.

See Channel Format and Batch Format for decompression and decoding specification.

Batch Queue

During the Batch Buffering stage, we reorder batches by their timestamps. If batches are missing for some time slots and a valid batch with a higher timestamp exists, this stage also generates empty batches to fill the gaps.

Batches are pushed to the next stage whenever there is one sequential batch directly following the timestamp of the current safe L2 head (the last block that can be derived from the canonical L1 chain). The parent hash of the batch must also match the hash of the current safe L2 head.

Note that the presence of any gaps in the batches derived from L1 means that this stage will need to buffer for a whole sequencing window before it can generate empty batches (because the missing batch(es) could have data in the last L1 block of the window in the worst case).

A batch can have 4 different forms of validity:

  • drop: the batch is invalid, and will always be in the future, unless we reorg. It can be removed from the buffer.
  • accept: the batch is valid and should be processed.
  • undecided: we are lacking L1 information until we can proceed batch filtering.
  • future: the batch may be valid, but cannot be processed yet and should be checked again later.

The batches are processed in order of the inclusion on L1: if multiple batches can be accept-ed the first is applied. An implementation can defer future batches a later derivation step to reduce validation work.

The batches validity is derived as follows:


  • batch as defined in the Batch format section.
  • epoch = safe_l2_head.l1_origin a L1 origin coupled to the batch, with properties: number (L1 block number), hash (L1 block hash), and timestamp (L1 block timestamp).
  • inclusion_block_number is the L1 block number when batch was first fully derived, i.e. decoded and output by the previous stage.
  • next_timestamp = safe_l2_head.timestamp + block_time is the expected L2 timestamp the next batch should have, see block time information.
  • next_epoch may not be known yet, but would be the L1 block after epoch if available.
  • batch_origin is either epoch or next_epoch, depending on validation.

Note that processing of a batch can be deferred until batch.timestamp <= next_timestamp, since future batches will have to be retained anyway.

Rules, in validation order:

  • batch.timestamp > next_timestamp -> future: i.e. the batch must be ready to process.
  • batch.timestamp < next_timestamp -> drop: i.e. the batch must not be too old.
  • batch.parent_hash != safe_l2_head.hash -> drop: i.e. the parent hash must be equal to the L2 safe head block hash.
  • batch.epoch_num + sequence_window_size < inclusion_block_number -> drop: i.e. the batch must be included timely.
  • batch.epoch_num < epoch.number -> drop: i.e. the batch origin is not older than that of the L2 safe head.
  • batch.epoch_num == epoch.number: define batch_origin as epoch.
  • batch.epoch_num == epoch.number+1:
    • If next_epoch is not known -> undecided: i.e. a batch that changes the L1 origin cannot be processed until we have the L1 origin data.
    • If known, then define batch_origin as next_epoch
  • batch.epoch_num > epoch.number+1 -> drop: i.e. the L1 origin cannot change by more than one L1 block per L2 block.
  • batch.epoch_hash != batch_origin.hash -> drop: i.e. a batch must reference a canonical L1 origin, to prevent batches from being replayed onto unexpected L1 chains.
  • batch.timestamp < batch_origin.time -> drop: enforce the min L2 timestamp rule.
  • batch.timestamp > batch_origin.time + max_sequencer_drift: enforce the L2 timestamp drift rule, but with exceptions to preserve above min L2 timestamp invariant:
    • len(batch.transactions) == 0:
      • epoch.number == batch.epoch_num: this implies the batch does not already advance the L1 origin, and must thus be checked against next_epoch.
        • If next_epoch is not known -> undecided: without the next L1 origin we cannot yet determine if time invariant could have been kept.
        • If batch.timestamp >= next_epoch.time -> drop: the batch could have adopted the next L1 origin without breaking the L2 time >= L1 time invariant.
    • len(batch.transactions) > 0: -> drop: when exceeding the sequencer time drift, never allow the sequencer to include transactions.
  • batch.transactions: drop if the batch.transactions list contains a transaction that is invalid or derived by other means exclusively:
    • any transaction that is empty (zero length byte string)
    • any deposited transactions (identified by the transaction type prefix byte)

If no batch can be accept-ed, and the stage has completed buffering of all batches that can fully be read from the L1 block at height epoch.number + sequence_window_size, and the next_epoch is available, then an empty batch can be derived with the following properties:

  • parent_hash = safe_l2_head.hash
  • timestamp = next_timestamp
  • transactions is empty, i.e. no sequencer transactions. Deposited transactions may be added in the next stage.
  • If next_timestamp < next_epoch.time: the current L1 origin is repeated, to preserve the L2 time invariant.
    • epoch_num = epoch.number
    • epoch_hash = epoch.hash
  • If the batch is the first batch of the epoch, that epoch is used instead of advancing the epoch to ensure that there is at least one L2 block per epoch.
    • epoch_num = epoch.number
    • epoch_hash = epoch.hash
  • Otherwise,
    • epoch_num = next_epoch.number
    • epoch_hash = next_epoch.hash

Payload Attributes Derivation

In the Payload Attributes Derivation stage, we convert the batches we get from the previous stage into instances of the PayloadAttributes structure. Such a structure encodes the transactions that need to figure into a block, as well as other block inputs (timestamp, fee recipient, etc). Payload attributes derivation is detailed in the section Deriving Payload Attributes section below.

This stage maintains its own copy of the system configuration, independent of the L1 retrieval stage. The system configuration is updated with L1 log events whenever the L1 epoch referenced by the batch input changes.

Engine Queue

In the Engine Queue stage, the previously derived PayloadAttributes structures are buffered and sent to the execution engine to be executed and converted into a proper L2 block.

The stage maintains references to three L2 blocks:

  • The finalized L2 head: everything up to and including this block can be fully derived from the finalized (i.e. canonical and forever irreversible) part of the L1 chain.
  • The safe L2 head: everything up to and including this block can be fully derived from the currently canonical L1 chain.
  • The unsafe L2 head: blocks between the safe and unsafe heads are unsafe blocks that have not been derived from L1. These blocks either come from sequencing (in sequencer mode) or from unsafe sync to the sequencer (in validator mode). This is also known as the "latest" head.

Additionally, it buffers a short history of references to recently processed safe L2 blocks, along with references from which L1 blocks each was derived. This history does not have to be complete, but enables later L1 finality signals to be translated into L2 finality.

Engine API usage

To interact with the engine, the execution engine API is used, with the following JSON-RPC methods:

Bedrock, Canyon, Delta: API Usage
  • engine_forkchoiceUpdatedV2 β€” updates the forkchoice (i.e. the chain head) to headBlockHash if different, and instructs the engine to start building an execution payload if the payload attributes parameter is not null.
  • engine_getPayloadV2 β€” retrieves a previously requested execution payload build.
  • engine_newPayloadV2 β€” executes an execution payload to create a block.
Ecotone: API Usage
  • engine_forkchoiceUpdatedV3 β€” updates the forkchoice (i.e. the chain head) to headBlockHash if different, and instructs the engine to start building an execution payload if the payload attributes parameter is not null.
  • engine_getPayloadV3 β€” retrieves a previously requested execution payload build.
  • engine_newPayload

The current version of op-node uses the v3 Engine API RPC methods as well as engine_newPayloadV2, due to engine_newPayloadV3 only supporting Ecotone execution payloads. Both engine_forkchoiceUpdatedV3 and engine_getPayloadV3 are backwards compatible with Bedrock, Canyon & Delta payloads.

Prior versions of op-node used v2 and v1 methods.

The execution payload is an object of type ExecutionPayloadV3.

The ExecutionPayload has the following requirements:

  • Bedrock
    • The withdrawals field MUST be nil
    • The blob gas used field MUST be nil
    • The blob gas limit field MUST be nil
  • Canyon, Delta
    • The withdrawals field MUST be non-nil
    • The withdrawals field MUST be an empty list
    • The blob gas used field MUST be nil
    • The blob gas limit field MUST be nil
  • Ecotone
    • The withdrawals field MUST be non-nil
    • The withdrawals field MUST be an empty list
    • The blob gas used field MUST be 0
    • The blob gas limit field MUST be 0

Forkchoice synchronization

If there are any forkchoice updates to be applied, before additional inputs are derived or processed, then these are applied to the engine first.

This synchronization may happen when:

  • A L1 finality signal finalizes one or more L2 blocks: updating the "finalized" L2 block.
  • A successful consolidation of unsafe L2 blocks: updating the "safe" L2 block.
  • The first thing after a derivation pipeline reset, to ensure a consistent execution engine forkchoice state.

The new forkchoice state is applied by calling fork choice updated on the engine API. On forkchoice-state validity errors the derivation pipeline must be reset to recover to consistent state.

L1-consolidation: payload attributes matching

If the unsafe head is ahead of the safe head, then consolidation is attempted, verifying that existing unsafe L2 chain matches the derived L2 inputs as derived from the canonical L1 data.

During consolidation, we consider the oldest unsafe L2 block, i.e. the unsafe L2 block directly after the safe head. If the payload attributes match this oldest unsafe L2 block, then that block can be considered "safe" and becomes the new safe head.

The following fields of the derived L2 payload attributes are checked for equality with the L2 block:

  • Bedrock, Canyon, Delta, Ecotone Blocks
    • parent_hash
    • timestamp
    • randao
    • fee_recipient
    • transactions_list (first length, then equality of each of the encoded transactions, including deposits)
    • gas_limit
  • Canyon, Delta, Ecotone Blocks
    • withdrawals (first presence, then length, then equality of each of the encoded withdrawals)
  • Ecotone Blocks
    • parent_beacon_block_root

If consolidation succeeds, the forkchoice change will synchronize as described in the section above.

If consolidation fails, the L2 payload attributes will be processed immediately as described in the section below. The payload attributes are chosen in favor of the previous unsafe L2 block, creating an L2 chain reorg on top of the current safe block. Immediately processing the new alternative attributes enables execution engines like go-ethereum to enact the change, as linear rewinds of the tip of the chain may not be supported.

L1-sync: payload attributes processing

If the safe and unsafe L2 heads are identical (whether because of failed consolidation or not), we send the L2 payload attributes to the execution engine to be constructed into a proper L2 block. This L2 block will then become both the new L2 safe and unsafe head.

If a payload attributes created from a batch cannot be inserted into the chain because of a validation error (i.e. there was an invalid transaction or state transition in the block) the batch should be dropped & the safe head should not be advanced. The engine queue will attempt to use the next batch for that timestamp from the batch queue. If no valid batch is found, the rollup node will create a deposit only batch which should always pass validation because deposits are always valid.

Interaction with the execution engine via the execution engine API is detailed in the Communication with the Execution Engine section.

The payload attributes are then processed with a sequence of:

  • Engine: Fork choice updated with current forkchoice state of the stage, and the attributes to start block building.
    • Non-deterministic sources, like the tx-pool, must be disabled to reconstruct the expected block.
  • Engine: Get Payload to retrieve the payload, by the payload-ID in the result of the previous step.
  • Engine: New Payload to import the new payload into the execution engine.
  • Engine: Fork Choice Updated to make the new payload canonical, now with a change of both safe and unsafe fields to refer to the payload, and no payload attributes.

Engine API Error handling:

  • On RPC-type errors the payload attributes processing should be re-attempted in a future step.
  • On payload processing errors the attributes must be dropped, and the forkchoice state must be left unchanged.
    • Eventually the derivation pipeline will produce alternative payload attributes, with or without batches.
    • If the payload attributes only contained deposits, then it is a critical derivation error if these are invalid.
  • On forkchoice-state validity errors the derivation pipeline must be reset to recover to consistent state.

Processing unsafe payload attributes

If no forkchoice updates or L1 data remain to be processed, and if the next possible L2 block is already available through an unsafe source such as the sequencer publishing it via the p2p network, then it is optimistically processed as an "unsafe" block. This reduces later derivation work to just consolidation with L1 in the happy case, and enables the user to see the head of the L2 chain faster than the L1 may confirm the L2 batches.

To process unsafe payloads, the payload must:

  • Have a block number higher than the current safe L2 head.
    • The safe L2 head may only be reorged out due to L1 reorgs.
  • Have a parent blockhash that matches the current unsafe L2 head.
    • This prevents the execution engine individually syncing a larger gap in the unsafe L2 chain.
    • This prevents unsafe L2 blocks from reorging other previously validated L2 blocks.
    • This check may change in the future versions to adopt e.g. the L1 snap-sync protocol.

The payload is then processed with a sequence of:

  • Bedrock/Canyon/Delta Payloads
    • engine_newPayloadV2: process the payload. It does not become canonical yet.
    • engine_forkchoiceUpdatedV2: make the payload the canonical unsafe L2 head, and keep the safe/finalized L2 heads.
  • Ecotone Payloads
    • engine_newPayloadV3: process the payload. It does not become canonical yet.
    • engine_forkchoiceUpdatedV3: make the payload the canonical unsafe L2 head, and keep the safe/finalized L2 heads.

Engine API Error handling:

  • On RPC-type errors the payload processing should be re-attempted in a future step.
  • On payload processing errors the payload must be dropped, and not be marked as canonical.
  • On forkchoice-state validity errors the derivation pipeline must be reset to recover to consistent state.

Resetting the Pipeline

It is possible to reset the pipeline, for instance if we detect an L1 reorg (reorganization). This enables the rollup node to handle L1 chain reorg events.

Resetting will recover the pipeline into a state that produces the same outputs as a full L2 derivation process, but starting from an existing L2 chain that is traversed back just enough to reconcile with the current L1 chain.

Note that this algorithm covers several important use-cases:

  • Initialize the pipeline without starting from 0, e.g. when the rollup node restarts with an existing engine instance.
  • Recover the pipeline if it becomes inconsistent with the execution engine chain, e.g. when the engine syncs/changes.
  • Recover the pipeline when the L1 chain reorganizes, e.g. a late L1 block is orphaned, or a larger attestation failure.
  • Initialize the pipeline to derive a disputed L2 block with prior L1 and L2 history inside a fault-proof program.

Handling these cases also means a node can be configured to eagerly sync L1 data with 0 confirmations, as it can undo the changes if the L1 later does recognize the data as canonical, enabling safe low-latency usage.

The Engine Queue is first reset, to determine the L1 and L2 starting points to continue derivation from. After this, the other stages are reset independent of each other.

Finding the sync starting point

To find the starting point, there are several steps, relative to the head of the chain traversing back:

  1. Find the current L2 forkchoice state
    • If no finalized block can be found, start at the Bedrock genesis block.
    • If no safe block can be found, fallback to the finalized block.
    • The unsafe block should always be available and consistent with the above (it may not be in rare engine-corruption recovery cases, this is being reviewed).
  2. Find the first L2 block with plausible L1 reference to be the new unsafe starting point, starting from previous unsafe, back to finalized and no further.
    • Plausible iff: the L1 origin of the L2 block is known and canonical, or unknown and has a block-number ahead of L1.
  3. Find the first L2 block with an L1 reference older than the sequencing window, to be the new safe starting point, starting at the above plausible unsafe head, back to finalized and no further.
    • If at any point the L1 origin is known but not canonical, the unsafe head is revised to parent of the current.
    • The highest L2 block with known canonical L1 origin is remembered as highest.
    • If at any point the L1 origin in the block is corrupt w.r.t. derivation rules, then error. Corruption includes:
      • Inconsistent L1 origin block number or parent-hash with parent L1 origin
      • Inconsistent L1 sequence number (always changes to 0 for a L1 origin change, or increments by 1 if not)
    • If the L1 origin of the L2 block n is older than the L1 origin of highest by more than a sequence window, and n.sequence_number == 0, then the parent L2 block of n will be the safe starting point.
  4. The finalized L2 block persists as the finalized starting point.
  5. Find the first L2 block with an L1 reference older than the channel-timeout
    • The L1 origin referenced by this block which we call l2base will be the base for the L2 pipeline derivation: By starting here, the stages can buffer any necessary data, while dropping incomplete derivation outputs until L1 traversal has caught up with the actual L2 safe head.

While traversing back the L2 chain, an implementation may sanity-check that the starting point is never set too far back compared to the existing forkchoice state, to avoid an intensive reorg because of misconfiguration.

Implementers note: step 1-4 are known as FindL2Heads. Step 5 is currently part of the Engine Queue reset. This may change to isolate the starting-point search from the bare reset logic.

Resetting derivation stages

  1. L1 Traversal: start at L1 base as first block to be pulled by next stage.
  2. L1 Retrieval: empty previous data, and fetch the base L1 data, or defer the fetching work to a later pipeline step.
  3. Frame Queue: empty the queue.
  4. Channel Bank: empty the channel bank.
  5. Channel Reader: reset any batch decoding state.
  6. Batch Queue: empty the batch queue, use base as initial L1 point of reference.
  7. Payload Attributes Derivation: empty any batch/attributes state.
  8. Engine Queue:
    • Initialize L2 forkchoice state with syncing start point state. (finalized/safe/unsafe)
    • Initialize the L1 point of reference of the stage to base.
    • Require a forkchoice update as first task
    • Reset any finality data

Where necessary, stages starting at base can initialize their system-config from data encoded in the l2base block.

About reorgs Post-Merge

Note that post-merge, the depth of reorgs will be bounded by the L1 finality delay (2 L1 beacon epochs, or approximately 13 minutes, unless more than 1/3 of the network consistently disagrees). New L1 blocks may be finalized every L1 beacon epoch (approximately 6.4 minutes), and depending on these finality-signals and batch-inclusion, the derived L2 chain will become irreversible as well.

Note that this form of finalization only affects inputs, and nodes can then subjectively say the chain is irreversible, by reproducing the chain from these irreversible inputs and the set protocol rules and parameters.

This is however completely unrelated to the outputs posted on L1, which require a form of proof like a fault-proof or zk-proof to finalize. Optimistic-rollup outputs like withdrawals on L1 are only labeled "finalized" after passing a week without dispute (fault proof challenge window), a name-collision with the proof-of-stake finalization.

Deriving Payload Attributes

For every L2 block derived from L1 data, we need to build payload attributes, represented by an expanded version of the PayloadAttributesV2 object, which includes additional transactions and noTxPool fields.

This process happens during the payloads-attributes queue ran by a verifier node, as well as during block-production ran by a sequencer node (the sequencer may enable the tx-pool usage if the transactions are batch-submitted).

Deriving the Transaction List

For each L2 block to be created by the sequencer, we start from a sequencer batch matching the target L2 block number. This could potentially be an empty auto-generated batch, if the L1 chain did not include a batch for the target L2 block number. Remember that the batch includes a sequencing epoch number, an L2 timestamp, and a transaction list.

This block is part of a sequencing epoch, whose number matches that of an L1 block (its L1 origin). This L1 block is used to derive L1 attributes and (for the first L2 block in the epoch) user deposits.

Therefore, a PayloadAttributesV2 object must include the following transactions:

Transactions must appear in this order in the payload attributes.

The L1 attributes are read from the L1 block header, while deposits are read from the L1 block's receipts. Refer to the deposit contract specification for details on how deposits are encoded as log entries.

Network upgrade automation transactions

Some network upgrades require automated contract changes or deployments at specific blocks. To automate these, without adding persistent changes to the execution-layer, special transactions may be inserted as part of the derivation process.


The Ecotone hardfork activation block contains the following transactions, in this order:

  • L1 Attributes Transaction, using the pre-Ecotone setL1BlockValues
  • User deposits from L1
  • Network Upgrade Transactions
    • L1Block deployment
    • GasPriceOracle deployment
    • Update L1Block Proxy ERC-1967 Implementation Slot
    • Update GasPriceOracle Proxy ERC-1967 Implementation Slot
    • GasPriceOracle Enable Ecotone
    • Beacon block roots contract deployment (EIP-4788)

To not modify or interrupt the system behavior around gas computation, this block will not include any sequenced transactions by setting noTxPool: true.

L1Block Deployment

The L1Block contract is upgraded to process the new Ecotone L1-data-fee parameters and L1 blob base-fee.

A deposit transaction is derived with the following attributes:

  • from: 0x4210000000000000000000000000000000000000
  • to: null
  • mint: 0
  • value: 0
  • gasLimit: 375,000
  • data: 0x60806040523480156100105... (full bytecode)
  • sourceHash: 0x877a6077205782ea15a6dc8699fa5ebcec5e0f4389f09cb8eda09488231346f8, computed with the "Upgrade-deposited" type, with `intent = "Ecotone: L1 Block Deployment"

This results in the Ecotone L1Block contract being deployed to 0x07dbe8500fc591d1852B76feE44d5a05e13097Ff, to verify:

cast compute-address --nonce=0 0x4210000000000000000000000000000000000000
Computed Address: 0x07dbe8500fc591d1852B76feE44d5a05e13097Ff

Verify sourceHash:

cast keccak $(cast concat-hex 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 $(cast keccak "Ecotone: L1 Block Deployment"))
# 0x877a6077205782ea15a6dc8699fa5ebcec5e0f4389f09cb8eda09488231346f8

Verify data:

git checkout 5996d0bc1a4721f2169ba4366a014532f31ea932
pnpm clean && pnpm install && pnpm build
jq -r ".bytecode.object" packages/contracts-bedrock/forge-artifacts/L1Block.sol/L1Block.json

This transaction MUST deploy a contract with the following code hash 0xc88a313aa75dc4fbf0b6850d9f9ae41e04243b7008cf3eadb29256d4a71c1dfd.

GasPriceOracle Deployment

The GasPriceOracle contract is upgraded to support the new Ecotone L1-data-fee parameters. Post fork this contract will use the blob base fee to compute the gas price for L1-data-fee transactions.

A deposit transaction is derived with the following attributes:

  • from: 0x4210000000000000000000000000000000000001
  • to: null,
  • mint: 0
  • value: 0
  • gasLimit: 1,000,000
  • data: 0x60806040523480156100... (full bytecode)
  • sourceHash: 0xa312b4510adf943510f05fcc8f15f86995a5066bd83ce11384688ae20e6ecf42 computed with the "Upgrade-deposited" type, with `intent = "Ecotone: Gas Price Oracle Deployment"

This results in the Ecotone GasPriceOracle contract being deployed to 0xb528D11cC114E026F138fE568744c6D45ce6Da7A, to verify:

cast compute-address --nonce=0 0x4210000000000000000000000000000000000001
Computed Address: 0xb528D11cC114E026F138fE568744c6D45ce6Da7A

Verify sourceHash:

❯ cast keccak $(cast concat-hex 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 $(cast keccak "Ecotone: Gas Price Oracle Deployment"))
# 0xa312b4510adf943510f05fcc8f15f86995a5066bd83ce11384688ae20e6ecf42

Verify data:

git checkout 5996d0bc1a4721f2169ba4366a014532f31ea932
pnpm clean && pnpm install && pnpm build
jq -r ".bytecode.object" packages/contracts-bedrock/forge-artifacts/GasPriceOracle.sol/GasPriceOracle.json

This transaction MUST deploy a contract with the following code hash 0x8b71360ea773b4cfaf1ae6d2bd15464a4e1e2e360f786e475f63aeaed8da0ae5.

L1Block Proxy Update

This transaction updates the L1Block Proxy ERC-1967 implementation slot to point to the new L1Block deployment.

A deposit transaction is derived with the following attributes:

  • from: 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
  • to: 0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000015 (L1Block Proxy)
  • mint: 0
  • value: 0
  • gasLimit: 50,000
  • data: 0x3659cfe600000000000000000000000007dbe8500fc591d1852b76fee44d5a05e13097ff
  • sourceHash: 0x18acb38c5ff1c238a7460ebc1b421fa49ec4874bdf1e0a530d234104e5e67dbc computed with the "Upgrade-deposited" type, with `intent = "Ecotone: L1 Block Proxy Update"

Verify data:

cast concat-hex $(cast sig "upgradeTo(address)") $(cast abi-encode "upgradeTo(address)" 0x07dbe8500fc591d1852B76feE44d5a05e13097Ff)

Verify sourceHash:

cast keccak $(cast concat-hex 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 $(cast keccak "Ecotone: L1 Block Proxy Update"))
# 0x18acb38c5ff1c238a7460ebc1b421fa49ec4874bdf1e0a530d234104e5e67dbc
GasPriceOracle Proxy Update

This transaction updates the GasPriceOracle Proxy ERC-1967 implementation slot to point to the new GasPriceOracle deployment.

A deposit transaction is derived with the following attributes:

  • from: 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
  • to: 0x420000000000000000000000000000000000000F (Gas Price Oracle Proxy)
  • mint: 0
  • value: 0
  • gasLimit: 50,000
  • data: 0x3659cfe6000000000000000000000000b528d11cc114e026f138fe568744c6d45ce6da7a
  • sourceHash: 0xee4f9385eceef498af0be7ec5862229f426dec41c8d42397c7257a5117d9230a computed with the "Upgrade-deposited" type, with intent = "Ecotone: Gas Price Oracle Proxy Update"

Verify data:

cast concat-hex $(cast sig "upgradeTo(address)") $(cast abi-encode "upgradeTo(address)" 0xb528D11cC114E026F138fE568744c6D45ce6Da7A)

Verify sourceHash:

cast keccak $(cast concat-hex 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 $(cast keccak "Ecotone: Gas Price Oracle Proxy Update"))
# 0xee4f9385eceef498af0be7ec5862229f426dec41c8d42397c7257a5117d9230a
GasPriceOracle Enable Ecotone

This transaction informs the GasPriceOracle to start using the Ecotone gas calculation formula.

A deposit transaction is derived with the following attributes:

  • from: 0xDeaDDEaDDeAdDeAdDEAdDEaddeAddEAdDEAd0001 (Depositer Account)
  • to: 0x420000000000000000000000000000000000000F (Gas Price Oracle Proxy)
  • mint: 0
  • value: 0
  • gasLimit: 80,000
  • data: 0x22b90ab3
  • sourceHash: 0x0c1cb38e99dbc9cbfab3bb80863380b0905290b37eb3d6ab18dc01c1f3e75f93, computed with the "Upgrade-deposited" type, with `intent = "Ecotone: Gas Price Oracle Set Ecotone"

Verify data:

cast sig "setEcotone()"

Verify sourceHash:

cast keccak $(cast concat-hex 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 $(cast keccak "Ecotone: Gas Price Oracle Set Ecotone"))
# 0x0c1cb38e99dbc9cbfab3bb80863380b0905290b37eb3d6ab18dc01c1f3e75f93
Beacon block roots contract deployment (EIP-4788)

EIP-4788 introduces a "Beacon block roots" contract, that processes and exposes the beacon-block-root values. at address BEACON_ROOTS_ADDRESS = 0x000F3df6D732807Ef1319fB7B8bB8522d0Beac02.

For deployment, EIP-4788 defines a pre-EIP-155 legacy transaction, sent from a key that is derived such that the transaction signature validity is bound to message-hash, which is bound to the input-data, containing the init-code.

However, this type of transaction requires manual deployment and gas-payments. And since the processing is an integral part of the chain processing, and has to be repeated for every OP-Stack chain, the deployment is approached differently here.

Some chains may already have a user-submitted instance of the EIP-4788 transaction. This is cryptographically guaranteed to be correct, but may result in the upgrade transaction deploying a second contract, with the next nonce. The result of this deployment can be ignored.

A Deposit transaction is derived with the following attributes:

  • from: 0x0B799C86a49DEeb90402691F1041aa3AF2d3C875, as specified in the EIP.
  • to: null
  • mint: 0
  • value: 0
  • gasLimit: 0x3d090, as specified in the EIP.
  • isCreation: true
  • data: 0x60618060095f395ff33373fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffe14604d57602036146024575f5ffd5b5f35801560495762001fff810690815414603c575f5ffd5b62001fff01545f5260205ff35b5f5ffd5b62001fff42064281555f359062001fff015500
  • isSystemTx: false, as per the Regolith upgrade, even the system-generated transactions spend gas.
  • sourceHash: 0x69b763c48478b9dc2f65ada09b3d92133ec592ea715ec65ad6e7f3dc519dc00c, computed with the "Upgrade-deposited" type, with intent = "Ecotone: beacon block roots contract deployment"

The contract address upon deployment is computed as rlp([sender, nonce]), which will equal:

  • BEACON_ROOTS_ADDRESS if deployed
  • a different address (0xE3aE1Ae551eeEda337c0BfF6C4c7cbA98dce353B) if nonce = 1: when a user already submitted the EIP transaction before the upgrade.


cast compute-address --nonce=0 0x0B799C86a49DEeb90402691F1041aa3AF2d3C875
# Computed Address: 0x000F3df6D732807Ef1319fB7B8bB8522d0Beac02

Verify sourceHash:

cast keccak $(cast concat-hex 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 $(cast keccak "Ecotone: beacon block roots contract deployment"))
# 0x69b763c48478b9dc2f65ada09b3d92133ec592ea715ec65ad6e7f3dc519dc00c

Building Individual Payload Attributes

After deriving the transactions list, the rollup node constructs a PayloadAttributesV2 as follows:

  • timestamp is set to the batch's timestamp.
  • random is set to the prev_randao L1 block attribute.
  • suggestedFeeRecipient is set to the Sequencer Fee Vault address. See Fee Vaults specification.
  • transactions is the array of the derived transactions: deposited transactions and sequenced transactions, all encoded with EIP-2718.
  • noTxPool is set to true, to use the exact above transactions list when constructing the block.
  • gasLimit is set to the current gasLimit value in the system configuration of this payload.
  • withdrawals is set to nil prior to Canyon and an empty array after Canyon

Batch Submitter

Table of Contents


The batch submitter, also referred to as the batcher, is the entity submitting the L2 sequencer data to L1, to make it available for verifiers.

The format of the data transactions is defined in the derivation spec: the data is constructed from L2 blocks in the reverse order as it is derived from data into L2 blocks.

The timing, operation and transaction signing is implementation-specific: any data can be submitted at any time, but only the data that matches the derivation spec rules will be valid from the verifier perspective.

The most minimal batcher implementation can be defined as a loop of the following operations:

  1. See if the unsafe L2 block number is past the safe block number: unsafe data needs to be submitted.
  2. Iterate over all unsafe L2 blocks, skip any that were previously submitted.
  3. Open a channel, buffer all the L2 block data to be submitted, while applying the encoding and compression as defined in the derivation spec.
  4. Pull frames from the channel to fill data transactions with, until the channel is empty.
  5. Submit the data transactions to L1

The L2 view of safe/unsafe does not instantly update after data is submitted, nor when it gets confirmed on L1, so special care may have to be taken to not duplicate data submissions.

Fault Proof

Table of Contents


A fault proof, also known as fraud proof or interactive game, consists of 3 components:

  • Program: given a commitment to all rollup inputs (L1 data) and the dispute, verify the dispute statelessly.
  • VM: given a stateless program and its inputs, trace any instruction step, and prove it on L1.
  • Interactive Dispute Game: bisect a dispute down to a single instruction, and resolve the base-case using the VM.

Each of these 3 components may have different implementations, which can be combined into different proof stacks, and contribute to proof diversity when resolving a dispute.

"Stateless execution" of the program, and its individual instructions, refers to reproducing the exact same computation by authenticating the inputs with a Pre-image Oracle.

Diagram of Program and VM architecture

Pre-image Oracle

The pre-image oracle is the only form of communication between the Program (in the Client role) and the VM (in the Server role).

The program uses the pre-image oracle to query any input data that is understood to be available to the user:

The communication happens over a simple request-response wire protocol, see Pre-image communication.

Pre-image key types

Pre-images are identified by a bytes32 type-prefixed key:

  • The first byte identifies the type of request.
  • The remaining 31 bytes identify the pre-image key.

Type 0: Zero key

The zero prefix is illegal. This ensures all pre-image keys are non-zero, enabling storage lookup optimizations and avoiding easy mistakes with invalid zeroed keys in the EVM.

Type 1: Local key

Information specific to the dispute: the remainder of the key may be an index, a string, a hash, etc. Only the contract(s) managing this dispute instance may serve the value for this key: it is localized and context-dependent.

This type of key is used for program bootstrapping, to identify the initial input arguments by index or name.

Type 2: Global keccak256 key

This type of key uses a global pre-image store contract, and is fully context-independent and permissionless. I.e. every key must have a single unique value, regardless of chain history or time.

Using a global store reduces duplicate pre-image registration work, and avoids unnecessary contract redeployments per dispute.

This global store contract should be non-upgradeable.

Since keccak256 is a safe 32-byte hash input, the first byte is overwritten with a 2 to derive the key, while keeping the rest of the key "readable" (matching the original hash).

Type 3: Global generic key

Reserved. This scheme allows for unlimited application-layer pre-image types without fault-proof VM redeployments.

This is a generic version of a global key store: key = 0x03 ++ keccak256(x, sender)[1:], where:

  • x is a bytes32, which can be a hash of an arbitrary-length type of cryptographically secure commitment.
  • sender is a bytes32 identifying the pre-image inserter address (left-padded to 32 bytes)

This global store contract should be non-upgradeable.

The global contract is permissionless: users can standardize around external contracts that verify pre-images (i.e. a specific sender will always be trusted for a specific kind of pre-image). The external contract verifies the pre-image before inserting it into the global store for usage by all fault proof VMs without requiring the VM or global store contract to be changed.

Users may standardize around upgradeable external pre-image contracts, in case the implementation of the verification of the pre-image is expected to change.

The store update function is update(x bytes32, offset uint64, span uint8, value bytes32):

  • x is the bytes32 x that the pre-image key is computed with.
  • Only part of the pre-image, starting at offset, and up to (incl.) 32 bytes span can be inserted at a time.
  • Pre-images may have an undefined length (e.g. a stream), we only need to know how many bytes of value are usable.
  • The key and offset will be hashed together to uniquely store the value and span, for later pre-image serving.

This enables fault proof programs to adopt any new pre-image schemes without VM update or contract redeployment.

It is up to the user to index the special pre-image values by this key scheme, as there is no way to revert it to the original commitment without knowing said commitment or value.

Type 4: Global SHA2-256 key

A SHA-256 pre-image.

Key: the SHA-256 hash, with the first byte overwritten with the type byte: 4 ++ sha256(data)[1:].

Type 5: Global EIP-4844 Point-evaluation key

An EIP-4844 point-evaluation. In an EIP-4844 blob, 4096 field elements represent the blob data.

It verifies p(z) = y given commitment that corresponds to the polynomial p(x) and a KZG proof. The value y is the pre-image. The value z is part of the key; the index of the point within the blob. The commitment is part of the key.

Each element is proven with a point-evaluation.

Key: 5 ++ keccak256(commitment ++ z)[1:], where:

  • 5 is the type byte
  • ++ is concatenation
  • commitment is a bytes48, representing the KZG commitment.
  • z is a big-endian uint256

Type 6: Global Precompile key

A precompile result. It maps directly to precompiles on Ethereum.

This preimage key can be used to avoid running expensive precompile operations in the program.

Key: 6 ++ keccak256(precompile ++ input)[1:], where:

  • 6 is the type byte
  • ++ is concatenation
  • precompile is the 20-byte address of the precompile contract
  • input is the input to the precompile contract

The result is identical to that of a call to the precompile contract, prefixed with a revert indicator:

  • reverted ++ precompile_result.

reverted is a 1-byte indicator with a 0 value if the precompile reverts for the given input, otherwise it's 1.

Type 7-128: reserved range

Range start and end both inclusive.

This range of key types is reserved for future usage by the core protocol. E.g. version changes, contract migrations, chain-data, additional core features, etc.

128 specifically (1000 0000 in binary) is reserved for key-type length-extension (reducing the content part to 30 or less key bytes), if the need arises.

Type 129-255: application usage

This range of key types may be used by forks or customized versions of the fault proof protocol.


Initial inputs are deterministic, but not necessarily singular or global: there may be multiple different disputes at the same time, each with its own disputed claims and L1 context.

To bootstrap, the program requests the initial inputs from the VM, using pre-image key type 1.

The VM is aware of the external context, and maps requested pre-image keys based on their type, i.e. a local lookup for type 1, or global one for 2, and optionally support other key-types.


There is one more form of optional communication between client and server: pre-image hinting. Hinting is optional, and is a no-op in a L1 VM implementation.

The hint itself comes at very low cost onchain: the hint can be a single write sys-call, which is instant as the memory to write as hint does not actually need to be loaded as part of the onchain proof.

Hinting allows the program, when generating a proof offchain, to instruct the VM what data it is interested in.

The VM can choose to execute the requested hint at any time: either locally (for standard requests), or in a modular form by redirecting the hint to tooling that may come with the VM program.

Hints do not have to be executed directly: they may first just be logged to show the intents of the program, and the latest hint may be buffered for lazy execution, or dropped entirely when in read-only mode (like onchain).

When the pre-image oracle serves a request, and the request cannot be served from an existing collection of pre-images (e.g. a local pre-image cache) then the VM can execute the hint to retrieve the missing pre-image(s). It is the responsibility of the program to provide sufficient hinting for every pre-image request. Some hints may have to be repeated: the VM only has to execute the last hint when handling a missing pre-image.

Note that hints may produce multiple pre-images: e.g. a hint for an ethereum block with transaction list may prepare pre-images for the header, each of the transactions, and the intermediate merkle-nodes that form the transactions-list Merkle Patricia Trie.

Hinting is implemented with a request-acknowledgement wire-protocol over a blocking two-way stream:

<request> := <length prefix> <hint bytes>

<response> := <ack>

<length prefix> := big-endian uint32  # length of <hint bytes>
<hint bytes> := byte sequence
<ack> := 1-byte zero value

The ack informs the client that the hint has been processed. Servers may respond to hints and pre-image (see below) requests asynchronously as they are on separate streams. To avoid requesting pre-images that are not yet fetched, clients should request the pre-image only after it has observed the hint acknowledgement.

Pre-image communication

Pre-images are communicated with a minimal wire-protocol over a blocking two-way stream. This protocol can be implemented with blocking read/write syscalls.

<request> := <bytes32>  # the type-prefixed pre-image key

<response> := <length prefix> <pre-image bytes>

<length prefix> := big-endian uint64  # length of <pre-image bytes>, note: uint64

The <length prefix> here may be arbitrarily high: the client can stop reading at any time if the required part of the pre-image has been read.

After the client writes new <request> bytes, the server should be prepared to respond with the pre-image starting from offset == 0 upon read calls.

The server may limit read results artificially to only a small amount of bytes at a time, even though the full pre-image is ready: this is expected regular IO protocol, and the client will just have to continue to read the small results at a time, until 0 bytes are read, indicating EOF. This enables the server to serve e.g. at most 32 bytes at a time or align reads with VM memory structure, to limit the amount of VM state that changes per syscall instruction, and thus keep the proof size per instruction bounded.

Fault Proof Program

The Fault Proof Program defines the verification of claims of the state-transition outputs of the L2 rollup as a pure function of L1 data.

The op-program is the reference implementation of the program, based on op-node and op-geth implementations.

The program consists of:

  • Prologue: load the inputs, given minimal bootstrapping, with possible test-overrides.
  • Main content: process the L2 state-transition, i.e. derive the state changes from the L1 inputs.
  • Epilogue: inspect the state changes to verify the claim.


The program is bootstrapped with two primary inputs:

  • l1_head: the L1 block hash that will be perceived as the tip of the L1 chain, authenticating all prior L1 history.
  • dispute: identity of the claim to verify.

Bootstrapping happens through special input requests to the host of the program.

Additionally, there are implied inputs, which are derived from the above primary inputs, but can be overridden for testing purposes:

  • l2_head: the L2 block hash that will be perceived as the previously agreed upon tip of the L2 chain, authenticating all prior L2 history.
  • Chain configurations: chain configuration may be baked into the program, or determined from attributes of the identified dispute on L1.
    • l1_chain_config: The chain-configuration of the L1 chain (also known as l1_genesis.json)
    • l2_chain_config: The chain-configuration of the L2 chain (also known as l2_genesis.json)
    • rollup_config: The rollup configuration used by the rollup-node (also known as rollup.json)

The implied inputs rely on L1-introspection to load attributes of the dispute through the dispute game interface, in the L1 history up and till the specified l1_head. The dispute may be the claim itself, or a pointer to specific prior claimed data in L1, depending on the dispute game interface.

Implied inputs are loaded in a "prologue" before the actual core state-transition function executes. During testing a simplified prologue that loads the overrides may be used.

Note: only the test-prologues are currently supported, since the dispute game interface is actively changing.

Main content

To verify a claim about L2 state, the program first reproduces the L2 state by applying L1 data to prior agreed L2 history.

This process is also known as the L2 derivation process, and matches the processing in the rollup node and execution-engine.

The difference is that rather than retrieving inputs from an RPC and applying state changes to disk, the inputs are loaded through the pre-image oracle and the changes accumulate in memory.

The derivation executes with two data-sources:

  • Interface to read-only L1 chain, backed by the pre-image oracle:
    • The l1_head determines the view over the available L1 data: no later L1 data is available.
    • The implementation of the chain traverses the header-chain from the l1_head down to serve by-number queries.
    • The l1_head is the L1 unsafe head, safe head, and finalized head.
  • Interface to L2 engine API
    • Prior L2 chain history is backed by the pre-image oracle, similar to the L1 chain:
      • The initial l2_head determines the view over the initial available L2 history: no later L2 data is available.
      • The implementation of the chain traverses the header-chain from the l2_head down to serve by-number queries.
      • The l2_head is the initial L2 unsafe head, safe head, and finalized head.
    • New L2 chain history accumulates in memory.
      • Although the pre-image oracle can be used to retrieve data by hash if memory is limited, the program should prefer to keep the newly created chain data in memory, to minimize pre-image oracle access.
      • The L2 unsafe head, safe head, and finalized L2 head will potentially change as derivation progresses.
      • L2 state consists of the diff of changes in memory, and any unchanged state nodes accessible through the read-only L2 history view.

See Pre-image routes for specifications of the pre-image oracle backing of these data sources.

Using these data-sources, the derivation pipeline is processed till we hit one of two conditions:

  • EOF: when we run out of L1 data, the L2 chain will not change further, and the epilogue can start.
  • Eager epilogue condition: depending on the type of claim to verify, if the L2 result is irreversible (i.e. no later L1 inputs can override it), the processing may end early when the result is ready. E.g. when asserting state at a specific L2 block, rather than the very tip of the L2 chain.


While the main-content produces the disputed L2 state already, the epilogue concludes what this means for the disputed claim.

The program produces a binary output to verify the claim, using a standard single-byte Unix exit-code:

  • a 0 for success, i.e. the claim is correct.
  • a non-zero code for failure, i.e. the claim is incorrect.
    • 1 should be preferred for identifying an incorrect claim.
    • Other non-zero exit codes may indicate runtime failure, e.g. a bug in the program code may resolve in a kind of panic or unexpected error. Safety should be preferred over liveness in this case, and the claim will fail.

To assert the disputed claim, the epilogue, like the main content, can introspect L1 and L2 chain data and post-process it further, to then make a statement about the claim with the final exit code.

A disputed output-root may be disproven by first producing the output-root, and then comparing it:

  1. Retrieve the output attributes from the L2 chain view: the state-root, block-hash, withdrawals storage-root.
  2. Compute the output-root, as the proposer should compute it.
  3. If the output-root matches the claim, exit with code 0. Otherwise, exit with code 1.

Note: the dispute game interface is actively changing, and may require additional claim assertions. the output-root epilogue may be replaced or extended for general L2 message proving.

Pre-image hinting routes

The fault proof program implements hint handling for the VM to use, as well as any program testing outside of VM environment. This can be exposed via a CLI, or alternative inter-process API.

Every instance of <blockhash> in the below routes is 0x-prefixed, lowercase, hex-encoded.

l1-block-header <blockhash>

Requests the host to prepare the L1 block header RLP pre-image of the block <blockhash>.

l1-transactions <blockhash>

Requests the host to prepare the list of transactions of the L1 block with <blockhash>: prepare the RLP pre-images of each of them, including transactions-list MPT nodes.

l1-receipts <blockhash>

Requests the host to prepare the list of receipts of the L1 block with <blockhash>: prepare the RLP pre-images of each of them, including receipts-list MPT nodes.

l1-precompile <precompile ++ inputbytes>

Requests the host to prepare the result of an L1 call to the precompile address given <inputbytes> as the input. The host also prepares a global keccak256 preimage of the hint data <precompile ++ inputbytes>.

l2-block-header <blockhash>

Requests the host to prepare the L2 block header RLP pre-image of the block <blockhash>.

l2-transactions <blockhash>

Requests the host to prepare the list of transactions of the L2 block with <blockhash>: prepare the RLP pre-images of each of them, including transactions-list MPT nodes.

l2-code <codehash>

Requests the host to prepare the L2 smart-contract code with the given <codehash>.

l2-state-node <nodehash>

Requests the host to prepare the L2 MPT node preimage with the given <nodehash>.

l2-output <outputroot>

Requests the host to prepare the L2 Output at the l2 output root <outputroot>. The L2 Output is the preimage of a computed output root.

Precompile Accelerators

Precompiles that are too expensive to be executed in a fault-proof VM can be executed more efficiently using the pre-image oracle. This approach ensures that the fault proof program can complete a state transition in a reasonable amount of time.

During program execution, the precompiles are substituted with interactions with pre-image oracle. The program hints the host for a precompile input. Which it the subsequently retrieves the result of the precompile opereation using the type 6 global precompile key. All accelerated precompiles must be functionally equivalent to their EVM equivalent.

Fault Proof VM

A fault proof VM implements:

  • a smart-contract to verify a single execution-trace step, e.g. a single MIPS instruction.
  • a CLI command to generate a proof of a single execution-trace step.
  • a CLI command to compute a VM state-root at step N

A fault proof VM relies on a fault proof program to provide an interface for fetching any missing pre-images based on hints.

The VM emulates the program, as prepared for the VM target architecture, and generates the state-root or instruction proof data as requested through the VM CLI.

Refer to the documentation of the fault proof VM for further usage information.

Fault Proof VMs:

  • Cannon: big-endian 32-bit MIPS proof, by OP Labs, in active development.
  • cannon-rs: Rust implementation of Cannon, by @clabby, in active development.
  • Asterisc: little-endian 64-bit RISC-V proof, by @protolambda, in active development.

Fault Proof Interactive Dispute Game

The interactive dispute game allows actors to resolve a dispute with an onchain challenge-response game that bisects to a disagreed block state transition, and then over the execution trace of the VM which models this state transition, bounded with a base-case that proves a single VM trace step.

The game is multi-player: different non-aligned actors may participate when bonded.

Response time is allocated based on the remaining time in the branch of the tree and alignment with the claim. The allocated response time is limited by the dispute-game window, and any additional time necessary based on L1 fee changes when bonds are insufficient.

Note: the timed, bonded, bisection dispute game is in development. Also see fault dispute-game specs for fault dispute game system specifications, And dispute-game-interface specs

Cannon Fault Proof Virtual Machine

Table of Contents


This is a description of the Cannon Fault Proof Virtual Machine (FPVM). The Cannon FPVM emulates a minimal Linux-based system running on big-endian 32-bit MIPS32 architecture. A lot of its behaviors are copied from Linux/MIPS with a few tweaks made for fault proofs. For the rest of this doc, we refer to the Cannon FPVM as simply the FPVM.

Operationally, the FPVM is a state transition function. This state transition is referred to as a Step, that executes a single instruction. We say the VM is a function , given an input state , steps on a single instruction encoded in the state to produce a new state .

Thus, the trace of a program executed by the FPVM is an ordered set of VM states.


The virtual machine state highlights the effects of running a Fault Proof Program on the VM. It consists of the following fields:

  1. memRoot - A bytes32 value representing the merkle root of VM memory.
  2. preimageKey - bytes32 value of the last requested pre-image key.
  3. preimageOffset - The 32-bit value of the last requested pre-image offset.
  4. pc - 32-bit program counter.
  5. nextPC - 32-bit next program counter. Note that this value may not always be when executing a branch/jump delay slot.
  6. lo - 32-bit MIPS LO special register.
  7. hi - 32-bit MIPS HI special register.
  8. heap - 32-bit base address of the most recent memory allocation via mmap.
  9. exitCode - 8-bit exit code.
  10. exited - 8-bit indicator that the VM has exited.
  11. step - 8-byte step counter.
  12. registers - General-purpose MIPS32 registers. Each register is a 32-bit value.

The state is represented by packing the above fields, in order, into a 226-byte buffer.

State Hash

The state hash is computed by hashing the 226-byte state buffer with the Keccak256 hash function and then setting the high-order byte to the respective VM status.

The VM status can be derived from the state's exited and exitCode fields.

enum VmStatus {
    Valid = 0,
    Invalid = 1,
    Panic = 2,
    Unfinished = 3,

fn vm_status(exit_code: u8, exited: bool) -> u8 {
    if exited {
        match exit_code {
            0 => VmStatus::Valid,
            1 => VmStatus::Invalid,
            _ => VmStatus::Panic,
    } else {


Memory is represented as a binary merkle tree. The tree has a fixed-depth of 27 levels, with leaf values of 32 bytes each. This spans the full 32-bit address space, where each leaf contains the memory at that part of the tree. The state memRoot represents the merkle root of the tree, reflecting the effects of memory writes. As a result of this memory representation, all memory operations are 4-byte aligned. Memory access doesn't require any privileges. An instruction step can access any memory location as the entire address space is unprotected.


FPVM state contains a heap that tracks the base address of the most recent memory allocation. Heap pages are bump allocated at the page boundary, per mmap syscall. mmap-ing is purely to satisfy program runtimes that need the memory-pointer result of the syscall to locate free memory. The page size is 4096.

The FPVM has a fixed program break at 0x40000000. However, the FPVM is permitted to extend the heap beyond this limit via mmap syscalls. For simplicity, there are no memory protections against "heap overruns" against other memory segments. Such VM steps are still considered valid state transitions.

Specification of memory mappings is outside the scope of this document as it is irrelevant to the VM state. FPVM implementers may refer to the Linux/MIPS kernel for inspiration.

Delay Slots

The post-state of a step updates the nextPC, indicating the instruction following the pc. However, in the case of where a branch instruction is being stepped, the nextPC post-state is set to the branch target. And the pc post-state set to the branch delay slot as usual.

A VM state transition is invalid whenever the current instruction is a delay slot that is filled with jump or branch type instruction. That is, where while stepping on a jump/branch instruction. Otherwise, there would be two consecutive delay slots. While this is considered "undefined" behavior in typical MIPS implementations, FPVM must raise an exception when stepping on such states.


Syscalls work similar to Linux/MIPS, including the syscall calling conventions and general syscall handling behavior. However, the FPVM supports a subset of Linux/MIPS syscalls with slightly different behaviors. The following table list summarizes the supported syscalls and their behaviors.

$v0system call$a0$a1$a2Effect
4090mmapuint32 addruint32 len🚫Allocates a page from the heap. See heap for details.
4045brk🚫🚫🚫Returns a fixed address for the program break at 0x40000000
4120clone🚫🚫🚫Returns 1
4246exit_groupuint8 exit_code🚫🚫Sets the Exited and ExitCode states to true and $a0 respectively.
4003readuint32 fdchar *bufuint32 countSimilar behavior as Linux/MIPS with support for unaligned reads. See I/O for more details.
4004writeuint32 fdchar *bufuint32 countSimilar behavior as Linux/MIPS with support for unaligned writes. See I/O for more details.
4055fcntluint32 fdint32 cmd🚫Similar behavior as Linux/MIPS. Only the F_GETFL (3) cmd is supported. Sets errno to 0x16 for all other commands

For all of the above syscalls, an error is indicated by setting the return register ($v0) to 0xFFFFFFFF (-1) and errno ($a3) is set accordingly. The VM must not modify any register other than $v0 and $a3 during syscall handling. For unsupported syscalls, the VM must do nothing except to zero out the syscall return ($v0) and errno ($a3) registers.

Note that the above syscalls have identical syscall numbers and ABIs as Linux/MIPS.


The VM does not support Linux open(2). However, the VM can read from and write to a predefined set of file descriptors.

NameFile descriptorDescription
stdin0read-only standard input stream.
stdout1write-only standard output stream.
stderr2write-only standard error stream.
hint response3read-only. Used to read the status of pre-image hinting.
hint request4write-only. Used to provide pre-image hints
pre-image response5read-only. Used to read pre-images.
pre-image request6write-only. Used to request pre-images.

Syscalls referencing unknown file descriptors fail with an EBADF errno as done on Linux.

Writing to and reading from standard output, input and error streams have no effect on the FPVM state. FPVM implementations may use them for debugging purposes as long as I/O is stateless.

All I/O operations are restricted to a maximum of 4 bytes per operation. Any read or write syscall request exceeding this limit will be truncated to 4 bytes. Consequently, the return value of read/write syscalls is at most 4, indicating the actual number of bytes read/written.

Standard Streams

Writing to stderr/stdout standard stream always succeeds with the write count input returned, effectively continuing execution without writing work. Reading from stdin has no effect other than to return zero and errno set to 0, signalling that there is no input.

Hint Communication

Hint requests and responses have no effect on the VM state other than setting the $v0 return register to the requested read/write count. VM implementations may utilize hints to setup subsequent pre-image requests.

Pre-image Communication

The preimageKey and preimageOffset state are updated via read/write syscalls to the pre-image read and write file descriptors (see I/O). The preimageKey buffers the stream of bytes written to the pre-image write fd. The preimageKey buffer is shifted to accommodate new bytes written to the end of it. A write also resets the preimageOffset to 0, indicating the intent to read a new pre-image.

When handling pre-image reads, the preimageKey is used to lookup the pre-image data from an Oracle. A max 4-byte chunk of the pre-image at the preimageOffset is read to the specified address. Each read operation increases the preimageOffset by the number of bytes requested (truncated to 4 bytes and subject to alignment constraints).

Pre-image I/O Alignment

As mentioned earlier in memory, all memory operations are 4-byte aligned. Since pre-image I/O occurs on memory, all pre-image I/O operations must strictly adhere to alignment boundaries. This means the start and end of a read/write operation must fall within the same alignment boundary. If an operation were to violate this, the input count of the read/write syscall must be truncated such that the effective address of the last byte read/written matches the input effective address.

The VM must read/write the maximum amount of bytes possible without crossing the input address alignment boundary. For example, the effect of a write request for a 3-byte aligned buffer must be exactly 3 bytes. If the buffer is misaligned, then the VM may write less than 3 bytes depending on the size of the misalignment.


The FPVM may raise an exception rather than output a post-state to signal an invalid state transition. Nominally, the FPVM must raise an exception in at least the following cases:

  • Invalid instruction (either via an invalid opcode or an instruction referencing registers outside the general purpose registers).
  • Pre-image read at an offset larger than the size of the pre-image.
  • Delay slot contains branch/jump instruction types.

VM implementations may raise an exception in other cases that is specific to the implementation. For example, an on-chain FPVM that relies on pre-supplied merkle proofs for memory access may raise an exception if the supplied merkle proof does not match the pre-state memRoot.

Stage One Decentralization

This section of the specification contains the system design for stage one decentralization, with a fault-proof system for output proposals and the integration with the OptimismPortal contract, which is the arbiter of withdrawals on L1.

Dispute Game Interface

Table of Contents


A dispute game is played between multiple parties when contesting the truthiness of a claim. In the context of an optimistic rollup, claims are made about the state of the layer two network to enable withdrawals to the layer one. A proposer makes a claim about the layer two state such that they can withdraw and a challenger can dispute the validity of the claim. The security of the layer two comes from the ability of fraudulent withdrawals being able to be disputed.

A dispute game interface is defined to allow for multiple implementations of dispute games to exist. If multiple dispute games run in production, it gives a similar security model as having multiple protocol clients, as a bug in a single dispute game will not result in the bug becoming consensus.


For added context, we define a few types that are used in the following snippets.

/// @notice A `Claim` type represents a 32 byte hash or other unique identifier for a claim about
///         a certain piece of information.
type Claim is bytes32;

/// @notice A custom type for a generic hash.
type Hash is bytes32;

/// @notice A dedicated timestamp type.
type Timestamp is uint64;

/// @notice A `GameType` represents the type of game being played.
type GameType is uint32;

/// @notice A `GameId` represents a packed 4 byte game ID, a 8 byte timestamp, and a 20 byte address.
/// @dev The packed layout of this type is as follows:
/// β”Œβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”¬β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”
/// β”‚   Bits    β”‚   Value   β”‚
/// β”œβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”Όβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€
/// β”‚ [0, 32)   β”‚ Game Type β”‚
/// β”‚ [32, 96)  β”‚ Timestamp β”‚
/// β”‚ [96, 256) β”‚ Address   β”‚
/// β””β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”΄β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”˜
type GameId is bytes32;

/// @title GameTypes
/// @notice A library that defines the IDs of games that can be played.
library GameTypes {
    /// @dev A dispute game type the uses the cannon vm.
    GameType internal constant CANNON = GameType.wrap(0);

    /// @dev A dispute game type that performs output bisection and then uses the cannon vm.
    GameType internal constant OUTPUT_CANNON = GameType.wrap(1);

    /// @notice A dispute game type that performs output bisection and then uses an alphabet vm.
    ///         Not intended for production use.
    GameType internal constant OUTPUT_ALPHABET = GameType.wrap(254);

    /// @notice A dispute game type that uses an alphabet vm.
    ///         Not intended for production use.
    GameType internal constant ALPHABET = GameType.wrap(255);

/// @notice The current status of the dispute game.
enum GameStatus {
    /// @dev The game is currently in progress, and has not been resolved.
    /// @dev The game has concluded, and the `rootClaim` was challenged successfully.
    /// @dev The game has concluded, and the `rootClaim` could not be contested.

DisputeGameFactory Interface

The dispute game factory is responsible for creating new DisputeGame contracts given a GameType and a root Claim. Challenger agents listen to the DisputeGameCreated events in order to keep up with on-going disputes in the protocol and participate accordingly.

A clones-with-immutable-args factory (originally by @wighawag, but forked and improved by @Vectorized) is used to create Clones. Each GameType has a corresponding implementation within the factory, and when a new game is created, the factory creates a clone of the GameType's pre-deployed implementation contract.

The rootClaim of created dispute games can either be a claim that the creator agrees or disagrees with. This is an implementation detail that is left up to the IDisputeGame to handle within its resolve function.

When the DisputeGameFactory creates a new DisputeGame contract, it calls initialize() on the clone to set up the game.

/// @title IDisputeGameFactory
/// @notice The interface for a DisputeGameFactory contract.
interface IDisputeGameFactory {
    /// @notice Emitted when a new dispute game is created
    /// @param disputeProxy The address of the dispute game proxy
    /// @param gameType The type of the dispute game proxy's implementation
    /// @param rootClaim The root claim of the dispute game
    event DisputeGameCreated(address indexed disputeProxy, GameType indexed gameType, Claim indexed rootClaim);

    /// @notice Emitted when a new game implementation added to the factory
    /// @param impl The implementation contract for the given `GameType`.
    /// @param gameType The type of the DisputeGame.
    event ImplementationSet(address indexed impl, GameType indexed gameType);

    /// @notice Emitted when a game type's initialization bond is updated
    /// @param gameType The type of the DisputeGame.
    /// @param newBond The new bond (in wei) for initializing the game type.
    event InitBondUpdated(GameType indexed gameType, uint256 indexed newBond);

    /// @notice Information about a dispute game found in a `findLatestGames` search.
    struct GameSearchResult {
        uint256 index;
        GameId metadata;
        Timestamp timestamp;
        Claim rootClaim;
        bytes extraData;

    /// @notice The total number of dispute games created by this factory.
    /// @return gameCount_ The total number of dispute games created by this factory.
    function gameCount() external view returns (uint256 gameCount_);

    /// @notice `games` queries an internal mapping that maps the hash of
    ///         `gameType ++ rootClaim ++ extraData` to the deployed `DisputeGame` clone.
    /// @dev `++` equates to concatenation.
    /// @param _gameType The type of the DisputeGame - used to decide the proxy implementation
    /// @param _rootClaim The root claim of the DisputeGame.
    /// @param _extraData Any extra data that should be provided to the created dispute game.
    /// @return proxy_ The clone of the `DisputeGame` created with the given parameters.
    ///         Returns `address(0)` if nonexistent.
    /// @return timestamp_ The timestamp of the creation of the dispute game.
    function games(
        GameType _gameType,
        Claim _rootClaim,
        bytes calldata _extraData
        returns (IDisputeGame proxy_, Timestamp timestamp_);

    /// @notice `gameAtIndex` returns the dispute game contract address and its creation timestamp
    ///          at the given index. Each created dispute game increments the underlying index.
    /// @param _index The index of the dispute game.
    /// @return gameType_ The type of the DisputeGame - used to decide the proxy implementation.
    /// @return timestamp_ The timestamp of the creation of the dispute game.
    /// @return proxy_ The clone of the `DisputeGame` created with the given parameters.
    ///         Returns `address(0)` if nonexistent.
    function gameAtIndex(uint256 _index)
        returns (GameType gameType_, Timestamp timestamp_, IDisputeGame proxy_);

    /// @notice `gameImpls` is a mapping that maps `GameType`s to their respective
    ///         `IDisputeGame` implementations.
    /// @param _gameType The type of the dispute game.
    /// @return impl_ The address of the implementation of the game type.
    ///         Will be cloned on creation of a new dispute game with the given `gameType`.
    function gameImpls(GameType _gameType) external view returns (IDisputeGame impl_);

    /// @notice Returns the required bonds for initializing a dispute game of the given type.
    /// @param _gameType The type of the dispute game.
    /// @return bond_ The required bond for initializing a dispute game of the given type.
    function initBonds(GameType _gameType) external view returns (uint256 bond_);

    /// @notice Creates a new DisputeGame proxy contract.
    /// @param _gameType The type of the DisputeGame - used to decide the proxy implementation.
    /// @param _rootClaim The root claim of the DisputeGame.
    /// @param _extraData Any extra data that should be provided to the created dispute game.
    /// @return proxy_ The address of the created DisputeGame proxy.
    function create(
        GameType _gameType,
        Claim _rootClaim,
        bytes calldata _extraData
        returns (IDisputeGame proxy_);

    /// @notice Sets the implementation contract for a specific `GameType`.
    /// @dev May only be called by the `owner`.
    /// @param _gameType The type of the DisputeGame.
    /// @param _impl The implementation contract for the given `GameType`.
    function setImplementation(GameType _gameType, IDisputeGame _impl) external;

    /// @notice Sets the bond (in wei) for initializing a game type.
    /// @dev May only be called by the `owner`.
    /// @param _gameType The type of the DisputeGame.
    /// @param _initBond The bond (in wei) for initializing a game type.
    function setInitBond(GameType _gameType, uint256 _initBond) external;

    /// @notice Returns a unique identifier for the given dispute game parameters.
    /// @dev Hashes the concatenation of `gameType . rootClaim . extraData`
    ///      without expanding memory.
    /// @param _gameType The type of the DisputeGame.
    /// @param _rootClaim The root claim of the DisputeGame.
    /// @param _extraData Any extra data that should be provided to the created dispute game.
    /// @return uuid_ The unique identifier for the given dispute game parameters.
    function getGameUUID(
        GameType _gameType,
        Claim _rootClaim,
        bytes memory _extraData
        returns (Hash uuid_);

    /// @notice Finds the `_n` most recent `GameId`'s of type `_gameType` starting at `_start`. If there are less than
    ///         `_n` games of type `_gameType` starting at `_start`, then the returned array will be shorter than `_n`.
    /// @param _gameType The type of game to find.
    /// @param _start The index to start the reverse search from.
    /// @param _n The number of games to find.
    function findLatestGames(
        GameType _gameType,
        uint256 _start,
        uint256 _n
        returns (GameSearchResult[] memory games_);

DisputeGame Interface

The dispute game interface defines a generic, black-box dispute. It exposes stateful information such as the status of the dispute, when it was created, as well as the bootstrap data and dispute type. This interface exposes one state mutating function, resolve, which when implemented should deterministically yield an opinion about the rootClaim and reflect the opinion by updating the status to CHALLENGER_WINS or DEFENDER_WINS.

Clones of the IDisputeGame's initialize functions will be called by the DisputeGameFactory atomically upon creation.

/// @title IDisputeGame
/// @notice The generic interface for a DisputeGame contract.
interface IDisputeGame is IInitializable {
    /// @notice Emitted when the game is resolved.
    /// @param status The status of the game after resolution.
    event Resolved(GameStatus indexed status);

    /// @notice Returns the timestamp that the DisputeGame contract was created at.
    /// @return createdAt_ The timestamp that the DisputeGame contract was created at.
    function createdAt() external view returns (Timestamp createdAt_);

    /// @notice Returns the timestamp that the DisputeGame contract was resolved at.
    /// @return resolvedAt_ The timestamp that the DisputeGame contract was resolved at.
    function resolvedAt() external view returns (Timestamp resolvedAt_);

    /// @notice Returns the current status of the game.
    /// @return status_ The current status of the game.
    function status() external view returns (GameStatus status_);

    /// @notice Getter for the game type.
    /// @dev The reference impl should be entirely different depending on the type (fault, validity)
    ///      i.e. The game type should indicate the security model.
    /// @return gameType_ The type of proof system being used.
    function gameType() external view returns (GameType gameType_);

    /// @notice Getter for the creator of the dispute game.
    /// @dev `clones-with-immutable-args` argument #1
    /// @return creator_ The creator of the dispute game.
    function gameCreator() external pure returns (address creator_);

    /// @notice Getter for the root claim.
    /// @dev `clones-with-immutable-args` argument #2
    /// @return rootClaim_ The root claim of the DisputeGame.
    function rootClaim() external pure returns (Claim rootClaim_);

    /// @notice Getter for the parent hash of the L1 block when the dispute game was created.
    /// @dev `clones-with-immutable-args` argument #3
    /// @return l1Head_ The parent hash of the L1 block when the dispute game was created.
    function l1Head() external pure returns (Hash l1Head_);

    /// @notice Getter for the extra data.
    /// @dev `clones-with-immutable-args` argument #4
    /// @return extraData_ Any extra data supplied to the dispute game contract by the creator.
    function extraData() external pure returns (bytes memory extraData_);

    /// @notice If all necessary information has been gathered, this function should mark the game
    ///         status as either `CHALLENGER_WINS` or `DEFENDER_WINS` and return the status of
    ///         the resolved game. It is at this stage that the bonds should be awarded to the
    ///         necessary parties.
    /// @dev May only be called if the `status` is `IN_PROGRESS`.
    /// @return status_ The status of the game after resolution.
    function resolve() external returns (GameStatus status_);

    /// @notice A compliant implementation of this interface should return the components of the
    ///         game UUID's preimage provided in the cwia payload. The preimage of the UUID is
    ///         constructed as `keccak256(gameType . rootClaim . extraData)` where `.` denotes
    ///         concatenation.
    /// @return gameType_ The type of proof system being used.
    /// @return rootClaim_ The root claim of the DisputeGame.
    /// @return extraData_ Any extra data supplied to the dispute game contract by the creator.
    function gameData() external view returns (GameType gameType_, Claim rootClaim_, bytes memory extraData_);

Fault Dispute Game

Table of Contents


The Fault Dispute Game (FDG) is a specific type of dispute game that verifies the validity of a root claim by iteratively bisecting over output roots and execution traces of single block state transitions down to a single instruction step. It relies on a Virtual Machine (VM) to falsify invalid claims made at a single instruction step.

Actors, i.e. Players, interact with the game by making claims that dispute other claims in the FDG. Each claim made narrows the range over the entire historical state of L2, until the source of dispute is a single state transition. Once a time limit is reached, the dispute game is resolved, based on claims made that are disputed and which aren't, to determine the winners of the game.


Virtual Machine (VM)

This is a state transition function (STF) that takes a pre-state and computes the post-state. The VM may access data referenced during the STF and as such, it also accepts a proof of this data. Typically, the pre-state contains a commitment to the proof to verify the integrity of the data referenced.

Mathematically, we define the STF as where

  • is the pre-state
  • is an optional proof needed for the transition from to .


This is a pre-image data store. It is often used by VMs to read external data during its STF. Before successfully executing a VM STF, it may be necessary to preload the PreimageOracle with pertinent data. The method for key-based retrieval of these pre-images varies according to the specific VM.

Execution Trace

An execution trace is a sequence where each is a VM state and for each , , . Every execution trace has a unique starting state, , that's preset to a FDG implementation. We refer to this state as the ABSOLUTE_PRESTATE.


Claims assert an output root or the state of the FPVM at a given instruction. This is represented as a Hash type, a bytes32 representing either an output root or a commitment to the last VM state in a trace. A FDG is initialized with an output root that corresponds to the state of L2 at a given L2 block number, and execution trace subgames at SPLIT_DEPTH + 1 are initialized with a claim that commits to the entire execution trace between two consecutive output roots (a block n -> n+1 state transition). As we'll see later, there can be multiple claims, committing to different output roots and FPVM states in the FDG.

Anchor State

An anchor state, or anchor output root, is a previous output root that is assumed to be valid. An FDG is always initialized with an anchor state and execution is carried out between this anchor state and the claimed output root. FDG contracts pull their anchor state from the Anchor State Registry contract. The initial anchor state for a FDG is the genesis state of the L2.

Clients must currently gather L1 data for the window between the anchor state and the claimed state. In order to reduce this L1 data requirement, claims about the state of the L2 become new anchor states when dispute games resolve in their favor. FDG contracts set their anchor states at initialization time so that these updates do not impact active games.

Anchor State Registry

The Anchor State Registry is a registry that maps FDG types to their current anchor states. The Anchor State Registry is specific to Fault Dispute Game contracts and may not be applicable to other types of dispute game contracts that do not have the same concept of state that progresses over time.


A Directed Acyclic Graph representing the relationship between claims, where:

  • is the set of nodes, each representing a claim. Formally, , where is a claim.
  • is the set of directed edges. An edge exists if is a direct dispute against through either an "Attack" or "Defend" move.


A sub-game is a DAG of depth 1, where the root of the DAG is a Claim and the children are Claims that counter the root. A good mental model around this structure is that it is a fundamental dispute between two parties over a single piece of information. These subgames are chained together such that a child within a subgame is the root of its own subgame, which is visualized in the resolution section. There are two types of sub-games in the fault dispute game:

  1. Output Roots
  2. Execution Trace Commitments

At and above the split depth, all subgame roots correspond to output roots, or commitments to the full state of L2 at a given L2 block number. Below the split depth, subgame roots correspond to commitments to the fault proof VM's state at a given instruction step.

Game Tree

The Game Tree is a binary tree of positions. Every claim in the DAG references a position in the Game Tree. The Game Tree has a split depth and maximum depth, SPLIT_DEPTH and MAX_GAME_DEPTH respectively, that are both preset to an FDG implementation. The split depth defines the maximum depth at which claims about output roots can occur, and below it, execution trace bisection occurs. Thus, the Game Tree contains positions, where is the MAX_GAME_DEPTH (unless , in which case there's only 1 position).

The full game tree, with a layer of the tree allocated to output bisection, and sub-trees after an arbitrary split depth, looks like:



A position represents the location of a claim in the Game Tree. This is represented by a "generalized index" (or gindex) where the high-order bit is the level in the tree and the remaining bits is a unique bit pattern, allowing a unique identifier for each node in the tree.

The gindex of a position can be calculated as , where:

  • is a function returning the depth of the position in the Game Tree
  • is a function returning the index of the position at its depth (starting from the left).

Positions at the deepest level of the game tree correspond to indices in the execution trace, whereas claims at the split depth represent single L2 blocks' output roots. Positions higher up the game tree also cover the deepest, right-most positions relative to the current position. We refer to this coverage as the trace index of a Position.

This means claims commit to an execution trace that terminates at the same index as their Position's trace index. That is, for a given trace index , its state witness hash corresponds to the th state in the trace.

Note that there can be multiple positions covering the same trace index.


This is an immutable, preset to a FDG implementation, representing the maximum amount of time that may accumulate on a team's chess clock.


This is an immutable, preset to a FDG implementation, representing the flat credit that is given to a team's clock if their clock has less than CLOCK_EXTENSION seconds remaining.

Freeloader Claims

Due to the subgame resolution logic, there are certain moves which result in the correct final resolution of the game, but do not pay out bonds to the correct parties.

An example of this is as follows:

  1. Alice creates a dispute game with an honest root claim.
  2. Bob counters the honest root with a correct claim at the implied L2 block number.
  3. Alice performs a defense move against Bob's counter, as the divergence exists later in Bob's view of the chain state.
  4. Bob attacks his own claim.

Bob's attack against his own claim is a counter to a bad claim, but with the incorrect pivot direction. If left untouched, because it exists at a position further left than Alice's, he will reclaim his own bond upon resolution. Because of this, the honest challenger must always counter freeloader claims for incentive compatibility to be preserved.

Critically, freeloader claims, if left untouched, do not influence incorrect resolution of the game globally.

Core Game Mechanics

This section specifies the core game mechanics of the FDG. The full FDG mechanics includes a specification for Bonds. Readers should understand basic game mechanics before reading up on the Bond specification.


The game involves two types of participants (or Players): Challengers and Defenders. These players are grouped into separate teams, each employing distinct strategies to interact with the game. Team members share a common goal regarding the game's outcome. Players interact with the game primarily through moves.


A Move is a challenge against an existing claim and must include an alternate claim asserting a different trace. Moves can either be attacks or defenses and serve to update to DAG by adding nodes and edges targeting the disputed claim.

Moves within the fault dispute game can claim two separate values: output roots and execution trace commitments. At and above the SPLIT_DEPTH, claims correspond to output roots, while below the split depth, they correspond to execution trace commitments.

Initially, claims added to the DAG are uncontested (i.e. not countered). Once a move targets a claim, that claim is considered countered. The status of a claim β€” whether it's countered or not β€” helps determine its validity and, ultimately, the game's winner.


A logical move made when a claim is disagreed with. A claim at the relative attack position to a node, n, in the Game Tree commits to half of the trace of the n’s claim. The attack position relative to a node can be calculated by multiplying its gindex by 2.

To illustrate this, here's a Game Tree highlighting an attack on a Claim positioned at 6.

Attacking node 6

Attacking the node at 6 moves creates a new claim positioned at 12.


The logical move against a claim when you agree with both it and its parent. A defense at the relative position to a node, n, in the Game Tree commits to the first half of n + 1’s trace range.

Defend at 4

Note that because of this, some nodes may never exist within the Game Tree. However, they're not necessary as these nodes have complimentary, valid positions with the same trace index within the tree. For example, a Position with gindex 5 has the same trace index as another Position with gindex 2. We can verify that all trace indices have valid moves within the game:

Game Tree Showing All Valid Move Positions

There may be multiple claims at the same position, so long as their state witness hashes are unique.

Each move adds new claims to the Game Tree at strictly increasing depth. Once a claim is at MAX_GAME_DEPTH, the only way to dispute such claims is to step.

L2 Block Number Challenge

This is a special type of action, made by the Challenger, to counter a root claim.

Given an output root preimage and its corresponding RLP-encoded L2 block header, the L2 block number can be verified. This process ensures the integrity and authenticity of an L2 block number. The procedure for this verification involves three steps: checking the output root preimage, validating the block hash preimage, and extracting the block number from the RLP-encoded header. By comparing the challenger-supplied preimages and the extracted block number against their claimed values, the consistency of the L2 block number with the one in the provided header can be confirmed, detecting any discrepancies.

Root claims made with an invalid L2 block number can be disputed through a special challenge. This challenge is validated in the FDG contract using the aforementioned procedure. However, it is crucial to note that this challenge can only be issued against the root claim, as it's the only entity making explicit claims on the L2 block number. A successful challenge effectively disputes the root claim once its subgame is resolved.


At MAX_GAME_DEPTH, the position of claims correspond to indices of an execution trace. It's at this point that the FDG is able to query the VM to determine the validity of claims, by checking the states they're committing to. This is done by applying the VM's STF to the state a claim commits to. If the STF post-state does not match the claimed state, the challenge succeeds.

/// @notice Perform an instruction step via an on-chain fault proof processor.
/// @dev This function should point to a fault proof processor in order to execute
///      a step in the fault proof program on-chain. The interface of the fault proof
///      processor contract should adhere to the `IBigStepper` interface.
/// @param _claimIndex The index of the challenged claim within `claimData`.
/// @param _isAttack Whether or not the step is an attack or a defense.
/// @param _stateData The stateData of the step is the preimage of the claim at the given
///        prestate, which is at `_stateIndex` if the move is an attack and `_claimIndex` if
///        the move is a defense. If the step is an attack on the first instruction, it is
///        the absolute prestate of the fault proof VM.
/// @param _proof Proof to access memory nodes in the VM's merkle state tree.
function step(uint256 _claimIndex, bool _isAttack, bytes calldata _stateData, bytes calldata _proof) external;

Step Types

Similar to moves, there are two ways to step on a claim; attack or defend. These determine the pre-state input to the VM STF and the expected output.

  • Attack Step - Challenges a claim by providing a pre-state, proving an invalid state transition. It uses the previous state in the execution trace as input and expects the disputed claim's state as output. There must exist a claim in the DAG that commits to the input.
  • Defense Step - Challenges a claim by proving it was an invalid attack, thereby defending the disputed ancestor's claim. It uses the disputed claim's state as input and expects the next state in the execution trace as output. There must exist a claim in the DAG that commits to the expected output.

The FDG step handles the inputs to the VM and asserts the expected output. A step that successfully proves an invalid post-state (when attacking) or pre-state (when defending) is a successful counter against the disputed claim. Players interface with step by providing an indicator of attack and state data (including any proofs) that corresponds to the expected pre/post state (depending on whether it's an attack or defend). The FDG will assert that an existing claim commits to the state data provided by players.

PreimageOracle Interaction

Certain steps (VM state transitions) require external data to be available by the PreimageOracle. To ensure a successful state transition, players should provide this data in advance. The FDG provides the following interface to manage data loaded to the PreimageOracle:

/// @notice Posts the requested local data to the VM's `PreimageOralce`.
/// @param _ident The local identifier of the data to post.
/// @param _execLeafIdx The index of the leaf claim in an execution subgame that requires the local data for a step.
/// @param _partOffset The offset of the data to post.
function addLocalData(uint256 _ident, uint256 _execLeafIdx, uint256 _partOffset) external;

The addLocalData function loads local data into the VM's PreimageOracle. This data consists of bootstrap data for the program. There are multiple sets of local preimage keys that belong to the FaultDisputeGame contract due to the ability for players to bisect to any block state transition since the configured anchor state, the _execLeafIdx parameter enables a search for the starting / disputed outputs to be performed such that the contract can write to and reference unique local keys in the PreimageOracle for each of these transitions.

1Parent L1 head hash at the time of the proposal
2Starting output root hash (commits to block # n)
3Disputed output root hash (commits to block # n + 1)
4Disputed L2 block number (block # n + 1)
5L2 Chain ID

For global keccak256 preimages, there are two routes for players to submit:

  1. Small preimages atomically.
  2. Large preimages via streaming.

Global keccak256 preimages are non-context specific and can be submitted directly to the PreimageOracle via the loadKeccak256PreimagePart function, which takes the part offset as well as the full preimage. In the event that the preimage is too large to be submitted through calldata in a single block, challengers must resort to the streaming option.

Large Preimage Proposals

Large preimage proposals allow for submitters to stream in a large preimage over multiple transactions, along-side commitments to the intermediate state of the keccak256 function after absorbing/permuting the bit block. This data is progressively merkleized on-chain as it is streamed in, with each leaf constructed as follows:

/// @notice Returns a leaf hash to add to a preimage proposal merkle tree.
/// @param input A single 136 byte chunk of the input.
/// @param blockIndex The index of the block that `input` corresponds to in the full preimage's absorbtion.
/// @param stateCommitment The hash of the full 5x5 state matrix *after* absorbing and permuting `input`.
function hashLeaf(
    bytes memory input,
    uint256 blockIndex,
    bytes32 stateCommitment
) internal view returns (bytes32 leaf) {
    require(input.length == 136, "input must be exactly the size of the keccak256 rate");

    leaf = keccak256(abi.encodePacked(input, blockIndex, stateCommitment));

Once the full preimage and all intermediate state commitments have been posted, the large preimage proposal enters a challenge period. During this time, a challenger can reconstruct the merkle tree that was progressively built on-chain locally by scanning the block bodies that contain the proposer's leaf preimages. If they detect that a commitment to the intermediate state of the hash function is incorrect at any step, they may perform a single-step dispute for the proposal in the PreimageOracle. This involves:

  1. Creating a merkle proof for the agreed upon prestate leaf (not necessary if the invalid leaf is the first one, the setup state of the matrix is constant.) within the proposal's merkle root.
  2. Creating a merkle proof for the disputed post state leaf within the proposal's merkle root.
  3. Computing the state matrix at the agreed upon prestate (not necessary if the invalid leaf is the first one, the setup state of the matrix is constant.)

The challenger then submits this data to the PreimageOracle, where the post state leaf's claimed input is absored into the pre state leaf's state matrix and the SHA3 permutation is executed on-chain. After that, the resulting state matrix is hashed and compared with the proposer's claim in the post state leaf. If the hash does not match, the proposal is marked as challenged, and it may not be finalized. If, after the challenge period is concluded, a proposal has no challenges, it may be finalized and the preimage part may be placed into the authorized mappings for the FPVM to read.

Team Dynamics

Challengers seek to dispute the root claim, while Defenders aim to support it. Both types of actors will move accordingly to support their team. For Challengers, this means attacking the root claim and disputing claims positioned at even depths in the Game Tree. Defenders do the opposite by disputing claims positioned at odd depths.

Players on either team are motivated to support the actions of their teammates. This involves countering disputes against claims made by their team (assuming these claims are honest). Uncontested claims are likely to result in a loss, as explained later under Resolution.

Game Clock

Every claim in the game has a Clock. A claim inherits the clock of its grandparent claim in the DAG (and so on). Akin to a chess clock, it keeps track of the total time each team takes to make moves, preventing delays. Making a move resumes the clock for the disputed claim and pauses it for the newly added one.

If a move is performed, where the potential grandchild's clock has less time than CLOCK_EXTENSION seconds remaining, the potential grandchild's clock is granted exactly CLOCK_EXTENSION seconds remaining. This is to combat the situation where a challenger must inherit a malicious party's clock when countering a freeloader claim, in order to preserve incentive compatibility for the honest party. As the extension only applies to the potential grandchild's clock, the max possible extension for the game is bounded, and scales with the MAX_GAME_DEPTH.

If the potential grandchild is an execution trace bisection root claim and their clock has less than CLOCK_EXTENSION seconds remaining, exactly CLOCK_EXTENSION * 2 seconds are allocated for the potential grandchild. This extra time is alloted to allow for completion of the off-chain FPVM run to generate the initial instruction trace.

A move against a particular claim is no longer possible once the parent of the disputed claim's Clock has accumulated MAX_CLOCK_DURATION seconds. By which point, the claim's clock has expired.


Resolving the FDG determines which team won the game. To do this, we use the internal sub game structure. Each claim within the game is the root of its own sub game. These subgames are modeled as nested DAGs, each with a max depth of 1. In order for a claim to be considered countered, only one of its children must be uncountered. Subgames can also not be resolved until all of their children, which are subgames themselves, have been resolved and the potential opponent's chess clock has run out. To determine if the potential opponent's chess clock has ran out, and therefore no more moves against the subgame are possible, the duration elapsed on the subgame root's parent clock is added to the difference between the current time and the timestamp of the subgame root's creation. Because each claim is the root of its own sub-game, truth percolates upwards towards the root claim by resolving each individual sub-game bottom-up.

In a game like the one below, we can resolve up from the deepest subgames. Here, we'd resolve b0 to uncountered and a0 to countered by walking up from their deepest children, and once all children of the root game are recursively resolved, we can resolve the root to countered due to b0 remaining uncountered.


Another example is this game, which has a slightly different structure. Here, the root claim will also be countered due to b0 remaining uncountered.

Given these rules, players are motivated to move quickly to challenge all dishonest claims. Each move bisects the historical state of L2 and eventually, MAX_GAME_DEPTH is reached where disputes can be settled conclusively. Dishonest players are disincentivized to participate, via backwards induction, as an invalid claim won't remain uncontested. Further incentives can be added to the game by requiring claims to be bonded, while rewarding game winners using the bonds of dishonest claims.

Resolving the L2 Block Number Challenge

The resolution of an L2 block number challenge occurs in the same manner as subgame resolution, with one caveat; the L2 block number challenger, if it exist, must be the winner of a root subgame. Thus, no moves against the root, including uncontested ones, can win a root subgame that has an L2 block number challenge.


Once the game is resolved, if the claim is shown to be valid, the FDG reports its state to the Anchor State Registry. The Anchor State Registry verifies that the request to update an anchor state comes from a FDG contract created by the Dispute Game Factory contract, confirms that the game resolved in favor of the defender, and confirms that the updated state would be newer than the current anchor state (based on the result of FaultDisputeGame.l2BlockNumber()). If these conditions are true, the Anchor State Registry updates the anchor state for the given game type.

Note that the dependency of the Anchor State Registry on the l2BlockNumber() function means that the registry may not be applicable to dispute game types that do not have a similar sense of progressing state over time. Currently, the Anchor State Registry is therefore assumed to be specific to the Fault Dispute Game contract and not to other dispute game types.

Honest Challenger (Fault Dispute Game)

Table of Contents


The honest challenger is an agent interacting in the Fault Dispute Game that supports honest claims and disputes false claims. An honest challenger strives to ensure a correct, truthful, game resolution. The honest challenger is also rational as any deviation from its behavior will result in negative outcomes. This document specifies the expected behavior of an honest challenger.

The Honest Challenger has two primary duties:

  1. Support valid root claims in Fault Dispute Games.
  2. Dispute invalid root claims in Fault Dispute Games.

The honest challenger polls the DisputeGameFactory contract for new and on-going Fault Dispute Games. For verifying the legitimacy of claims, it relies on a synced, trusted rollup node as well as a trace provider (ex: Cannon). The trace provider must be configured with the ABSOLUTE_PRESTATE of the game being interacted with to generate the traces needed to make truthful claims.


To ensure an accurate and incentive compatible fault dispute system, the honest challenger behaviour must preserve three invariants for any game:

  1. The game resolves as DefenderWins if the root claim is correct and ChallengerWins if the root claim is incorrect
  2. The honest challenger is refunded the bond for every claim it posts and paid the bond of the parent of that claim
  3. The honest challenger never counters its own claim

Fault Dispute Game Responses

The honest challenger determines which claims to counter by iterating through the claims in the order they are stored in the contract. This ordering ensures that a claim's ancestors are processed prior to the claim itself. For each claim, the honest challenger determines and tracks the set of honest responses to all claims, regardless of whether that response already exists in the full game state.

The root claim is considered to be an honest claim if and only if it has a state witness Hash that agrees with the honest challenger's state witness hash for the root claim.

The honest challenger should counter a claim if and only if:

  1. The claim is a child of a claim in the set of honest responses
  2. The set of honest responses, contains a sibling to the claim with a trace index greater than or equal to the claim's trace index

Note that this implies the honest challenger never counters its own claim, since there is at most one honest counter to each claim, so an honest claim never has an honest sibling.


To respond to a claim with a depth in the range of [1, MAX_DEPTH], the honest challenger determines if the claim has a valid commitment. If the state witness hash matches the honest challenger's at the same trace index, then we disagree with the claim's stance by move to defend. Otherwise, the claim is attacked.

The claim that would be added as a result of the move is added to the set of honest moves being tracked.

If the resulting claim does not already exist in the full game state, the challenger issue the move by calling the FaultDisputeGame contract.


At the max depth of the game, claims represent commitments to the state of the fault proof VM at a single instruction step interval. Because the game can no longer bisect further, when the honest challenger counters these claims, the only option for an honest challenger is to execute a VM step on-chain to disprove the claim at MAX_GAME_DEPTH.

If the counteredBy of the claim being countered is non-zero, the claim has already been countered and the honest challenger does not perform any action.

Otherwise, similar to the above section, the honest challenger will issue an attack step when in response to such claims with invalid state witness commitments. Otherwise, it issues a defense step.


The honest challenger responds to claims as soon as possible to avoid the clock of its counter-claim from expiring.


When the chess clock of a subgame root has run out, the subgame can be resolved. The honest challenger should resolve all subgames in bottom-up order, until the subgame rooted at the game root is resolved.

The honest challenger accomplishes this by calling the resolveClaim function on the FaultDisputeGame contract. Once the root claim's subgame is resolved, the challenger then finally calls the resolve function to resolve the entire game.

The FaultDisputeGame does not put a time cap on resolution - because of the liveness assumption on honest challengers and the bonds attached to the claims they’ve countered, challengers are economically incentivized to resolve the game promptly to capture the bonds.

Bond Incentives

Table of Contents


Bonds is an add-on to the core Fault Dispute Game. The core game mechanics are designed to ensure honesty as the best response to winning subgames. By introducing financial incentives, Bonds makes it worthwhile for honest challengers to participate. Without the bond reward incentive, the FDG will be too costly for honest players to participate in given the cost of verifying and making claims.

Implementations may allow the FDG to directly receive bonds, or delegate this responsibility to another entity. Regardless, there must be a way for the FDG to query and distribute bonds linked to a claim.

Bonds are integrated into the FDG in two areas:

  • Moves
  • Subgame Resolution


Moves must be adequately bonded to be added to the FDG. This document does not specify a scheme for determining the minimum bond requirement. FDG implementations should define a function computing the minimum bond requirement with the following signature:

function getRequiredBond(Position _movePosition) public pure returns (uint256 requiredBond_)

As such, attacking or defending requires a check for the getRequiredBond() amount against the bond attached to the move. To incentivize participation, the minimum bond should cover the cost of a possible counter to the move being added. Thus, the minimum bond depends only on the position of the move that's added.

Subgame Resolution

If a subgame root resolves incorrectly, then its bond is distributed to the leftmost claimant that countered it. This creates an incentive to identify the earliest point of disagreement in an execution trace. The subgame root claimant gets back its bond iff it resolves correctly.

At maximum game depths, where a claimant counters a bonded claim via step, the bond is instead distributed to the account that successfully called step.

Leftmost Claim Incentives

There exists defensive positions that cannot be countered, even if they hold invalid claims. These positions are located on the same level as honest claims, but situated to its right (i.e. its gindex > honest claim's).

An honest challenger can always successfully dispute any sibling claims not positioned to the right of an honest claim. The leftmost payoff rule encourages such disputes, ensuring only one claim is leftmost at correct depths. This claim will be the honest one, and thus bond rewards will be directed exclusively to honest claims.

Fault Proof Mainnet Incentives

This section describes the specific bond incentives to be used for the Fault Proof Mainnet launch of the OP Stack fault proof system.

Authenticated Roles

GuardianRole responsible for blacklisting dispute game contracts and changing the respected dispute game type
System OwnerRole that owns the ProxyAdmin contract that in turn owns most Proxy contracts within the OP Stack

Base Fee Assumption

FPM bonds are to assume a fixed 200 Gwei base fee. Future iterations of the fault proof may include a dynamic base fee calculation. For the moment, we suppose that the Guardian address may account for increased average base fees by updating the OptimismPortal contract to a new respected game type with a higher assumed base fee.

Bond Scaling

FPM bonds are priced in the amount of gas that they are intended to cover. Bonds start at the very first depth of the game at a baseline of 400_000 gas. The 400_000 value is chosen as a deterrence amount that is approximately double the cost to respond at the top level. Bonds scale up to a value of 300_000_000 gas, a value chosen to cover approximately double the cost of a max-size Large Preimage Proposal.

We use a multiplicative scaling mechanism to guarantee that the ratio between bonds remains constant. We determine the multiplier based on the proposed MAX_DEPTH of 73. We can use the formula x = (300_000_000 / 400_000) ** (1 / 73) to determine that x = 1.09493. At each depth N, the amount of gas charged is therefore 400_000 * (1.09493 ** N)

Below is a diagram demonstrating this curve for a max depth of 73.

bond scaling curve

Required Bond Formula

Applying the Base Fee Assumption and Bond Scaling specifications, we have a getRequiredBond function:

def get_required_bond(position):
    assumed_gas_price = 200 gwei
    base_gas_charged = 400_000
    gas_charged = 400_000 * (1.09493 ** position.depth)
    return gas_charged * assumed_gas_price

Other Incentives

There are other costs associated with participating in the game, including operating a challenger agent and the opportunity cost of locking up capital in the dispute game. While we do not explicitly create incentives to cover these costs, we assume that the current bond rewards, based on this specification, are enough as a whole to cover all other costs of participation.


FPM introduces a contract DelayedWETH designed to hold the bonded ETH for each Fault Dispute Game. DelayedWETH is an extended version of the standard WETH contract that introduces a delayed unwrap mechanism that allows an owner address to function as a backstop in the case that a Fault Dispute Game would incorrectly distribute bonds.

DelayedWETH is modified from WETH as follows:

  • DelayedWETH is an upgradeable proxy contract.
  • DelayedWETH has an owner() address. We typically expect this to be set to the System Owner address.
  • DelayedWETH has a delay() function that returns a period of time that withdrawals will be delayed.
  • DelayedWETH has an unlock(guy,wad) function that modifies a mapping called withdrawals keyed as withdrawals[msg.sender][guy] => WithdrawalRequest where WithdrawalRequest is struct Withdrawal Request { uint256 amount, uint256 timestamp }. When unlock is called, the timestamp for withdrawals[msg.sender][guy] is set to the current timestamp and the amount is increased by the given amount.
  • DelayedWETH modifies the WETH.withdraw function such that an address must provide a "sub-account" to withdraw from. The function signature becomes withdraw(guy,wad). The function retrieves withdrawals[msg.sender][guy] and checks that the current block.timestamp is greater than the timestamp on the withdrawal request plus the delay() seconds and reverts if not. It also confirms that the amount being withdrawn is less than the amount in the withdrawal request. Before completing the withdrawal, it reduces the amount contained within the withdrawal request. The original withdraw(wad) function becomes an alias for withdraw(msg.sender, wad). withdraw(guy,wad) will not be callable when SuperchainConfig.paused() is true.
  • DelayedWETH has a hold() function that allows the owner() address to give itself an allowance from any address.
  • DelayedWETH has a recover() function that allows the owner() address to recover any amount of ETH from the contract.

Sub-Account Model

This specification requires that withdrawal requests specify "sub-accounts" that these requests correspond to. This takes the form of requiring that unlock and withdraw both take an address guy parameter as input. By requiring this extra input, withdrawals are separated between accounts and it is always possible to see how much WETH a specific end-user of the FaultDisputeGame can withdraw at any given time. It is therefore possible for the DelayedWETH contract to account for all bug cases within the FaultDisputeGame as long as the FaultDisputeGame always passes the correct address into withdraw.

Delay Period

We propose a delay period of 7 days for most OP Stack chains. 7 days provides sufficient time for the owner() of the DelayedWETH contract to act even if that owner is a large multisig that requires action from many different members over multiple timezones.


DelayedWETH is expected to be integrated into the Fault Dispute Game as follows:

  • When FaultDisputeGame.initialize is triggered, DelayedWETH.deposit{value: msg.value}() is called.
  • When FaultDisputeGame.move is triggered, DelayedWETH.deposit{value: msg.value}() is called.
  • When FaultDisputeGame.resolveClaim is triggered, DelayedWETH.unlock(recipient, bond) is called.
  • When FaultDisputeGame.claimCredit is triggered, DelayedWETH.withdraw(recipient, claim) is called.
    participant U as User
    participant FDG as FaultDisputeGame
    participant DW as DelayedWETH

    U->>FDG: initialize()
    FDG->>DW: deposit{value: msg.value}()
    Note over DW: FDG gains balance in DW

    loop move by Users
        U->>FDG: move()
        FDG->>DW: deposit{value: msg.value}()
        Note over DW: Increases FDG balance in DW

    loop resolveClaim by Users
        U->>FDG: resolveClaim()
        FDG->>DW: unlock(recipient, bond)
        Note over DW: Starts timer for recipient

    loop claimCredit by Users
        U->>FDG: claimCredit()
        FDG->>DW: withdraw(recipient, claim)
        Note over DW: Checks timer/amount for recipient
        DW->>FDG: Transfer claim to FDG
        FDG->>U: Transfer claim to User

Bridge Integration

Table of Contents


With fault proofs, the withdrawal path changes such that withdrawals submitted to the OptimismPortal are proven against output proposals submitted as a FaultDisputeGame prior to being finalized. Output proposals are now finalized whenever a dispute game resolves in their favor.

Legacy Semantics

The OptimismPortal uses the L2OutputOracle in the withdrawal path of the rollup to allow users to prove the presence of their withdrawal inside of the L2ToL1MessagePasser account storage root, which can be retrieved by providing a preimage to an output root in the oracle. The oracle currently holds a list of all L2 outputs proposed to L1 by a permissioned PROPOSER key. The list in the contract has the following properties:

  • It must always be sorted by the L2 Block Number that the output proposal is claiming it corresponds to.
  • All outputs in the list that are > FINALIZATION_PERIOD_SECONDS old are considered "finalized." The separator between unfinalized/finalized outputs moves forwards implicitly as time passes.


Currently, if there is a faulty output proposed by the permissioned PROPOSER key, a separate permissioned CHALLENGER key may intervene. Note that the CHALLENGER role effectively has god-mode privileges, and can currently act without proving that the outputs they're deleting are indeed incorrect. By deleting an output proposal, the challenger also deletes all output proposals in front of it.

With the upgrade to the Fault Proof Alpha Chad system, output proposals are no longer sent to the L2OutputOracle, but to the DisputeGameFactory in order to be fault proven. In contrast to the L2OO, an incorrect output proposal is not deleted, but proven to be incorrect. The semantics of finalization timelines and the definition of a "finalized" output proposal also change. Since the DisputeGameFactory fulfills the same role as the L2OutputOracle in a post fault proofs world by tracking proposed outputs, and the L2OO's semantics are incompatible with the new system, the L2OO is no longer required.

FPAC OptimismPortal Mods Specification

Roles - OptimismPortal

  • Guardian: Permissioned actor able to pause the portal, blacklist dispute games, and change the RESPECTED_GAME_TYPE.

New DeployConfig Variables

DISPUTE_GAME_FINALITY_DELAY_SECONDSThe amount of time given to the Guardian role to blacklist a resolved dispute game before any withdrawals proven against it can be finalized, in case of system failure.
PROOF_MATURITY_DELAY_SECONDSFormerly FINALIZATION_PERIOD_SECONDS in the L2OutputOracle, defines the duration that must pass between proving and finalizing a withdrawal.
RESPECTED_GAME_TYPEThe dispute game type that the portal uses for the withdrawal path.

Data Structures

Withdrawals are now proven against dispute games, which have immutable "root claims" representing the output root being proposed. The ProvenWithdrawal struct is now defined as:

/// @notice Represents a proven withdrawal.
/// @custom:field disputeGameProxy The address of the dispute game proxy that the withdrawal was proven against.
/// @custom:field timestamp        Timestamp at which the withdrawal was proven.
struct ProvenWithdrawal {
    IDisputeGame disputeGameProxy;
    uint64 timestamp;

State Layout

Legacy Spacers

Spacers should be added at the following storage slots in the OptimismPortal so that they may not be reused:

52Legacy provenWithdrawals mapping. Withdrawals proven against the L2OutputOracle's output proposals will be deleted upon the upgrade.
54Legacy L2OutputOracle address.

New State Variables

DisputeGameFactory address

/// @notice Address of the DisputeGameFactory.
/// @custom:network-specific
DisputeGameFactory public disputeGameFactory;

Respected Game Type

/// @notice The respected game type of the `OptimismPortal`.
///         Can be changed by Guardian.
GameType public respectedGameType;

Respected Game Type Updated Timestamp

/// @notice The timestamp at which the respected game type was last updated.
uint64 public respectedGameTypeUpdatedAt;

New ProvenWithdrawals mapping

/// @notice A mapping of withdrawal hashes to `ProvenWithdrawal` data.
mapping(bytes32 => ProvenWithdrawal) public provenWithdrawals;

Blacklisted DisputeGame mapping

/// @notice A mapping of dispute game addresses to whether or not they are blacklisted.
mapping(IDisputeGame => bool) public disputeGameBlacklist;

proveWithdrawalTransaction modifications

Proving a withdrawal transaction now proves against an output root in a dispute game, rather than one in the L2OutputOracle.


The type signature of the function does not change, but the purpose of the second argument transitions from providing an index within the L2OutputOracle's l2Outputs array to an index within the DisputeGameFactory's list of created games.

/// @notice Proves a withdrawal transaction.
/// @param _tx               Withdrawal transaction to finalize.
/// @param _disputeGameIndex Index of the dispute game to prove the withdrawal against.
/// @param _outputRootProof  Inclusion proof of the L2ToL1MessagePasser contract's storage root.
/// @param _withdrawalProof  Inclusion proof of the withdrawal in L2ToL1MessagePasser contract.
function proveWithdrawalTransaction(
    Types.WithdrawalTransaction memory _tx,
    uint256 _disputeGameIndex,
    Types.OutputRootProof calldata _outputRootProof,
    bytes[] calldata _withdrawalProof
) external whenNotPaused;

New Invariants - proveWithdrawalTransaction

Trusted GameType The DisputeGameFactory can create many different types of dispute games, delineated by their GameType. The game type of the dispute game fetched from the factory's list at _disputeGameIndex must be of type RESPECTED_GAME_TYPE. The call should revert on all other game types it encounters.

Changed Invariants - proveWithdrawalTransaction

Re-proving withdrawals Users being able to re-prove withdrawals, in special cases, is still necessary to prevent user withdrawals from being bricked. It is kept to protect honest users when they prove their withdrawal inside of a malicious proposal. The timestamp of re-proven withdrawals is still reset.

  1. Old: Re-proving is allowed if the output root at the proven withdrawal's l2OutputIndex changed in the L2OutputOracle.
  2. New: Re-proving is allowed at any time by the user. When a withdrawal is re-proven, its proof maturity delay is reset.

finalizeWithdrawalTransaction modifications

Finalizing a withdrawal transaction now references a DisputeGame to determine the status of the output proposal that the withdrawal was proven against.

New Invariants - finalizeWithdrawalTransaction

Trusted GameType The DisputeGameFactory can create many different types of dispute games, delineated by their GameType. The game type of the dispute game fetched from the factory's list at _disputeGameIndex must be of type RESPECTED_GAME_TYPE. The call should revert on all other game types it encounters.

Respected Game Type Updated A withdrawal may never be finalized if the dispute game was created before the respected game type was last updated.

Dispute Game Blacklist The Guardian role can blacklist certain DisputeGame addresses in the event of a system failure. If the address of the dispute game that the withdrawal was proven against is present in the disputeGameBlacklist mapping, the call should always revert.

Dispute Game Maturity See "Air-gap"

Changed Invariants - finalizeWithdrawalTransaction

Output Proposal Validity Instead of checking if the proven withdrawal's output proposal has existed for longer the legacy finalization period, we check if the dispute game has resolved in the root claim's favor. A FaultDisputeGame must never be considered to have resolved in the rootClaim's favor unless its status() is equal to DEFENDER_WINS.


Given it's own section due to it's importance, the air gap is an enforced period of time between a dispute game's resolution and users being able to finalize withdrawals that were proven against its root claim. When the DisputeGame resolves globally, it stores the timestamp. The portal's finalizeWithdrawalTransaction function asserts that DISPUTE_GAME_FINALITY_DELAY_SECONDS have passed since the resolution timestamp before allowing any withdrawals proven against the dispute game to be finalized. Because the FaultDisputeGame is a trusted implementation set by the owner of the DisputeGameFactory, it is safe to trust that this value is honestly set.

Blacklisting DisputeGames

A new method is added to assign DisputeGames in the disputeGameBlacklist mapping mentioned in "State Layout", in the event that a dispute game is detected to have resolved incorrectly. The only actor who may call this function is the Guardian role.

Blacklisting a dispute game means that no withdrawals proven against it will be allowed to finalize (per the "Dispute Game Blacklist" invariant), and they must re-prove against a new dispute game that resolves correctly. The Portal's guardian role is obligated to blacklist any dispute games that it deems to have resolved incorrectly. Withdrawals proven against a blacklisted dispute game are not prevented from re-proving or being finalized in the future.

Blacklisting a full GameType

In the event of a catastrophic failure, we can upgrade the OptimismPortal proxy to an implementation with a different RESPECTED_GAME_TYPE. All pending withdrawals that reference a different game type will not be allowed to finalize and must re-prove, due to the "Trusted GameType" invariant. This should generally be avoided, but allows for a blanket blacklist of pending withdrawals corresponding to the current RESPECTED_GAME_TYPE. Depending on if we're okay with the tradeoffs, this also may be the most efficient way to upgrade the dispute game in the future.

Proxy Upgrade

Upgrading the OptimismPortal proxy to an implementation that follows this specification will invalidate all pending withdrawals. This means that all users with pending withdrawals will need to re-prove their withdrawals against an output proposal submitted in the form of a DisputeGame.

Permissioned FaultDisputeGame

As a fallback to permissioned proposals, a child contract of the FaultDisputeGame will be created that has 2 new roles: the PROPOSER and a CHALLENGER (or set of challengers). Each interaction (move [attack / defend], step, resolve / resolveClaim, addLocalData, etc.) will be permissioned to the CHALLENGER key, and the initialize function will be permissioned to the PROPOSER key.

In the event that we'd like to switch back to permissioned proposals, we can change the RESPECTED_GAME_TYPE in the OptimismPortal to a deployment of the PermissionedFaultDisputeGame.

Roles - PermissionedDisputeGame

  • PROPOSER - Actor that can create a PermissionedFaultDisputeGame and participate in the games they've created.
  • CHALLENGER - Actor(s) that can participate in a PermissionedFaultDisputeGame.


State Layout

2 new immutables:

/// @notice The `PROPOSER` role.
address public immutable PROPOSER;

/// @notice The `CHALLENGER` role.
address public immutable CHALLENGER;


Every function that can mutate state should be overridden to add a check that either:

  1. The msg.sender has the CHALLENGER role.
  2. The msg.sender has the PROPOSER role.

If the msg.sender does not have either role, the function must revert.

The exception is the initialize function, which may only be called if the tx.origin is the PROPOSER role.


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Precompiled contracts exist on OP-Stack chains at predefined addresses. They are similar to predeploys but are implemented as native code in the EVM as opposed to bytecode. Precompiles are used for computationally expensive operations, that would be cost prohibitive to implement in Solidity. Where possible predeploys are preferred, as precompiles must be implemented in every execution client.

OP-Stack chains contain the standard Ethereum precompiles as well as a small number of additional precompiles. The following table lists each of the additional precompiles. The system version indicates when the precompile was introduced.



The P256VERIFY precompile performs signature verification for the secp256r1 elliptic curve. This curve has widespread adoption. It's used by Passkeys, Apple Secure Enclave and many other systems.

It is specified as part of RIP-7212 and was added to the OP-Stack protocol in the Fjord release. The op-geth implementation is here.

Address: 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000100


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Predeployed smart contracts exist on Optimism at predetermined addresses in the genesis state. They are similar to precompiles but instead run directly in the EVM instead of running native code outside of the EVM.

Predeploys are used instead of precompiles to make it easier for multiclient implementations as well as allowing for more integration with hardhat/foundry network forking.

Predeploy addresses exist in 1 byte namespace 0x42000000000000000000000000000000000000xx. Proxies are set at each possible predeploy address except for the GovernanceToken and the ProxyAdmin.

The LegacyERC20ETH predeploy lives at a special address 0xDeadDeAddeAddEAddeadDEaDDEAdDeaDDeAD0000 and there is no proxy deployed at that account.

The following table includes each of the predeploys. The system version indicates when the predeploy was introduced. The possible values are Legacy or Bedrock or Canyon. Deprecated contracts should not be used.




Address: 0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000000

The LegacyMessagePasser contract stores commitments to withdrawal transactions before the Bedrock upgrade. A merkle proof to a particular storage slot that commits to the withdrawal transaction is used as part of the withdrawing transaction on L1. The expected account that includes the storage slot is hardcoded into the L1 logic. After the bedrock upgrade, the L2ToL1MessagePasser is used instead. Finalizing withdrawals from this contract will no longer be supported after the Bedrock and is only left to allow for alternative bridges that may depend on it. This contract does not forward calls to the L2ToL1MessagePasser and calling it is considered a no-op in context of doing withdrawals through the CrossDomainMessenger system.

Any pending withdrawals that have not been finalized are migrated to the L2ToL1MessagePasser as part of the upgrade so that they can still be finalized.



Address: 0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000016

The L2ToL1MessagePasser stores commitments to withdrawal transactions. When a user is submitting the withdrawing transaction on L1, they provide a proof that the transaction that they withdrew on L2 is in the sentMessages mapping of this contract.

Any withdrawn ETH accumulates into this contract on L2 and can be permissionlessly removed from the L2 supply by calling the burn() function.



Address: 0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000002

The DeployerWhitelist is a predeploy that was used to provide additional safety during the initial phases of Optimism. It previously defined the accounts that are allowed to deploy contracts to the network.

Arbitrary contract deployment was subsequently enabled and it is not possible to turn off. In the legacy system, this contract was hooked into CREATE and CREATE2 to ensure that the deployer was allowlisted.

In the Bedrock system, this contract will no longer be used as part of the CREATE codepath.

This contract is deprecated and its usage should be avoided.



Address: 0xDeadDeAddeAddEAddeadDEaDDEAdDeaDDeAD0000

The LegacyERC20ETH predeploy represents all ether in the system before the Bedrock upgrade. All ETH was represented as an ERC20 token and users could opt into the ERC20 interface or the native ETH interface.

The upgrade to Bedrock migrates all ether out of this contract and moves it to its native representation. All of the stateful methods in this contract will revert after the Bedrock upgrade.

This contract is deprecated and its usage should be avoided.



Address: 0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000006

WETH9 is the standard implementation of Wrapped Ether on Optimism. It is a commonly used contract and is placed as a predeploy so that it is at a deterministic address across Optimism based networks.



Address: 0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000007

The L2CrossDomainMessenger gives a higher level API for sending cross domain messages compared to directly calling the L2ToL1MessagePasser. It maintains a mapping of L1 messages that have been relayed to L2 to prevent replay attacks and also allows for replayability if the L1 to L2 transaction reverts on L2.

Any calls to the L1CrossDomainMessenger on L1 are serialized such that they go through the L2CrossDomainMessenger on L2.

The relayMessage function executes a transaction from the remote domain while the sendMessage function sends a transaction to be executed on the remote domain through the remote domain's relayMessage function.



Address: 0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000010

The L2StandardBridge is a higher level API built on top of the L2CrossDomainMessenger that gives a standard interface for sending ETH or ERC20 tokens across domains.

To deposit a token from L1 to L2, the L1StandardBridge locks the token and sends a cross domain message to the L2StandardBridge which then mints the token to the specified account.

To withdraw a token from L2 to L1, the user will burn the token on L2 and the L2StandardBridge will send a message to the L1StandardBridge which will unlock the underlying token and transfer it to the specified account.

The OptimismMintableERC20Factory can be used to create an ERC20 token contract on a remote domain that maps to an ERC20 token contract on the local domain where tokens can be deposited to the remote domain. It deploys an OptimismMintableERC20 which has the interface that works with the StandardBridge.

This contract can also be deployed on L1 to allow for L2 native tokens to be withdrawn to L1.



Address: 0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000013

The L1BlockNumber returns the last known L1 block number. This contract was introduced in the legacy system and should be backwards compatible by calling out to the L1Block contract under the hood.

It is recommended to use the L1Block contract for getting information about L1 on L2.



Address: 0x420000000000000000000000000000000000000F

In the legacy system, the GasPriceOracle was a permissioned contract that was pushed the L1 base fee and the L2 gas price by an offchain actor. The offchain actor observes the L1 blockheaders to get the L1 base fee as well as the gas usage on L2 to compute what the L2 gas price should be based on a congestion control algorithm.

After Bedrock, the GasPriceOracle is no longer a permissioned contract and only exists to preserve the API for offchain gas estimation. The function getL1Fee(bytes) accepts an unsigned RLP transaction and will return the L1 portion of the fee. This fee pays for using L1 as a data availability layer and should be added to the L2 portion of the fee, which pays for execution, to compute the total transaction fee.

The values used to compute the L1 portion of the fee prior to the Ecotone upgrade are:

  • scalar
  • overhead
  • decimals

After the Bedrock upgrade, these values are instead managed by the SystemConfig contract on L1. The scalar and overhead values are sent to the L1Block contract each block and the decimals value has been hardcoded to 6.

Following the Ecotone upgrade, the values used for L1 fee computation are:

  • baseFeeScalar
  • blobBaseFeeScalar
  • decimals

These new scalar values are managed by the SystemConfig contract on the L1 by introducing a backwards compatible versioned encoding scheme of its scalars storage slot. The decimals remains hardcoded to 6, and the overhead value is ignored.



Address: 0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000015

The L1Block was introduced in Bedrock and is responsible for maintaining L1 context in L2. This allows for L1 state to be accessed in L2.


ProxyAdmin Address: 0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018

The ProxyAdmin is the owner of all of the proxy contracts set at the predeploys. It is itself behind a proxy. The owner of the ProxyAdmin will have the ability to upgrade any of the other predeploy contracts.



Address: 0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000011

The SequencerFeeVault accumulates any transaction priority fee and is the value of block.coinbase. When enough fees accumulate in this account, they can be withdrawn to an immutable L1 address.

To change the L1 address that fees are withdrawn to, the contract must be upgraded by changing its proxy's implementation key.



Address: 0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000012

The OptimismMintableERC20Factory is responsible for creating ERC20 contracts on L2 that can be used for depositing native L1 tokens into. These ERC20 contracts can be created permisionlessly and implement the interface required by the StandardBridge to just work with deposits and withdrawals.

Each ERC20 contract that is created by the OptimismMintableERC20Factory allows for the L2StandardBridge to mint and burn tokens, depending on if the user is depositing from L1 to L2 or withdrawing from L2 to L1.



Address: 0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000017

The OptimismMintableERC721Factory is responsible for creating ERC721 contracts on L2 that can be used for depositing native L1 NFTs into.



Address: 0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000019

The BaseFeeVault predeploy receives the base fees on L2. The base fee is not burnt on L2 like it is on L1. Once the contract has received a certain amount of fees, the ETH can be withdrawn to an immutable address on L1.



Address: 0x420000000000000000000000000000000000001a

The L1FeeVault predeploy receives the L1 portion of the transaction fees. Once the contract has received a certain amount of fees, the ETH can be withdrawn to an immutable address on L1.



Address: 0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000020

The SchemaRegistry predeploy implements the global attestation schemas for the Ethereum Attestation Service protocol.



Address: 0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000021

The EAS predeploy implements the Ethereum Attestation Service protocol.

Beacon Block Root

Address: 0x000F3df6D732807Ef1319fB7B8bB8522d0Beac02

The BeaconBlockRoot predeploy provides access to the L1 beacon block roots. This was added during the Ecotone network upgrade and is specified in EIP-4788.


Table of Contents


Preinstalled smart contracts exist on Optimism at predetermined addresses in the genesis state. They are similar to precompiles but instead run directly in the EVM instead of running native code outside of the EVM and are developed by third parties unaffiliated with the Optimism Collective.

These preinstalls are commonly deployed smart contracts that are being placed at genesis for convenience. It's important to note that these contracts do not have the same security guarantees as Predeployed smart contracts.

The following table includes each of the preinstalls.

Arachnid's Deterministic Deployment Proxy0x4e59b44847b379578588920cA78FbF26c0B4956C
ERC-4337 v0.6.0 EntryPoint0x5FF137D4b0FDCD49DcA30c7CF57E578a026d2789
ERC-4337 v0.6.0 SenderCreator0x7fc98430eaedbb6070b35b39d798725049088348
ERC-4337 v0.7.0 EntryPoint0x0000000071727De22E5E9d8BAf0edAc6f37da032
ERC-4337 v0.7.0 SenderCreator0xEFC2c1444eBCC4Db75e7613d20C6a62fF67A167C



Address: 0x69f4D1788e39c87893C980c06EdF4b7f686e2938

A multisignature wallet with support for confirmations using signed messages based on ERC191. Differs from SafeL2 by not emitting events to save gas.



Address: 0xfb1bffC9d739B8D520DaF37dF666da4C687191EA

A multisignature wallet with support for confirmations using signed messages based on ERC191. Differs from Safe by emitting events.



Address: 0x998739BFdAAdde7C933B942a68053933098f9EDa

Allows to batch multiple transactions into one.



Address: 0xA1dabEF33b3B82c7814B6D82A79e50F4AC44102B

Allows to batch multiple transactions into one, but only calls.



Address: 0x914d7Fec6aaC8cd542e72Bca78B30650d45643d7

Singleton factory used by Safe-related contracts based on Arachnid's Deterministic Deployment Proxy.

The original library used a pre-signed transaction without a chain ID to allow deployment on different chains. Some chains do not allow such transactions to be submitted; therefore, this contract will provide the same factory that can be deployed via a pre-signed transaction that includes the chain ID. The key that is used to sign is controlled by the Safe team.



Address: 0xcA11bde05977b3631167028862bE2a173976CA11

Multicall3 has two main use cases:

  • Aggregate results from multiple contract reads into a single JSON-RPC request.
  • Execute multiple state-changing calls in a single transaction.



The create2Deployer is a nice Solidity wrapper around the CREATE2 opcode. It provides the following ABI.

     * @dev Deploys a contract using `CREATE2`. The address where the
     * contract will be deployed can be known in advance via {computeAddress}.
     * The bytecode for a contract can be obtained from Solidity with
     * `type(contractName).creationCode`.
     * Requirements:
     * - `bytecode` must not be empty.
     * - `salt` must have not been used for `bytecode` already.
     * - the factory must have a balance of at least `value`.
     * - if `value` is non-zero, `bytecode` must have a `payable` constructor.
    function deploy(uint256 value, bytes32 salt, bytes memory code) public;
     * @dev Deployment of the {ERC1820Implementer}.
     * Further information: https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1820
    function deployERC1820Implementer(uint256 value, bytes32 salt);
     * @dev Returns the address where a contract will be stored if deployed via {deploy}.
     * Any change in the `bytecodeHash` or `salt` will result in a new destination address.
    function computeAddress(bytes32 salt, bytes32 codeHash) public view returns (address);
     * @dev Returns the address where a contract will be stored if deployed via {deploy} from a
     * contract located at `deployer`. If `deployer` is this contract's address, returns the
     * same value as {computeAddress}.
    function computeAddressWithDeployer(
        bytes32 salt,
        bytes32 codeHash,
        address deployer
    ) public pure returns (address);

Address: 0x13b0D85CcB8bf860b6b79AF3029fCA081AE9beF2

When Canyon activates, the contract code at 0x13b0D85CcB8bf860b6b79AF3029fCA081AE9beF2 is set to 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.

Arachnid's Deterministic Deployment Proxy


Address: 0x4e59b44847b379578588920cA78FbF26c0B4956C

This contract can deploy other contracts with a deterministic address on any chain using CREATE2. The CREATE2 call will deploy a contract (like CREATE opcode) but instead of the address being keccak256(rlp([deployer_address, nonce])) it instead uses the hash of the contract's bytecode and a salt. This means that a given deployer address will deploy the same code to the same address no matter when or where they issue the deployment. The deployer is deployed ith a one-time-use-account, so no matter what chain the deployer is on, its address will always be the same. This means the only variables in determining the address of your contract are its bytecode hash and the provided salt.

Between the use of CREATE2 opcode and the one-time-use-account for the deployer, this contracts ensures that a given contract will exist at the exact same address on every chain, but without having to use the same gas pricing or limits every time.



Address: 0x000000000022D473030F116dDEE9F6B43aC78BA3

Permit2 introduces a low-overhead, next-generation token approval/meta-tx system to make token approvals easier, more secure, and more consistent across applications.

ERC-4337 v0.6.0 EntryPoint


Address: 0x5FF137D4b0FDCD49DcA30c7CF57E578a026d2789

This contract verifies and executes the bundles of ERC-4337 v0.6.0 UserOperations sent to it.

ERC-4337 v0.6.0 SenderCreator


Address: 0x7fc98430eaedbb6070b35b39d798725049088348

Helper contract for EntryPoint v0.6.0, to call userOp.initCode from a "neutral" address, which is explicitly not EntryPoint itself.

ERC-4337 v0.7.0 EntryPoint


Address: 0x0000000071727De22E5E9d8BAf0edAc6f37da032

This contract verifies and executes the bundles of ERC-4337 v0.7.0 UserOperations sent to it.

ERC-4337 v0.7.0 SenderCreator


Address: 0xEFC2c1444eBCC4Db75e7613d20C6a62fF67A167C

Helper contract for EntryPoint v0.7.0, to call userOp.initCode from a "neutral" address, which is explicitly not EntryPoint itself.

Superchain Configuration

Table of Contents


The SuperchainConfig contract is used to manage global configuration values for multiple OP Chains within a single Superchain network.

Configurable values

Configurability of the Superchain is currently limited to two values:

The SuperchainConfig contract manages the following configuration values:

  • PAUSED_SLOT: A boolean value indicating whether the Superchain is paused.
  • GUARDIAN_SLOT: The address of the guardian, which can pause and unpause the system.

Configuration data flow

All contracts which read from the SuperchainConfig contract hold its address as storage values in the proxy account, and call directly to it when reading configuration data.

flowchart TD
StandardBridge --> SuperchainConfig
L1ERC721Bridge --> SuperchainConfig
L1CrossDomainMessenger --> SuperchainConfig
OptimismPortal --> SuperchainConfig


The Superchain pause feature is a safety mechanism designed to temporarily halt withdrawals from the system in an emergency situation. The Guardian role is authorized to pause and unpause the system.

Paused identifiers

When the system is paused the Paused(string identifier) event is emitted. This allows for the caller to provide additional information to be used during incident response.

Scope of pausability

The pause applies specifically to withdrawals of assets from the L1 bridge contracts. The L2 bridge contracts are not pausable, on the basis that issues on L2 can be addressed more easily by a hard fork in the consensus layer.

When the Pause is activated, the following methods are disabled:

  1. OptimismPortal.proveWithdrawalTransaction()
  2. OptimismPortal.finalizeWithdrawalTransaction()
  3. L1CrossDomainMessenger.relayMessage()
  4. StandardBridge.finalizeBridgeERC20()
  5. StandardBridge.finalizeBridgeETH()
  6. L1ERC721Bridge.finalizeBridgeERC721()

Superchain Upgrades

Table of Contents


Superchain upgrades, also known as forks or hardforks, implement consensus-breaking changes.

A Superchain upgrade requires the node software to support up to a given Protocol Version. The version indicates support, the upgrade indicates the activation of new functionality.

This document lists the protocol versions of the OP-Stack, starting at the Bedrock upgrade, as well as the default Superchain Targets.

Activation rule parameters of network upgrades are configured as part of the Superchain Target specification: chains following the same Superchain Target upgrade synchronously.

Protocol Version

The Protocol Version documents the progression of the total set of canonical OP-Stack specifications. Components of the OP-Stack implement the subset of their respective protocol component domain, up to a given Protocol Version of the OP-Stack.

OP-Stack mods, i.e. non-canonical extensions to the OP-Stack, are not included in the versioning of the Protocol. Instead, mods must specify which upstream Protocol Version they are based on and where breaking changes are made. This ensures tooling of the OP-Stack can be shared and collaborated on with OP-Stack mods.

The Protocol Version is NOT a hardfork identifier, but rather indicates software-support for a well-defined set of features introduced in past and future hardforks, not the activation of said hardforks.

Changes that can be included in prospective Protocol Versions may be included in the specifications as proposals, with explicit notice of the Protocol Version they are based on. This enables an iterative integration process into the canonical set of specifications, but does not guarantee the proposed specifications become canonical.

Note that the Protocol Version only applies to the Protocol specifications with the Superchain Targets specified within. This versioning is independent of the Semver versioning used in OP Stack smart-contracts, and the Semver-versioned reference software of the OP-Stack.

Protocol Version Format

The Protocol Version is Semver-compatible. It is encoded as a single 32 bytes long <protocol version>. The version must be encoded as 32 bytes of DATA in JSON RPC usage.

The encoding is typed, to ensure future-compatibility.

<protocol version> ::= <version-type><typed-payload>
<version-type> ::= <uint8>
<typed-payload> ::= <31 bytes>

version-type 0:

<reserved> ::= <7 zeroed bytes>
<build> ::= <8 bytes>
<major> ::= <big-endian uint32>
<minor> ::= <big-endian uint32>
<patch> ::= <big-endian uint32>
<pre-release> ::= <big-endian uint32>

The <reserved> bytes of the Protocol Version are reserved for future extensions.

Protocol versions with a different <version-type> should not be compared directly.

Build identifier

The <build> identifier, as defined by Semver, is ignored when determining version precedence. The <build> must be non-zero to apply to the protocol version.

Modifications of the OP-Stack should define a <build> to distinguish from the canonical protocol feature-set. Changes to the <build> may be encoded in the <build> itself to stay aligned with the upstream protocol. The major/minor/patch versions should align with that of the upstream protocol that the modifications are based on. Users of the protocol can choose to implement custom support for the alternative <build>, but may work out of the box if the major features are consistent with that of the upstream protocol version.

The 8 byte <build> identifier may be presented as a string for human readability if the contents are alpha-numeric, including - and ., as outlined in the Semver format specs. Trailing 0 bytes can be used for padding. It may be presented as 0x-prefixed hex string otherwise.

Major versions

Major version changes indicate support for new consensus-breaking functionality. Major versions should retain support for functionality of previous major versions for syncing/indexing of historical chain data. Implementations may drop support for previous Major versions, when there are viable alternatives, e.g. l2geth for pre-Bedrock data.

Minor versions

Minor version changes indicate support for backward compatible extensions, including backward-compatible additions to the set of chains in a Superchain Target. Backward-compatibility is defined by the requirement for existing end-users to upgrade nodes and tools or not. Minor version changes may also include optional offchain functionality, such as additional syncing protocols.

Patch versions

Patch version changes indicate backward compatible bug fixes and improvements.


Pre-releases of the protocol are proposals: these are not stable targets for production usage. A pre-release might not satisfy the intended compatibility requirements as denoted by its associated normal version. The <pre-release> must be non-zero to apply to the protocol version. The <pre-release> 0-value is reserved for non-prereleases, i.e. v3.1.0 is higher than v3.1.0-1.

Node-software may support a pre-release, but must not activate any protocol changes without the user explicitly opting in through the means of a feature-flag or configuration change.

A pre-release is not an official version and is meant for protocol developers to communicate an experimental changeset before the changeset is reviewed by governance. Pre-releases are subject to change.

Protocol Version Exposure

The Protocol Version is not exposed to the application-layer environment: hardforks already expose the change of functionality upon activation as required, and the Protocol Version is meant for offchain usage only. The protocol version indicates support rather than activation of functionality. There is one exception however: signaling by onchain components to offchain components. More about this in Superchain Version signaling.

Superchain Target

Changes to the L2 state-transition function are transitioned into deterministically across all nodes through an activation rule.

Changes to L1 smart-contracts must be compatible with the latest activated L2 functionality, and are executed through L1 contract-upgrades.

A Superchain Target defines a set of activation rules and L1 contract upgrades shared between OP-Stack chains, to upgrade the chains collectively.

Superchain Version signaling

Each Superchain Target tracks the protocol changes, and signals the recommended and required Protocol Version ahead of activation of new breaking functionality.

  • recommended: a signal in advance of a network upgrade, to alert users of the protocol change to be prepared for. Node software is recommended to signal the recommendation to users through logging and metrics.
  • required: a signal shortly in advance of a breaking network upgrade, to alert users of breaking changes. Users may opt in to elevated alerts or preventive measures, to ensure consistency with the upgrade.

Signaling is done through a L1 smart-contract that is monitored by the OP-Stack software. Not all components of the OP-Stack are required to directly monitor L1 however: cross-component APIs like the Engine API may be used to forward the Protocol Version signals, to keep components encapsulated from L1. See engine_signalOPStackVersionV1.

ProtocolVersions L1 contract

The ProtocolVersions contract on L1 enables L2 nodes to pick up on superchain protocol version signals.

The interface is:

  • Required storage slot: bytes32(uint256(keccak256("protocolversion.required")) - 1)
  • Recommended storage slot: bytes32(uint256(keccak256("protocolversion.recommended")) - 1)
  • Required getter: required() returns ProtocolVersion
  • Recommended getter recommended() returns ProtocolVersion
  • Version updates also emit a typed event: event ConfigUpdate(uint256 indexed version, UpdateType indexed updateType, bytes data)

Activation rules

The below L2-block based activation rules may be applied in two contexts:

  • The rollup node, specified through the rollup configuration (known as rollup.json), referencing L2 blocks (or block input-attributes) that pass through the derivation pipeline.
  • The execution engine, specified through the chain configuration (known as the config part of genesis.json), referencing blocks or input-attributes that are part of, or applied to, the L2 chain.

For both types of configurations, some activation parameters may apply to all chains within the superchain, and are then retrieved from the superchain target configuration.

L2 Block-number based activation (deprecated)

Activation rule: upgradeNumber != null && block.number >= upgradeNumber

Starting at, and including, the L2 block with block.number >= upgradeNumber, the upgrade rules apply. If the upgrade block-number upgradeNumber is not specified in the configuration, the upgrade is ignored.

This block number based method has commonly been used in L1 up until the Bellatrix/Paris upgrade, a.k.a. The Merge, which was upgraded through special rules.

This method is not superchain-compatible, as the activation-parameter is chain-specific (different chains may have different block-heights at the same moment in time).

This applies to the L2 block number, not to the L1-origin block number. This means that an L2 upgrade may be inactive, and then active, without changing the L1-origin.

L2 Block-timestamp based activation

Activation rule: upgradeTime != null && block.timestamp >= upgradeTime

Starting at, and including, the L2 block with block.timestamp >= upgradeTime, the upgrade rules apply. If the upgrade block-timestamp upgradeTime is not specified in the configuration, the upgrade is ignored.

This is the preferred superchain upgrade activation-parameter type: it is synchronous between all L2 chains and compatible with post-Merge timestamp-based chain upgrades in L1.

This applies to the L2 block timestamp, not to the L1-origin block timestamp. This means that an L2 upgrade may be inactive, and then active, without changing the L1-origin.

This timestamp based method has become the default on L1 after the Bellatrix/Paris upgrade, a.k.a. The Merge, because it can be planned in accordance with beacon-chain epochs and slots.

Note that the L2 version is not limited to timestamps that match L1 beacon-chain slots or epochs. A timestamp may be chosen to be synchronous with a specific slot or epoch on L1, but the matching L1-origin information may not be present at the time of activation on L2.

OP-Stack Protocol versions

  • v1.0.0: 2021 Jan 16th - Mainnet Soft Launch, based on OVM. (announcement)
  • v1.1.0: 2021 Aug 19th - Community launch. (announcement)
  • v2.0.0: 2021 Nov 12th - the EVM-Equivalence update, also known as OVM 2.0 and chain regenesis. (announcement)
  • v2.1.0: 2022 May 31st - Optimism Collective. (announcement).
  • v3.0.0-1: 2023 Jan 13th - Bedrock pre-release, deployed on OP-Goerli, and later Base-Goerli.
  • v3.0.0: 2023 Jun 6th - Bedrock, including the Regolith hardfork improvements, first deployed on OP-Mainnet.
  • v4.0.0: 2024 Jan 11th - Canyon network upgrade (Shapella). Governance Proposal.
  • v5.0.0: 2024 Feb 22nd - Delta network upgrade (Span Batches). Governance Proposal.
  • v6.0.0: 2024 Mar 14th - Ecotone network upgrade (4844 Blob Batches + Cancun). Governance Proposal.
  • v7.0.0: 2024 Jul 10th (optimistic1) - Fjord network upgrade (RIP-7212 precompile + FastLZ cost fn + Brotli compression). Governance Proposal.

Post-Bedrock Network upgrades

Activation Timestamps

Governance approves all network upgrades & the time at which the upgrade activates. The approved governance proposal is the canonoical document for the timestamp; however, the timestamps are replicated here for ease of use.

Network UpgradeMainnet Upgrade TimestampSepolia Upgrade TimestampGoerli Upgrade Timestamp

Governance vote and veto still have to pass.

System Config

Table of Contents


The SystemConfig is a contract on L1 that can emit rollup configuration changes as log events. The rollup block derivation process picks up on these log events and applies the changes.

System config contents (version 0)

Version 0 of the system configuration contract defines the following parameters:

batcherHash (bytes32)

A versioned hash of the current authorized batcher sender(s), to rotate keys as batch-submitter. The first byte identifies the version.

Version 0 embeds the current batch submitter ethereum address (bytes20) in the last 20 bytes of the versioned hash.

In the future this versioned hash may become a commitment to a more extensive configuration, to enable more extensive redundancy and/or rotation configurations.


The L1 fee parameters, also known as Gas Price Oracle (GPO) parameters, are used to compute the L1 data fee applied to an L2 transaction. The specific parameters used depend on the upgrades that are active.

Fee parameter updates are signaled to L2 through the GAS_CONFIG log-event of the SystemConfig.

Pre-Ecotone scalar, overhead (uint256,uint256)

The overhead and scalar are consulted and passed to the L2 via L1 attribute info.

The values are interpreted as big-endian uint256.

Ecotone scalar, overhead (uint256,uint256) change

After Ecotone activation:

  • The scalar attribute encodes additional scalar information, in a versioned encoding scheme.
  • The overhead value is ignored: it does not affect the L2 state-transition output.

The scalar is encoded as big-endian uint256, interpreted as bytes32, and composed as following:

*Byte ranges are indicated with [ (inclusive) and ) (exclusive).

  • 0: scalar-version byte
  • [1, 32): depending scalar-version:
    • Scalar-version 0:
      • [1, 28): padding, should be zero.
      • [28, 32): big-endian uint32, encoding the L1-fee baseFeeScalar
      • This version implies the L1-fee blobBaseFeeScalar is set to 0.
      • In the event there are non-zero bytes in the padding area, baseFeeScalar must be set to MaxUint32.
      • This version is compatible with the pre-Ecotone scalar value (assuming a uint32 range).
    • Scalar-version 1:
      • [1, 24): padding, must be zero.
      • [24, 28): big-endian uint32, encoding the blobBaseFeeScalar
      • [28, 32): big-endian uint32, encoding the baseFeeScalar
      • This version is meant to configure the EIP-4844 blob fee component, once blobs are used for data-availability.
    • Other scalar-version values: unrecognized. OP-Stack forks are recommended to utilize the >= 128 scalar-version range and document their scalar encoding.

Invalid and unrecognized scalar event-data should be ignored, and the last valid configuration should continue to be utilized.

The baseFeeScalar and blobBaseFeeScalar are incorporated into the L2 through the Ecotone L1 attributes deposit transaction calldata.

Future upgrades of the SystemConfig contract may provide additional typed getters/setters for the versioned scalar information.

In Ecotone the existing setGasConfig function, and scalar and overhead getters, continue to function.

When the batch-submitter utilizes EIP-4844 blob data for data-availability it can adjust the scalars to accurately price the resources:

  • baseFeeScalar to correspond to the share of the user-transaction (per byte) in the total regular L1 EVM gas usage consumed by the data-transaction of the batch-submitter. For blob transactions this is the fixed intrinsic gas cost of the L1 transaction.

  • blobBaseFeeScalar to correspond to share of a user-transaction (per byte) in the total Blob data that is introduced by the data-transaction of the batch-submitter.

gasLimit (uint64)

The gas limit of the L2 blocks is configured through the system config. Changes to the L2 gas limit are fully applied in the first L2 block with the L1 origin that introduced the change, as opposed to the 1/1024 adjustments towards a target as seen in limit updates of L1 blocks.

The gas limit may not be set to a value larger than 200_000_000. This is to ensure that the L2 blocks are fault provable and of reasonable size to be processed by the client software. Over time, this value will be increased.

unsafeBlockSigner (address)

Blocks are gossiped around the p2p network before they are made available on L1. To prevent denial of service on the p2p layer, these unsafe blocks must be signed with a particular key to be accepted as "canonical" unsafe blocks. The address corresponding to this key is the unsafeBlockSigner. To ensure that its value can be fetched with a storage proof in a storage layout independent manner, it is stored at a special storage slot corresponding to keccak256("systemconfig.unsafeblocksigner").

Unlike the other values, the unsafeBlockSigner only operates on blockchain policy. It is not a consensus level parameter.

Writing the system config

The SystemConfig contract applies authentication to all writing contract functions, the configuration management can be configured to be any type of ethereum account or contract.

On a write, an event is emitted for the change to be picked up by the L2 system, and a copy of the new written configuration variable is retained in L1 state to read with L1 contracts.

Reading the system config

A rollup node initializes its derivation process by finding a starting point based on its past L2 chain:

  • When started from L2 genesis, the initial system configuration is retrieved from the rollup chain configuration.
  • When started from an existing L2 chain, a previously included L1 block is determined as derivation starting point, and the system config can thus be retrieved from the last L2 block that referenced the L1 block as L1 origin:
    • If the chain state precedes the Ecotone upgrade, batcherHash, overhead and scalar are retrieved from the L1 block info transaction. Otherwise, batcherHash, baseFeeScalar, and blobBaseFeeScalar are retrieved instead.
    • gasLimit is retrieved from the L2 block header.
    • other future variables may also be retrieved from other contents of the L2 block, such as the header.

After preparing the initial system configuration for the given L1 starting input, the system configuration is updated by processing all receipts from each new L1 block.

The contained log events are filtered and processed as follows:

  • the log event contract address must match the rollup SystemConfig deployment
  • the first log event topic must match the ABI hash of ConfigUpdate(uint256,uint8,bytes)
  • the second topic determines the version. Unknown versions are critical derivation errors.
  • the third topic determines the type of update. Unknown types are critical derivation errors.
  • the remaining event data is opaque, encoded as ABI bytes (i.e. includes offset and length data), and encodes the configuration update. In version 0 the following types are supported:
    • type 0: batcherHash overwrite, as bytes32 payload.
    • type 1: Pre-Ecotone, overhead and scalar overwrite, as two packed uint256 entries. After Ecotone upgrade, overhead is ignored and scalar interpreted as a versioned encoding that updates baseFeeScalar and blobBaseFeeScalar.
    • type 2: gasLimit overwrite, as uint64 payload.
    • type 3: unsafeBlockSigner overwrite, as address payload.

Note that individual derivation stages may be processing different L1 blocks, and should thus maintain individual system configuration copies, and apply the event-based changes as the stage traverses to the next L1 block.

OP Stack Configurability

Table of Contents

When deploying the OP Stack software to a production environment, certain parameters about the protocol can be configured. These configurations can include a variety of parameters which affect the resulting properties of the blockspace in question.

There are four categories of OP Stack configuration options:

  • Consensus Parameters: Parameters and properties of the chain that may be set at genesis and fixed for the lifetime of the chain, or may be changeable through a privileged account or protocol upgrade.
  • Policy Parameters: Parameters of the chain that might be changed without breaking consensus. Consensus is enforced by the protocol, while policy parameters may be changeable within constraints imposed by consensus.
  • Admin Roles: These roles can upgrade contracts, change role owners, or update protocol parameters. These are typically cold/multisig wallets not used directly in day to day operations.
  • Service Roles: These roles are used to manage the day-to-day operations of the chain, and therefore are often hot wallets.

Each category also defines the standard configuration values for it's given parameters. Standard configuration is the set of requirements for an OP Stack chain to be considered a Standard Chain within the superchain. These requirements are currently a draft, pending governance approval.

The recommended way to deploy L1 contracts for an OP chain that meet the standard configuration will be with the OP Stack Manager.

Consensus Parameters

Config PropertyDescriptionAdministratorStandard Config RequirementNotes
Batch Inbox addressL1 address where calldata/blobs are posted (see Batcher Transaction).StaticCurrent convention is versionByte || keccak256(bytes32(chainId))[:19], where || denotes concatenation, versionByte is 0x00, and chainId is a uint256.It is recommended, but not required, to follow this convention.
Batcher HashA versioned hash of the current authorized batcher sender(s).System Config Ownerbytes32(uint256(uint160(batchSubmitterAddress)))Batch Submitter address padded with zeros to fit 32 bytes.
Chain IDUnique ID of Chain used for TX signature validation.StaticFoundation-approved, globally unique value 1.Foundation will ensure chains are responsible with their chain IDs until there's a governance process in place.
Proof Maturity DelayThe length of time that must pass between proving and finalizing a withdrawal.L1 Proxy Admin7 daysHigh security. Excessively safe upper bound that leaves enough time to consider social layer solutions to a hack if necessary. Allows enough time for other network participants to challenge the integrity of the corresponding output root.
Dispute Game FinalityThe amount of time given to the Guardian role to blacklist a resolved dispute game before any withdrawals proven against it can be finalized, in the case of a system failure.L1 Proxy Admin3.5 daysHigh security. Allows enough time for the Guardian to blacklist games.
Respected Game TypeThe respected game type of the OptimismPortal. Determines the type of dispute games that can be used to finalize withdrawals.GuardianCANNON (0)The game type may be changed to PERMISSIONED_CANNON (1) as a fallback to permissioned proposals, in the event of a failure in the Fault Proof system.
Fee ScalarMarkup on transactions compared to the raw L1 data cost.System Config OwnerSet such that Fee Margin is between 0 and 50%.
Gas LimitGas limit of the L2 blocks is configured through the system config.System Config OwnerNo higher than 200_000_000 gasChain operators are driven to maintain a stable and reliable chain. When considering to change this value, careful deliberation is necessary.
Genesis stateInitial state at chain genesis, including code and storage of predeploys (all L2 smart contracts). See Predeploy.StaticOnly standard predeploys and preinstalls, no additional state.Homogeneity & standardization, ensures initial state is secure.
L2 block timeFrequency with which blocks are produced as a result of derivation.L1 Proxy Admin2 secondsHigh security & interoperability compatibility requirement, until de-risked/solved at app layer.
Resource configConfig for the EIP-1559 based curve used for the deposit gas market.L1 Proxy AdminSee resource config table.Constraints are imposed in code when setting the resource config.
Sequencing window SizeMaximum allowed batch submission gap, after which L1 fallback is triggered in derivation.Static3_600 base layer blocks (12 hours for an L2 on Ethereum, assuming 12 second L1 blocktime). e.g. 12 second blocks, .This is an important value for constraining the sequencer's ability to re-order transactions; higher values would pose a risk to user protections.
Start blockBlock at which the system config was initialized the first time.L1 Proxy AdminThe block where the SystemConfig was initialized.Simple clear restriction.
Superchain targetChoice of cross-L2 configuration. May be omitted in isolated OP Stack deployments. Includes SuperchainConfig and ProtocolVersions contract addresses.StaticMainnet or SepoliaA superchain target defines a set of layer 2 chains which share SuperchainConfig and ProtocolVersions contracts deployed on layer 1.
Governance TokenOP token used for the Optimism Collective's Token House governance.n/aDisabledSimple clear restriction.

The chain ID must be globally unique among all EVM chains.

Resource Config

Config PropertyStandard Config Requirement

Policy Parameters

Config PropertyDescriptionAdministratorStandard Config RequirementNotes
Data Availability TypeBatcher can currently be configured to use blobs or calldata (See Data Availability Provider).Batch submitter addressEthereum (Blobs, Calldata)Alt-DA is not yet supported for the standard configuration, but the sequencer can switch at-will between blob and calldata with no restriction, since both are L1 security.
Batch submission frequencyFrequency with which batches are submitted to L1 (see Batcher Transaction).Batch submitter address1_800 base layer blocks (6 hours for an L2 on Ethereum, assuming 12 second L1 blocktime) or lowerBatcher needs to fully submit each batch within the sequencing window, so this leaves buffer to account for L1 network congestion and the amount of data the batcher would need to post.
Output frequencyFrequency with which output roots are submitted to L1.L1 Proxy Admin43_200 L2 Blocks (24 hours for an L2 on Ethereum, assuming 2 second L2 blocktime) or lower e.g. 2 second blocks, .Deprecated once fault proofs are implemented. This value cannot be 0.

Admin Roles

Config PropertyDescriptionAdministratorAdministersStandard Config RequirementNotes
L1 Proxy AdminAccount authorized to upgrade L1 contracts.L1 Proxy Admin OwnerBatch Inbox Address, Start block, Proposer address, Challenger address, Guardian address, Proof Maturity Delay, Dispute Game Finality, Output frequency, L2 block time, L1 smart contractsProxyAdmin.sol from the latest op-contracts/vX.Y.X release of source code in Optimism repository.Governance-controlled, high security.
L1 ProxyAdmin ownerAccount authorized to update the L1 Proxy Admin.L1 Proxy Admin0x5a0Aae59D09fccBdDb6C6CcEB07B7279367C3d2A 2Governance-controlled, high security.
L2 Proxy AdminAccount authorized to upgrade L2 contracts.L2 Proxy Admin OwnerPredeploysProxyAdmin.sol from the latest op-contracts/vX.Y.X release of source code in Optimism repository. Predeploy address: 0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018.Governance-controlled, high security.
L2 ProxyAdmin ownerAccount authorized to upgrade protocol contracts via calls to the ProxyAdmin. This is the aliased L1 ProxyAdmin owner address.L2 Proxy AdminGnosis Safe between Optimism Foundation (OF) and the Security Council (SC). Aliased Address: 0x6B1BAE59D09fCcbdDB6C6cceb07B7279367C4E3b 3Governance-controlled, high security.
System Config OwnerAccount authorized to change values in the SystemConfig contract. All configuration is stored on L1 and picked up by L2 as part of the derivation of the L2 chain.Batch submitter address, Sequencer P2P / Unsafe head signer, Fee Margin, Gas limit, System Config OwnerChain Governor or ServicerAs defined in the Law of Chains

2 of 2 GnosisSafe between Optimism Foundation (OF) and the Security Council (SC) on L1. Mainnet and Sepolia addresses can be found at privileged roles.


Aliased address of the 2 of 2 Gnosis Safe between Optimism Foundation (OF) and the Security Council (SC) on L1. The reason for aliasing can be found in the glossary. This address was calculated using the following arithmetic: 0x5a0Aae59D09fccBdDb6C6CcEB07B7279367C3d2A + 0x1111000000000000000000000000000000001111 = 0x6B1BAE59D09fCcbdDB6C6cceb07B7279367C4E3b.

Service Roles

Config PropertyDescriptionAdministratorStandard Config RequirementNotes
Batch submitter addressAccount which authenticates new batches submitted to L1 Ethereum.System Config OwnerNo requirement
Challenger addressAccount which can interact with existing permissioned dispute games.L1 Proxy Admin0x9BA6e03D8B90dE867373Db8cF1A58d2F7F006b3A 4Optimism Foundation (OF) multisig leveraging battle-tested software. This role is only active when the OptimismPortal respected game type is PERMISSIONED_CANNON.
Guardian addressAccount authorized to pause L1 withdrawals from contracts, blacklist dispute games, and set the respected game type in the OptimismPortal.L1 Proxy Admin0x09f7150D8c019BeF34450d6920f6B3608ceFdAf2A 1/1 Safe owned by the Security Council Safe, with the Deputy Guardian Module enabled to allow the Optimism Foundation to act as Guardian.
Proposer addressAccount which can create and interact with permissioned dispute games on L1.L1 Proxy AdminNo requirementThis role is only active when the OptimismPortal respected game type is PERMISSIONED_CANNON. The L1ProxyAdmin sets the implementation of the PERMISSIONED_CANNON game type. Thus, it determines the proposer configuration of the permissioned dispute game.
Sequencer P2P / Unsafe head signerAccount which authenticates the unsafe/pre-submitted blocks for a chain at the P2P layer.System Config OwnerNo requirement

5 of 7 GnosisSafe controlled by Optimism Foundation (OF). Mainnet and Sepolia addresses can be found at privileged roles.

Custom Gas Token

Table of Contents


Custom gas token is also known as "custom L2 native asset". It allows for an L1-native ERC20 token to collateralize and act as the gas token on L2. The native asset is used to buy gas which is used to pay for resources on the network and is represented by EVM opcodes such as CALLVALUE (msg.value).

Both the L1 and L2 smart contract systems MUST be able to introspect on the address of the gas paying token to ensure the security of the system. The source of truth for the configuration of the address of the token is in the L1 SystemConfig smart contract.

The terms "custom gas token", "gas paying token", "native asset" and "gas paying asset" can all be used interchangebly. Note, Ether is not a custom gas token, but may be used to pay gas. More on this in ## Configuring the Gas Paying Token.


ETHER_TOKEN_ADDRESSaddress(0xEeeeeEeeeEeEeeEeEeEeeEEEeeeeEeeeeeeeEEeE)Represents ether for gas paying asset
DEPOSITOR_ACCOUNTaddress(0xDeaDDEaDDeAdDeAdDEAdDEaddeAddEAdDEAd0001)Account with auth permissions on L1Block contract
GAS_PAYING_TOKEN_SLOTbytes32(uint256(keccak256("opstack.gaspayingtoken")) - 1)Storage slot that contains the address and decimals of the gas paying token
GAS_PAYING_TOKEN_NAME_SLOTbytes32(uint256(keccak256("opstack.gaspayingtokenname")) - 1)Storage slot that contains the ERC20 name() of the gas paying token
GAS_PAYING_TOKEN_SYMBOL_SLOTbytes32(uint256(keccak256("opstack.gaspayingtokensymbol")) - 1)Storage slot that contains the ERC20 symbol() of the gas paying token

Properties of a Gas Paying Token

The gas paying token MUST satisfy the standard ERC20 interface and implementation. It MUST be an L1 contract.

The gas paying token MUST NOT:

  • Have a fee on transfer
  • Have rebasing logic
  • Have call hooks on transfer
  • Have other than 18 decimals
  • Have out of band methods for modifying balance or allowance
  • Have a name() that is more than 32 bytes long
  • Have a symbol() this is more than 32 bytes long
  • Be a double entrypoint token

It MUST be enforced on chain that the token has exactly 18 decimals to guarantee no losses of precision when depositing a token that has a different number of decimals. It MUST be enforced on chain that the token's name and symbol are less than 32 bytes to guarantee they can each fit into a single storage slot.

It MAY be possible to support ERC20 tokens with varying amounts of decimals in the future.

Automated Validation

Ideally it is possible to have automated validation of custom gas paying tokens to know that the token satisfies the above properties. Due to the nature of the EVM, it may not always be possible to do so. ERC-165 isn't always used by ERC20 tokens and isn't guaranteed to tell the truth. USDT does not correctly implement the ERC20 spec. It may be possible to use execution traces to observe the properties of the ERC20 tokens but some degree of social consensus will be required for determining the validity of an ERC20 token.

Configuring the Gas Paying Token

The gas paying token is set within the L1 SystemConfig smart contract. This allows for easy access to the information required to know if an OP Stack chain is configured to use a custom gas paying token. The gas paying token is set during initialization and cannot be modified by the SystemConfig bytecode. Since the SystemConfig is proxied, it is always possible to modify the storage slot that holds the gas paying token address directly during an upgrade. It is assumed that the chain operator will not modify the gas paying token address unless they specifically decide to do so and appropriately handle the consequences of the action.

The gas paying token address is network specific configuration, therefore it MUST be set in storage and not as an immutable. This ensures that the same contract bytecode can be used by multiple OP Stack chains.

If the address in the GAS_PAYING_TOKEN_SLOT slot for SystemConfig is address(0), the system is configured to use ether as the gas paying token, and the getter for the token returns ETHER_TOKEN_ADDRESS. If the address in the GAS_PAYING_TOKEN_SLOT slot for SystemConfig is not address(0), the system is configured to use a custom gas paying token, and the getter returns the address in the slot.

flowchart LR
    subgraph Layer One
        subgraph SystemConfig
          TA1[Token Address]
        CO[Chain Operator] -->|"initialize()"| SystemConfig
        SystemConfig -->|"setGasPayingToken()"| OP

    subgraph Layer Two
        subgraph L1Block
          TA2[Token Address]
    OP -->|"setGasPayingToken()"| L1Block

Contract Modifications

IGasToken Interface

This interface encapsulates the shared interface.

interface IGasToken {
    /// @notice Getter for the ERC20 token address that is used to pay for gas and its decimals.
    function gasPayingToken() external view returns (address, uint8);
    /// @notice Returns the gas token name.
    function gasPayingTokenName() external view returns (string memory);
    /// @notice Returns the gas token symbol.
    function gasPayingTokenSymbol() external view returns (string memory);
    /// @notice Returns true if the network uses a custom gas token.
    function isCustomGasToken() external view returns (bool);

If a custom gas token is not used, then gasPayingToken() should return (ETHER_TOKEN_ADDRESS, 18), gasPayingTokenName should return Ether and gasPayingTokenSymbol should return ETH.

This interface applies to the following contracts:

  • L1Block
  • SystemConfig

Gas Token Aware

The following contracts are aware internally if the chain is using a custom gas token but do not expose anything as part of their ABI that indicates awareness.

  • L1StandardBridge
  • L2StandardBridge
  • L1CrossDomainMessenger
  • L2CrossDomainMessenger
  • OptimismPortal


The OptimismPortal is updated with a new interface specifically for depositing custom tokens.


The depositERC20Transaction function is useful for sending custom gas tokens to L2. It is broken out into its own interface to maintain backwards compatibility with chains that use ether, to help simplify the implementation and make it explicit for callers that are trying to deposit an ERC20 native asset.

function depositERC20Transaction(
    address _to,
    uint256 _mint,
    uint256 _value,
    uint64 _gasLimit,
    bool _isCreation,
    bytes memory _data
) public;

This function MUST revert when ether is the L2's native asset. It MUST not be payable, meaning that it will revert when ether is sent with a CALL to it. It uses a transferFrom flow, so users MUST first approve() the OptimismPortal before they can deposit tokens.

Function Arguments

The following table describes the arguments to depositERC20Transaction

_toaddressThe target of the deposit transaction
_mintuint256The amount of token to deposit
_valueuint256The value of the deposit transaction, used to transfer native asset that is already on L2 from L1
_gasLimituint64The gas limit of the deposit transaction
_isCreationboolSignifies the _data should be used with CREATE
_databytesThe calldata of the deposit transaction


This function is the hot code path for all usage of the L1StandardBridge and L1CrossDomainMessenger, so it MUST be as backwards compatible as possible. It MUST revert for chains using custom gas token when ether is sent with the CALL. This prevents ether from being stuck in the OptimismPortal, since it cannot be used to mint native asset on L2.


This function MUST only be callable by the SystemConfig. When called, it creates a special deposit transaction from the DEPOSITOR_ACCOUNT that calls the L1Block.setGasPayingToken function. The ERC20 name and symbol are passed as bytes32 to prevent the usage of dynamically sized string arguments.

function setGasPayingToken(address _token, uint8 _decimals, bytes32 _name, bytes32 _symbol) external;


The StandardBridge contracts on both L1 and L2 MUST be aware of the custom gas token. The ether specific ABI on the StandardBridge is disabled when custom gas token is enabled.

The following methods MUST revert when custom gas token is being used:

  • bridgeETH(uint32,bytes)
  • bridgeETHTo(address,uint32,bytes)
  • receive()
  • finalizeBridgeETH(address, address, uint256, bytes)

The following legacy methods in L1StandardBridge MUST revert when custom gas token is being used:

  • depositETH(uint32,bytes)
  • depositETHTo(address,uint32,bytes)
  • finalizeETHWithdrawal(address,address,uint256,bytes)

The following legacy methods in L2StandardBridge MUST always revert when custom gas token is being used:

  • withdraw(address,uint256,uint32,bytes)
  • withdrawTo(address,address,uint256,uint32,bytes)
  • finalizeDeposit(address,address,address,address,uint256,bytes)

These methods are deprecated and subject to be removed in the future.


The CrossDomainMessenger contracts on both L1 and L2 MUST NOT be able to faciliate the transfer of native asset on custom gas token chains due to their tight coupling with ether and the OptimismPortal and L2ToL1MessagePasser contracts.

It is possible to support this in the future with a redesign of the CrossDomainMessenger contract. It would need to have conditional logic based on being a custom gas token chain and faciliate transfer of the ERC20 token to the end user on the other side. It adds a layer of extra state modifying calls so it may not be worth adding.

The following methods MUST revert when CALLVALUE is non zero:

  • sendMessage(address,bytes,uint32)

It should be impossible to call relayMessage when CALLVALUE is non zero, as it is enforced by sendMessage.

The CrossDomainMessenger also has the API for getting the custom gas token, namely gasPayingToken(), which outputs a tuple of the address and decimals of the custom gas token.

  • The L1CrossDomainMessenger fetches this tuple from the SystemConfig contract.
  • The L2CrossDomainMessenger fetches this tuple from the L1Block contract.


The SystemConfig is the source of truth for the address of the custom gas token. It does on chain validation, stores information about the token and well as passes the information to L2.


The SystemConfig is modified to allow the address of the custom gas paying token to be set during the call to initialize. Using a custom gas token is indicated by passing an address other than ETHER_TOKEN_ADDRESS or address(0). If address(0) is used for initialization, it MUST be mapped into ETHER_TOKEN_ADDRESS before being forwarded to the rest of the system. When a custom gas token is set, the number of decimals on the token MUST be exactly 18, the name of the token MUST be less than or equal to 32 bytes and the symbol MUST be less than or equal to 32 bytes. If the token passes all of these checks, OptimismPortal.setGasPayingToken is called. The implementation of initialize MUST not allow the chain operator to change the address of the custom gas token if it is already set.


The L1Block contract is upgraded with a permissioned function setGasPayingToken that is used to set information about the gas paying token. The DEPOSITOR_ACCOUNT MUST be the only account that can call the setter function. This setter is differentiated from the setL1BlockValues functions because the gas paying token is not meant to be dynamic config whereas the arguments to setL1BlockValues are generally dynamic in nature.

Any L2 contract that wants to learn the address of the gas paying token can call the getter on the L1Block contract.

function setGasPayingToken(address _token, uint8 _decimals, byte32 _name, bytes32 _symbol) external;


The WETH9 predeploy is updated so that it calls out to the L1Block contract to retreive the name and symbol. This allows for front ends to more easily trust the token contract. It should prepend Wrapped to the name and W to the symbol.

User Flow

The user flow for custom gas token chains is slightly different than for chains that use ether to pay for gas. The following tables highlight the methods that can be used for depositing and withdrawing the native asset. Not every interface is included.

The StandardBridge and CrossDomainMessenger are symmetric in their APIs between L1 and L2 meaning that "sending to the other domain" indicates it can be used for both deposits and withdrawals.

When ETH is the Native Asset

Native Asset Send to Other DomainL1StandardBridge.bridgeETH(uint32,bytes) payableNone
Native Asset and/or Message Send to Other DomainL1CrossDomainMessenger.sendMessage(address,bytes,uint32) payableNone
Native Asset DepositOptimismPortal.depositTransaction(address,uint256,uint64,bool,bytes) payableNone
ERC20 Send to Other DomainL1StandardBridge.bridgeERC20(address,address,uint256,uint32,bytes)Approve L1StandardBridge for ERC20
Native Asset WithdrawalL2ToL1MessagePasser.initiateWithdrawal(address,uint256,bytes) payableNone

There are multiple APIs for users to deposit or withdraw ether. Depending on the usecase, different APIs should be preferred. For a simple send of just ether with no calldata, the OptimismPortal or L2ToL1MessagePasser should be used directly. If sending with calldata and replayability on failed calls is desired, the CrossDomainMessenger should be used. Using the StandardBridge is the most expensive and has no real benefit for end users.

When an ERC20 Token is the Native Asset

Native Asset DepositOptimismPortal.depositERC20Transaction(address,uint256,uint256,uint64,bool,bytes)Approve OptimismPortal for ERC20
ERC20 Send to Other DomainL1StandardBridge.bridgeERC20(address,address,uint256,uint32,bytes)Approve L1StandardBridge for ERC20
Native Asset WithdrawalL2ToL1MessagePasser.initiateWithdrawal(address,uint256,bytes) payableNone

Users should deposit native asset by calling depositERC20Transaction on the OptimismPortal contract. Users must first approve the address of the OptimismPortal so that the OptimismPortal can use transferFrom to take ownership of the ERC20 asset.

Users should withdraw value by calling the L2ToL1MessagePasser directly.

The following diagram shows the control flow for when a user attempts to send ether through the StandardBridge, either on L1 or L2.

flowchart TD
    A1(User) -->|Attempts to deposit/withdraw ether| A2(StandardBridge or CrossDomainMessenger)
    A2 -->|Is chain using custom gas token?| A3{SystemConfig or L1Block}
    A3 --> |Yes| A2
    A2 --> |Revert| A1


The main difference is that the StandardBridge and CrossDomainMessenger cannot be used to send the native asset to the other domain when an ERC20 token is the native asset. The StandardBridge can still be used for bridging arbitrary ERC20 tokens and the CrossDomainMessenger can still be used for arbitrary message passing.


The custom gas token upgrade is not yet defined to be part of a particular network upgrade, but it will be scheduled as part of a future hardfork. On the network upgrade block, a set of deposit transaction based upgrade transactions are deterministically generated by the derivation pipeline in the following order:

  • L1 Attributes Transaction calling setL1BlockValuesEcotone
  • User deposits from L1
  • Network Upgrade Transactions
    • L1Block deployment
    • L2CrossDomainMessenger deployment
    • L2StandardBridge deployment
    • Update L1Block Proxy ERC-1967 Implementation Slot
    • Update L2CrossDomainMessenger Proxy ERC-1967 Implementation Slot
    • Update L2StandardBridge Proxy ERC-1967 Implementation Slot

The deployment transactions MUST have a from value that has no code and has no known private key. This is to guarantee it cannot be frontran and have its nonce modified. If this was possible, then an attacker would be able to modify the address that the implementation is deployed to because it is based on CREATE and not CREATE2. This would then cause the proxy implementation set transactions to set an incorrect implementation address, resulting in a bricked contract. The calldata is not generated dynamically to enable deterministic upgrade transactions across all networks.

The proxy upgrade transactions are from address(0) because the Proxy implementation considers address(0) to be an admin. Going straight to the Proxy guarantees that the upgrade will work because there is no guarantee that the Proxy is owned by the ProxyAdmin and going through the ProxyAdmin would require stealing the identity of its owner, which may be different on every chain. That would require adding L2 RPC access to the derivation pipeline and make the upgrade transactions non deterministic.

L1Block Deployment

  • from: 0x4210000000000000000000000000000000000002
  • to: null
  • mint: 0
  • value: 0
  • gasLimit: TODO
  • data: TODO
  • sourceHash: TODO

L2CrossDomainMessenger Deployment

  • from: 0x4210000000000000000000000000000000000003
  • to: null
  • mint: 0
  • value: 0
  • gasLimit: 375,000
  • data: TODO
  • sourceHash: TODO

L2StandardBridge Deployment

  • from: 0x4210000000000000000000000000000000000004
  • to: null
  • mint: 0
  • value: 0
  • gasLimit: 375,000
  • data: TODO
  • sourceHash: TODO

L1Block Proxy Update

  • from: 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
  • to: 0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000015
  • mint: 0
  • value: 0
  • gasLimit: 50,000
  • data: TODO
  • sourceHash: TODO

L2CrossDomainMessenger Proxy Update

  • from: 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
  • to: 0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000007
  • mint: 0
  • value: 0
  • gasLimit: 50,000
  • data: TODO
  • sourceHash: TODO

L2StandardBridge Proxy Update

  • from: 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
  • to: 0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000010
  • mint: 0
  • value: 0
  • gasLimit: 50,000
  • data: TODO
  • sourceHash: TODO


It was decided to use address(0xEeeeeEeeeEeEeeEeEeEeeEEEeeeeEeeeeeeeEEeE) to represent ether to push ecosystem standardization efforts around using this address to represent ether in DeFi protocols or APIs.

Standard Config

There is currently no strong definition of what it means to be part of the standard config when using the OP Stack with custom gas token enabled. This will be defined in the future.


The OP Stack natively charges fees in terms of ether due to the fee formula taking into account the basefee and blobbasefee. When a custom gas token is used, fees are paid in the custom gas token but the conversion rate to ether is not taken into account as part of the protocol. It is assumed that the fees will be configured by the chain operator such that the revenue earned in custom gas token can be swapped into ether to pay for posting the data to L1.

Security Considerations

OptimismPortal Token Allowance

The OptimismPortal makes calls on behalf of users. It is therefore unsafe to be able to call the address of the custom gas token itself from the OptimismPortal because it would be a simple way to approve an attacker's balance and steal the entire ERC20 token balance of the OptimismPortal.

Interoperability Support

Interop is supported between chains even if they use different custom gas tokens. The token address and the number of decimals are legible on chain. In the future we may add the ability to poke a chain such that it emits an event that includes the custom gas token address and its number of decimals to easily be able to introspect on the native asset of another chain.

Wrapped Ether

The WETH9 predeploy at 0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000006 represents wrapped native asset and not wrapped ether. Portable and fungible ether across different domains is left for a future project.

Alt-DA Mode

Table of Contents

Note: Alt-DA Mode is a Beta feature of the MIT licensed OP Stack. While it has received initial review from core contributors, it is still undergoing testing, and may have bugs or other issues.


Using Alt-DA mode means switching to an offchain data availability provider. The protocol guarantees availability with a challenge contract on L1 where users can challenge the availability of input data used to derive the chain. Challenging an input commitment means forcing providers to submit the input data on chain to prove the data is available during a time period. We call the period during which any party can challenge a commitment challenge_window and the period during which any party can submit the input data to resolve the challenge resolve_window. If a challenge is not resolved by the time resolve_window of L1 blocks have passed, chain derivation must be reset, omitting the input data when rederiving therefore causing a reorg.

Input Commitment Submission

The batching and compression of input data remain unchanged. When a batch is ready to be submitted to the inbox address, the data is uploaded to the DA storage layer instead, and a commitment (specified below) is submitted as the bacher inbox transaction call data.

Commitment txdata introduces version 1 to the transaction format, in order to interpret the txdata as a commitment during the l1 retrieval step of the derivation pipeline:


The derivationVersion0 byte is still prefixed to the input data stored in the DA provider so the frames can be decoded downstream.

Commitments are encoded as commitment_type_byte ++ commitment_bytes, where commitment_bytes depends on the commitment_type_byte where [0, 128) are reserved for official implementations:


The da-service commitment is as follows: da_layer_byte ++ payload. The DA layer byte must be initially restricted to the range [0, 127). This specification will not apportion DA layer bytes, but different DA layers should coordinate to ensure that the DA layer bytes do not conflict. DA Layers can do so in this discussion. The payload is a bytestring which is up to the DA layer to specify. The DA server should be able to parse the payload, find the data on the DA layer, and verify that the data returned from the DA layer matches what was committed to in the payload.

The batcher SHOULD cap input payloads to the maximum L1 tx size or the input will be skipped during derivation. See derivation section for more details.

The batcher SHOULD NOT submit a commitment onchain unless input data was successfully stored on the service. In addition, a DA provider storage service SHOULD return an error response if it is unable to properly store the request payload so as to signal to the batcher to retry. Input commitments submitted onchain without proper storage on the DA provider service are subject to challenges if the input cannot be retrieved during the challenge window, as detailed in the following section.

DA Server

Input data is uploaded to the storage layer via plain HTTP calls to the DA server.

This service is responsible to interacting with the Data Availability Layer (DA layer). The layer could be a content addressable storage layer like IPFS or any S3 compatible storage or it could a specific DA focused blockchain. Content addressed systems like S3 should use the first put/<hex_encoded_commitment> because they can pre-commpute the commitment. Blockchain based DA layers should use put and then submit the returned commitment to L1. Because commitments can include the block height or hash, the commitment cannot be computed prior to submitting it to the DA Layer.

Any DA provider can implement the following endpoints to receive and serve input data:

  • Request:
      POST /put/<hex_encoded_commitment>
      Content-Type: application/octet-stream
      Body: <preimage_bytes>
      200 OK
  • Request:
      POST /put
      Content-Type: application/octet-stream
      Body: <preimage_bytes>
      200 OK
      Content-Type: application/octet-stream
      Body: <hex_encoded_commitment>
  • Request:
      GET /get/<hex_encoded_commitment>
      200 OK
      Content-Type: application/octet-stream
      Body: <preimage_bytes>

Data Availability Challenge Contract


fixedResolutionCostuint256Fixed gas cost of resolving a challenge, set to 72925
variableResolutionCostuint256Upper limit gas cost per byte scaled by precision constant, set to 16640
variableResolutionCostPrecisionuint256Precision of the variable resolution cost, set to 1000
challengeWindowuint256Number of L1 blocks whereby a commitment MAY be challenged after it's included onchain
resolveWindowuint256Number of L1 blocks whereby input data SHOULD be submitted onchain after a challenge
bondSizeuint256Bond amount in Wei posted by the challenger so that bondSize >= resolveCost
resolverRefundFactoruint256Factor defining the portion of the resolving cost refunded to the resolver

Data availability is guaranteed via a permissionless challenge contract on the L1 chain. Users have a set number of L1 blocks (challengeWindow) during which they are able to call the challenge method of the contract with the following inputs:

function challenge(uint256 challengedBlockNumber, bytes calldata challengedCommitment) external payable
  • The L1 block number in which it was included.
  • Versioned commitment bytes (i.e. 0 ++ keccak256(frame.. ))

Users with access to the input data then have another window of L1 blocks (resolveWindow) during which they can submit it as calldata to the chain by calling the resolve method of the contract. If the data is not included onchain by the time the resolve window is elapsed, derivation of the L2 canonical chain will reorg starting from this first block derived from the challenged input data to the last block derived from the L1 block at which it expired. See more details about Derivation in the following section.

function resolve(uint256 challengedBlockNumber, bytes calldata challengedCommitment, bytes calldata resolveData) external

In order to challenge a commitment, users deposit a bond amount where bond >= resolve_tx_gas_cost. If the gas cost of resolving the challenge was lower than the bond, the difference is reimbursed to the challenger where cost = (fixedResolutionCost + preImageLength * variableResolutionCost / variableResolutionCostPrecision) * gasPrice and the rest of the bond is burnt. If the challenge is not resolved in time and expired, the bond is returned and can be withdrawn by the challenger or used to challenge another commitment. bondSize can be updated by the contract owner similar to SystemConfig variables. See Security Considerations for more details on bond management.

The state of all challenges can be read from the contract state or by syncing contract events. challengeWindow and resolveWindow are constant values that currently cannot be changed unless the contract is upgraded. A dynamic window mechanism may be explored in the future.

Any challenge with a properly encoded commitment, a bond amount associated with the challenger address and a block number within the challenge window is accepted by the contract. However, a challenge is only valid if the commitment and block number pairing map to a valid commitment and its L1 origin block number during derivation. Challenges associated with an illegal commitment or block number will be ignored during derivation and have no impact on the state of the chain.

The contract is deployed behind upgradable proxy so the address can be hardcoded in the rollup config file and does not need to change. A future upgrade can add custom resolver functions to be chosen dynamically when a user calls the resolve function to support other alt DA solutions.


Input data is retrieved during derivation of L2 blocks. The changes to the derivation pipeline when using the alt DA source are limited to wrapping the L1 based DataAvailabilitySource step in the pipeline with a module that enables pulling the data from the offchain DA source once we've extracted the commitment from L1 DA.

Similarly to L1 based DA, for each L1 block we open a calldata source to retrieve the input commitments from the transactions and use each commitment with its l1 origin block number to resolve the input data from the storage service. To enable smooth transition between alt-da and rollup mode, any L1 data retrieved from the batcher inbox that is not prefixed with txDataVersion1 is forwarded downstream to be parsed as input frames or skipped as invalid data.

In addition, we filter events from the DA Challenge contract included in the block and sync a local state of challenged input commitments. As the derivation pipeline steps through challenge_window + resolve_window amount of L1 blocks, any challenge marked as active becomes expired causing a reset of the derivation pipeline.

// The status enum of a DA Challenge event
enum ChallengeStatus {

// DA Challenge event filtered
event ChallengeStatusChanged(
  bytes indexed challengedCommitment, uint256 indexed challengedBlockNumber, ChallengeStatus status

Derivation can either be driven by new L1 blocks or restarted (reset) from the L1 origin of the last L2 safe head known by the execution engine. The model here is of weak subjectivity whereby a new node coming onto the network can connect to at least 1 honest peer and sync blocks in the challenge_window to reconstruct the same state as the rest of the network. As with EIP-4844, applications SHOULD take on the burden of storing historical data relevant to themselves beyond the challenge window.

When stepping through new L1 origin blocks, input data is loaded from the DA storage service. If the service responds with a 404 (not found) error, derivation stalls and the DA Manager starts a detached traversal of new L1 blocks until:

  • An Active challenge event is found, detached L1 traversal continues:
    • A Resolved challenge event is found: derivation continues with the input data submitted onchain.
    • A high enough L1 block is reached such as latest_l1 - pipeline_l1_origin = resolve_window_size: input data is skipped from the derivation output.
  • Data is never challenged, derivation returns critical error.

When derivation is reset, the pipeline steps through previously seen L1 origins so that: sync_starting_point = latest_l1_block - (challenge_window_size + resolve_window_size + sequencer_window_size). In that case, the DA manager has already synced the state of challenges during the range of L1 blocks traversed so the pipeline can either skip commitments with expired challenges and reorg the L2 chain or load input data from the resolving transaction calldata. In addition, an expired challenge will reorg out [r_start, r_end] L2 blocks so that r_start is the first block derived from the expired challenge's input and r_end the last L2 block derived before the pipeline was reset.

Derivation MUST skip input data such as input_data_size > MAX_L1_TX_SIZE where MAX_L1_TX_SIZE is a consensus constant of 130672 bytes when commitment_type == 0. Different DA layers can potentially resolve the challenge without immediately loading all of the data onto L1 in a single transaction & therefore are exempt from this limit. In theory MAX_L1_TX_SIZE could be increased up to (tx_gas_limit - fixed_resolution_cost) / dynamic_resolution_cost based on the cost of resolving challenges in the contract implementation however to make challenging accessible it is capped based on geth's txMaxSize. 130672 is chosen as 131072 - 400. Geth rejects transactions from the mempool with a total serialized size over 131072. 400 bytes are allocated as overhead (signature, to address, metadata).

Fault Proof

The derivation pipeline is integrated with fault proofs by adding additional hint types to the preimage oracle in order to query the input data from the DA provider as well as onchain challenge status.

l2-input <commitment>

The input data stored on the DA storage for the given <commitment>.

l1-challenge-status <commitment> <blocknumber>

The status of the challenge for the given <commitment> at the given <blocknumber> on the L1 DataAvailabilityChallenge contract.

Safety and Finality

Similarly to rollup mode, the engine queue labels any new blocks derived from input data with a commitment on the L1 chain as β€œsafe”. Although labeled as β€œsafe”, the chain might still reorg in case of a faulty DA provider and users must use the β€œfinalized” label for a guarantee that their state cannot revert.

With Alt-DA mode on, the engine queue does receive finality signals from the L1 RPC AND from the DA manager that keeps track of challenges. The DA manager maintains an internal state of all the input commitments in the current challengeWindow as they are validated by the derivation pipeline.

The L2 chain can be marked as finalized when the L1 block in which commitments can no longer be invalidated becomes finalized. Without Alt-DA Mode, L2 blocks are safe when the batch is on L1. Plasma commitments are only "optimistically safe" when the commitment is found in a L1 block. Commitments then become safe when that commitment can no longer be invalidated. Then finalization can proceed as normal: when the L1 block that an L2 block is derived from becomes finalized, the L2 block can be marked as finalized.

The engine queue will maintain a longer buffer of L2 blocks waiting for the DA window to expire and the L1 block with the commitment to be finalized in order to signal finality.

Security Considerations

The Data Availability Challenge contract mitigates DoS vulnerability with a payable bond requirement making challenging the availability of a commitment at least as expensive as submitting the data onchain to resolve the challenge. In addition, the reward is not net positive for the fisherman who forced the release of data by challenging thus preventing money pump vulnerability while still making challenging affordable to altruistic fishermen and users who desire to pay to guarantee data availability on L1. Lastly, if needed a resolver_refund_factor can be dialed up such as resolver_refund_factor * resolving_cost is refunded to the resolver (where 0 <= refund_factor <= 1) while the rest of the bond is burnt.


The ability for a blockchain to easily read the state of another blockchain is called interoperability. Low latency interoperability allows for horizontally scalable blockchains, a key feature of the superchain.

Note: this document references an "interop network upgrade" as a temporary name. The actual name of the network upgrade will be included in this document in the future.

Source ChainA blockchain that includes an initiating message
Destination ChainA blockchain that includes an executing message
Initiating MessageAn event emitted from a source chain
Executing MessageAn event emitted from a destination chain's CrossL2Inbox that includes an initiating message
Cross Chain MessageThe cumulative execution and side effects of the initiating message and executing message
Dependency SetThe set of chains that originate initiating transactions where the executing transactions are valid

A total of two transactions are required to complete a cross chain message. The first transaction is submitted to the source chain and emits an event that can be consumed on a destination chain. The second transaction is submitted to a destination chain, where the block builder SHOULD only include it if they are certain that the first transaction was included in the source chain. There is no strict requirement that the executing message is ever submitted.

The term "block builder" is used interchangeably with the term "sequencer" for the purposes of this document but they need not be the same entity in practice.


  • Dependency Set: definition of chains and chain-dependencies in the Superchain.
  • Messaging: messaging functionality, core of protocol-level interoperability.
  • Predeploys: system contracts to interface with other chains.
  • Execution: enhancements to the execution-layer.
  • Sequencer: Sequencer Policy and block-building information.
  • Verifier: Verification of cross-L2 messaging.
  • Rollup Node P2P: modifications to the rollup-node P2P layer to support fast interop.
  • Fault Proof: modifications to prove interop functionality in the fault-proof.
  • Upgrade: Superchain upgrade process to activate Interop.
  • Token Bridging: sending ERC20 tokens between chains

The Dependency Set

Table of Contents

The dependency set defines the set of chains that destination chains allow as source chains. Another way of saying it is that the dependency set defines the set of initiating messages that are valid for an executing message to be included. An executing message MUST have an initiating message that is included in a chain in the dependency set.

The dependency set is defined by a set of chain ids. Since it is impossible to enforce uniqueness of chain ids, social consensus MUST be used to determine the chain that represents the canonical chain id. This particularly impacts the block builder as they SHOULD use the chain id to assist in validation of executing messages.

The dependency set is configured on a per chain basis.

The chain id of the local chain MUST be considered as part of its own dependency set.

While the dependency set explicitly defines the set of chains that are depended on for incoming messages, the full set of transitive dependencies must be known to allow for the progression of safety. This means that the op-node needs to be aware of all transitive dependencies.

Chain ID

The concept of a chain id was introduced in EIP-155 to prevent replay attacks between chains. This EIP does not specify the max size of a chain id, although EIP-2294 attempts to add a maximum size. Since this EIP is stagnant, all representations of chain ids MUST be the uint256 type.

In the future, OP Stack chains reserve the right to use up to 32 bytes to represent a chain id. The configuration of the chain should deterministically map to a chain id and with careful architecture changes, all possible OP Stack chains in the superchain will be able to exist counterfactually.

It is a known issue that not all software in the Ethereum can handle 32 byte chain ids.

Updating the Dependency Set

The SystemConfig is updated to manage the dependency set. The chain operator can add or remove chains from the dependency set through the SystemConfig. A new ConfigUpdate event UpdateType enum is added that corresponds to a change in the dependency set.

The SystemConfig MUST enforce that the maximum size of the dependency set is type(uint8).max or 255.


When a ConfigUpdate event is emitted where the UpdateType is DEPENDENCY_SET, the L2 network will update its dependency set. The chain operator SHOULD be able to add or remove chains from the dependency set.

Security Considerations

Dynamic Size of L1 Attributes Transaction

The L1 Attributes transaction includes the dependency set which is dynamically sized. This means that the worst case (largest size) transaction must be accounted for when ensuring that it is not possible to create a block that has force inclusion transactions that go over the L2 block gas limit. It MUST be impossible to produce an L2 block that consumes more than the L2 block gas limit. Limiting the dependency set size is an easy way to ensure this.

Maximum Size of the Dependency Set

The maximum size of the dependency set is constrained by the L2 block gas limit. The larger the dependency set, the more costly it is to fully verify the network. It also makes the block building role more centralized as it requires more hardware to verify executing transactions before inclusion.

Layer 1 as Part of the Dependency Set

The layer one MAY be part of the dependency set if the fault proof implementation is set up to support it. It is known that it is possible but it is not known if this is going to be a feature of the first release. This section should be clarified when the decision is made.

If layer one is part of the dependency set, then it means that any event on L1 can be pulled into any L2. This is a very powerful abstraction as a minimal amount of execution can happen on L1 which triggers additional exeuction across all L2s in the OP Stack.


Table of Contents


A message is a broadcast payload emitted from an identified source.

Message payload

Opaque bytes that represent a Log.

It is serialized by first concatenating the topics and then with the data.

msg := make([]byte, 0)
for _, topic := range log.Topics {
    msg = append(msg, topic.Bytes()...)
msg = append(msg, log.Data...)

The _msg can easily be decoded into a Solidity struct with abi.decode since each topic is always 32 bytes and the data generally ABI encoded.

Message Identifier

The Identifier that uniquely represents a log that is emitted from a chain. It can be considered to be a unique pointer to a particular log. The derivation pipeline and fault proof program MUST ensure that the _msg corresponds exactly to the log that the Identifier points to.

struct Identifier {
    address origin;
    uint256 blocknumber;
    uint256 logIndex;
    uint256 timestamp;
    uint256 chainid;
originaddressAccount that emits the log
blocknumberuint256Block number in which the log was emitted
logIndexuint256The index of the log in the array of all logs emitted in the block
timestampuint256The timestamp that the log was emitted. Used to enforce the timestamp invariant
chainiduint256The chain id of the chain that emitted the log

The Identifier includes the set of information to uniquely identify a log. When using an absolute log index within a particular block, it makes ahead of time coordination more complex. Ideally there is a better way to uniquely identify a log that does not add ordering constraints when building a block. This would make building atomic cross chain messages more simple by not coupling the exact state of the block templates between multiple chains together.

Messaging ends

Initiating Messages

Each Log (also known as event in solidity) forms an initiating message. The raw log data froms the Message Payload.

Messages are broadcast: the protocol does not enshrine address-targeting within messages.

The initiating message is uniquely identifiable with an Identifier, such that it can be distinguished from other duplicate messages within the same transaction or block.

An initiating message may be executed many times: no replay-protection is enshrined in the protocol.

Executing Messages

An executing message is represented by the ExecutingMessage event that is emitted by the CrossL2Inbox predeploy. This event is coupled to a CALL with the payload that is emitted within the event, allowing introspection of the data without needing to do call tracing. All of the information required to satisfy the invariants MUST be included in this event.

Both the block builder and the verifier use this information to ensure that all system invariants are held.

The executing message is verified by checking if there is an existing initiating-message that originates at Identifier with matching Message Payload.

Since an executing message is defined by a log, it means that reverting calls to the CrossL2Inbox do not count as executing messages.

Messaging Invariants

  • Timestamp Invariant: The timestamp at the time of inclusion of the executing message MUST be greater than or equal to the timestamp of the initiating message.
  • ChainID Invariant: The chain id of the initiating message MUST be in the dependency set
  • Message Expiry Invariant: The timestamp at the time of inclusion of the executing message MUST be lower than the initiating message timestamp (as defined in the Identifier) + EXPIRY_TIME.

Timestamp Invariant

The timestamp invariant ensures that initiating messages cannot come from a future block. Note that since all transactions in a block have the same timestamp, it is possible for an executing transaction to be ordered before the initiating message in the same block.

ChainID Invariant

Without a guarantee on the set of dependencies of a chain, it may be impossible for the derivation pipeline to know which chain to source the initiating message from. This also allows for chain operators to explicitly define the set of chains that they depend on.

Message Expiry Invariant

Note: Message Expiry as property of the protocol is in active discussion. It helps set a strict bound on total messaging activity to support, but also limits use-cases. This trade-off is in review. This invariant may be ignored in initial interop testnets.

The expiry invariant invalidates inclusion of any executing message with id.timestamp + EXPIRY_TIME < executing_block.timestamp where:

  • id is the Identifier encoded in the executing message, matching the block attributes of the initiating message.
  • executing_block is the block where the executing message was included in.
  • EXPIRY_TIME = 180 * 24 * 60 * 60 = 15552000 seconds, i.e. 180 days.

Message Graph

The dependencies of messages can be modeled as a directed graph:

  • vertex: a block
  • edge: a dependency:
    • parent-block (source) to block (target)
    • message relay, from initiation (source) to execution (target)

If the source of an edge is invalidated, the target is invalidated.

Invalid messages

A message is said to be "invalid" when the executing message does not have a valid dependency.

Dependencies are invalid when:

  • The dependency is unknown.
  • The dependency is known but not part of the canonical chain.
  • The dependency is known but does not match all message attributes (Identifier and payload).

Block reorgs

The Identifier used by an executing message does not cryptographically commit to the block it may reference.

Messages may be executed before the block that initiates them is sealed.

When tracking message dependencies, edges are maintained for all identified source blocks.

Reorgs are resolved by filtering the view of the solver to only canonical blocks. If the source block is not canonical, the dependency is invalid.

The canonical L2 block at the identified block-height is the source of truth.

Block Recommits

Blocks may be partially built, or sealed but not published, and then rebuilt.

Any optimistically assumed messages have to be revalidated, and the original partial block can be removed from the dependency graph.

Intra-block messaging: cycles

While messages cannot be initiated by future blocks, they can be initiated by any transactions within the same timestamp, as per the Timestamp Invariant.

This property allows messages to form cycles in the graph: blocks with equal timestamp, of chains in the same dependency set, may have dependencies on one another.

Resolving cross-chain safety

To determine cross-chain safety, the graph is inspected for valid graph components that have no invalid dependencies, while applying the respective safety-view on the blocks in the graph.

I.e. the graph must not have any inward edges towards invalid blocks within the safety-view.

A safety-view is the subset of canonical blocks of all chains with the specified safety label or a higher safety label. Dependencies on blocks outside of the safety-view are invalid, but may turn valid once the safety-view changes (e.g. a reorg of unsafe blocks).

By resolving in terms of graph-components, cyclic dependencies and transitive dependencies are addressed.

Horizon timestamp

The maximum seen timestamp in the graph is the horizon_timestamp.

The verifier can defer growth of the graph past this horizon_timestamp, until the graph has been resolved and pruned.

Pruning the graph

Edges between blocks can be de-duplicated, when the blocks are complete and sealed.

The same initiating or executing messages, but attached to different blocks, may have to be added back to the graph if the set of blocks changes.

Blocks with cross-chain safety in the finalized-blocks safety-view can be optimized: outward edges for initiating messages may be attached when relevant to resolution of newer lower-safety blocks. No inward edges are required anymore however, as the maximum safety has been ensured.

Blocks older than horizon_timestamp - (2 * EXPIRY_TIME) cannot be depended on from any valid block within the graph, and can thus be safely pruned entirely.

Bounding the graph

With many events, and transitive dependencies, resolving the cross-chain safety may be an intensive task for a verifier. It is thus important for the graph to be reasonably bounded, such that it can be resolved.

The graph is bounded in 4 ways:

  • Every block can only depend on blocks of chains in the dependency set, as per the ChainID invariant.
  • Every block cannot depend on future blocks, as per the Timestamp invariant.
  • Every block has a maximum gas limit, an intrinsic cost per transaction, and thus a maximum inward degree of dependencies.
  • Every block cannot depend on expired messages, as per the Message expiry invariant.

The verifier is responsible for filtering out non-canonical parts of the graph.

Security Considerations

Cyclic dependencies

If there is a cycle in the dependency set, chains MUST still be able to promote unsafe blocks to safe blocks. A cycle in the dependency set happens anytime that two chains are in each other's dependency set. This means that they are able to send cross chain messages to each other.

Transitive dependencies

The safety of a chain is only ensured when the inputs are safe: dependencies are thus said to be transitive. Without validating the transitive dependencies, the verifier relies on the verification work of the nodes that it sources its direct dependencies from.


Table of Contents

Two new system level predeploys are introduced for managing cross chain messaging along with an update to the L1Block contract with additional functionality.



The CrossL2Inbox is responsible for executing a cross chain message on the destination chain. It is permissionless to execute a cross chain message on behalf of any user.

To ensure safety of the protocol, the Message Invariants must be enforced.

Message execution arguments

The following fields are required for executing a cross chain message:

_msgbytesThe message payload, matching the initiating message.
_idIdentifierA Identifier pointing to the initiating message.
_targetaddressAccount that is called with _msg.


The message payload of the executing message.

This must match the emitted payload of the initiating message identified by _id.


A pointer to the _msg in a remote (or local) chain.

The message Identifier of the executing message. This is required to enforce the message executes an existing and valid initiating message.

By including the Identifier in the calldata, it makes static analysis much easier for block builders. It is impossible to check that the Identifier matches the cross chain message on chain. If the block builder includes a message that does not correspond to the Identifier, their block will be reorganized by the derivation pipeline.

A possible upgrade path to this contract would involve adding a new function. If any fields in the Identifier change, then a new 4byte selector will be generated by solc.


Messages are broadcast, not directed. Upon execution the caller can specify which address to target: there is no protocol enforcement on what this value is.

The _target is called with the _msg as input. In practice, the _target will be a contract that needs to know the schema of the _msg so that it can be decoded. It MAY call back to the CrossL2Inbox to authenticate properties about the _msg using the information in the Identifier.

ExecutingMessage Event

The ExecutingMessage event represents an executing message. It MUST be emitted on every call to executeMessage.

event ExecutingMessage(bytes,bytes);

The data encoded in the event contains the Identifier and the msg. The following pseudocode shows the deserialization:

(bytes memory identifier, bytes memory log) = abi.decode(log.data, (bytes, bytes));
Identifier id = abi.decode(identifier, (Identifier));

It is not possible to use solidity structs directly in events, which is why it is ABI encoded into bytes first.

Reference implementation

A simple implementation of the executeMessage function is included below.

function executeMessage(Identifier calldata _id, address _target, bytes calldata _msg) public payable {
    require(_id.timestamp <= block.timestamp);

    assembly {
      tstore(ORIGIN_SLOT, _id.origin)
      tstore(BLOCKNUMBER_SLOT, _id.blocknumber)
      tstore(LOG_INDEX_SLOT, _id.logIndex)
      tstore(TIMESTAMP_SLOT, _id.timestamp)
      tstore(CHAINID_SLOT, _id.chainid)

    bool success = SafeCall.call({
      _target: _target,
      _value: msg.value,
      _calldata: _msg


    emit ExecutingMessage(abi.encode(_id), _msg);

Note that the executeMessage function is payable to enable relayers to earn in the gas paying asset.

Identifier Getters

The Identifier MUST be exposed via public getters so that contracts can call back to authenticate properties about the _msg.



The L2ToL2CrossDomainMessenger is a higher level abstraction on top of the CrossL2Inbox that provides features necessary for secure transfers ERC20 tokens between L2 chains. Messages sent through the L2ToL2CrossDomainMessenger on the source chain receive both replay protection as well as domain binding, ie the executing transaction can only be valid on a single chain.

relayMessage Invariants

  • Only callable by the CrossL2Inbox
  • The Identifier.origin MUST be address(L2ToL2CrossDomainMessenger)
  • The _destination chain id MUST be equal to the local chain id
  • The CrossL2Inbox cannot call itself

sendExpire Invariants

  • The message MUST have not been successfully relayed
  • The EXPIRY_WINDOW MUST have elapsed since the message first failed to be relayed
  • The expired message MUST not have been previously sent back to source
  • The expired message MUST not be relayable after being sent back

relayExpire Invariants

  • Only callable by the CrossL2Inbox
  • The message source MUST be block.chainid
  • The Identifier.origin MUST be address(L2ToL2CrossDomainMessenger)
  • The expiredMessages mapping MUST only contain messages that originated in this chain and failed to be relayed on destination.
  • Already expired messages MUST NOT be relayed.

Message Versioning

Versioning is handled in the most significant bits of the nonce, similarly to how it is handled by the CrossDomainMessenger.

function messageNonce() public view returns (uint256) {
    return Encoding.encodeVersionedNonce(nonce, MESSAGE_VERSION);

No Native Support for Cross Chain Ether Sends

To enable interoperability between chains that use a custom gas token, there is no native support for sending ether between chains. ether must first be wrapped into WETH before sending between chains.


The L2ToL2CrossDomainMessenger uses a similar interface to the L2CrossDomainMessenger but the _minGasLimit is removed to prevent complexity around EVM gas introspection and the _destination chain is included instead.

Sending Messages

The initiating message is represented by the following event:

event SentMessage(bytes message) anonymous;

The bytes are an ABI encoded call to relayMessage. The event is defined as anonymous so that no topics are prefixed to the abi encoded call.

An explicit _destination chain and nonce are used to ensure that the message can only be played on a single remote chain a single time. The _destination is enforced to not be the local chain to avoid edge cases.

There is no need for address aliasing as the aliased address would need to commit to the source chain's chain id to create a unique alias that commits to a particular sender on a particular domain and it is far more simple to assert on both the address and the source chain's chain id rather than assert on an unaliased address. In both cases, the source chain's chain id is required for security. Executing messages will never be able to assume the identity of an account because msg.sender will never be the identity that initiated the message, it will be the L2ToL2CrossDomainMessenger and users will need to callback to get the initiator of the message.

function sendMessage(uint256 _destination, address _target, bytes calldata _message) external {
    require(_destination != block.chainid);

    bytes memory data = abi.encodeCall(L2ToL2CrossDomainMessenger.relayMessage, (_destination, block.chainid, messageNonce(), msg.sender, _target, _message));
    emit SentMessage(data);

Note that sendMessage is not payable.

Relaying Messages

When relaying a message through the L2ToL2CrossDomainMessenger, it is important to require that the _destination equal to block.chainid to ensure that the message is only valid on a single chain. The hash of the message is used for replay protection.

It is important to ensure that the source chain is in the dependency set of the destination chain, otherwise it is possible to send a message that is not playable.

When a message fails to be relayed, only the timestamp at which it first failed along with its source chain id are stored. This is needed for calculation of the failed message's expiry. The source chain id is also required to simplify the function signature of sendExpire.

function relayMessage(uint256 _destination, uint256 _source, uint256 _nonce, address _sender, address _target, bytes memory _message) external payable {
    require(msg.sender == address(CROSS_L2_INBOX));
    require(_destination == block.chainid);
    require(CROSS_L2_INBOX.origin() == address(this));

    bytes32 messageHash = keccak256(abi.encode(_destination, _source, _nonce, _sender, _target, _message));
    require(sentMessages[messageHash] == false);

    assembly {

    sentMessages[messageHash] = true;

    bool success = SafeCall.call({
       _target: _target,
       _value: msg.value,
       _calldata: _message

    if (!success) {
      emit FailedRelayedMessage(messageHash);

      if (failedMessages[messageHash].timestamp == 0) {
        failedMessages[messageHash] = FailedMessage({timestamp: block.timestamp, sourceChainId: _source});


    successfulMessages[messageHash] = true;
    delete failedMessages[messageHash];
    emit RelayedMessage(messageHash);

Note that the relayMessage function is payable to enable relayers to earn in the gas paying asset.

To enable cross chain authorization patterns, both the _sender and the _source MUST be exposed via public getters.

Sending Expired Message Hashes

When expiring a message that failed to be relayed on the destination chain to the source chain, it's crucial to ensure the message can only be sent back to the L2ToL2CrossDomainMessenger contract in its source chain.

This function has no auth, which allows anyone to expire a given message hash. The EXPIRY_WINDOW variable is added to give the users enough time to replay their failed messages and to prevent malicious actors from performing a griefing attack by expiring messages upon arrival.

Once the expired message is sent to the source chain, the message on the local chain is set as successful in the successfulMessages mapping to ensure non-replayability and deleted from failedMessages. An initiating message is then emitted to relayExpire

function sendExpire(bytes32 _expiredHash) external nonReentrant {
    if (successfulMessages[_expiredHash]) revert MessageAlreadyRelayed();

    (uint256 messageTimestamp, uint256 messageSource) = failedMessages[_expiredHash];

    if (block.timestamp <  messageTimestamp + EXPIRY_WINDOW) revert ExpiryWindowHasNotEnsued();

    delete failedMessages[_expiredHash];
    successfulMessages[_expiredHash] = true;

    bytes memory data = abi.encodeCall(
        (_expiredHash, messageSource)
    emit SentMessage(data);

Relaying Expired Message Hashes

When relaying an expired message, only message hashes of actual failed messages should be stored, for this we must ensure the origin of the log, and caller are all expected contracts.

It's also important to ensure only the hashes of messages that were initiated in this chain are accepted.

If all checks have been successful, the message has is stored in the expiredMessages mapping. This enables smart contracts to read from it and check whether a message expired or not, and handle this case accordingly.

function relayExpire(bytes32 _expiredHash, uint256 _messageSource) external {
    if (_messageSource != block.chainid) revert IncorrectMessageSource();
    if (expiredMessages[_expiredHash] != 0) revert ExpiredMessageAlreadyRelayed();
    if (msg.sender != Predeploys.CROSS_L2_INBOX) revert ExpiredMessageCallerNotCrossL2Inbox();

    if (CrossL2Inbox(Predeploys.CROSS_L2_INBOX).origin() != Predeploys.L2_TO_L2_CROSS_DOMAIN_MESSENGER) {
        revert CrossL2InboxOriginNotL2ToL2CrossDomainMessenger();

    expiredMessages[_expiredHash] = block.timestamp;

    emit MessageHashExpired(_expiredHash);



Static Configuration

The L1Block contract MUST include method setConfig(ConfigType, bytes) for setting the system's static values, which are defined as values that only change based on the chain operator's input. This function serves to reduce the size of the L1 Attributes transaction, as well as to reduce the need to add specific one off functions. It can only be called by DEPOSITOR_ACCOUNT.

The ConfigType enum is defined as follows:

enum ConfigType {

The second argument to setConfig is a bytes value that is ABI encoded with the necessary values for the ConfigType.

SET_GAS_PAYING_TOKENabi.encode(token, decimals, name, symbol)


  • token is the gas paying token's address (type address)

  • decimals is the gas paying token's decimals (type uint8)

  • name is the gas paying token's name (type bytes32)

  • symbol is the gas paying token's symbol (type bytes32)

  • chainId is the chain id intended to be added or removed from the dependency set (type uint256)

Calls to setConfig MUST originate from SystemConfig and are forwarded to L1Block by OptimismPortal.

Dependency Set

L1Block is updated to include the set of allowed chains. These chains are added and removed through setConfig calls with ADD_DEPENDENCY or REMOVE_DEPENDENCY, respectively. The maximum size of the dependency set is type(uint8).max, and adding a chain id when the dependency set size is at its maximum MUST revert. If a chain id already in the dependency set, such as the chain's chain id, is attempted to be added, the call MUST revert. If a chain id that is not in the dependency set is attempted to be removed, the call MUST revert. If the chain's chain id is attempted to be removed, the call also MUST revert.

L1Block MUST provide a public getter to check if a particular chain is in the dependency set called isInDependencySet(uint256). This function MUST return true when a chain id in the dependency set, or the chain's chain id, is passed in as an argument, and false otherwise. Additionally, L1Block MUST provide a public getter to return the dependency set called dependencySet(). This function MUST return the array of chain ids that are in the dependency set. L1Block MUST also provide a public getter to get the dependency set size called dependencySetSize(). This function MUST return the length of the dependency set array.

Security Considerations



Table of Contents


This is an experimental section and may be changed in the future. It is not required for the initial release.

After the full execution of a block, the set of logs that are emitted MUST be merklized and included in the block header. This commitment MUST be included as the block header's extra data field. The events are serialized with using Simple Serialize aka SSZ.

The goal of committing to data in the extra data field is to make commitments to data required to verify executing messages easier. The commitment could also commit to the set of executing messages instead of just the logs which represent all possible initiating messages that originate in the block. This would reduce rounds of communication for nodes that use proofs to verify executing messages.

MAX_LOG_DATA_SIZEuint64(2**24) or 16,777,216
MAX_MESSAGES_PER_BLOCKuint64(2**20) or 1,048,576
class Log(Container):
    address: ExecutionAddress
    topics: List[bytes32, 4]
    data: ByteList[MAX_LOG_DATA_SIZE]
    transaction_hash: bytes32
    transaction_index: uint64
    log_index: uint64

  log_0, log_1, log_2, ...)

block.extra_data = logs.hash_tree_root()

Security Considerations



Table of Contents

Sequencer Policy

Sequencer Policy is the process of optimistically enacting rules outside of consensus (the state-transition function in this context), and the choices can then be asynchronously validated by verifiers and the fault-proof.

In the context of superchain interoperability, sequencer policy is utilized to enable cross-chain message relay without adding additional state-transition complexity or cross-chain synchronicity to the protocol.

Block Building

The goal is to present information in a way where it is as efficient as possible for the block builder to only include executing messages that have a corresponding initiating message. It is not possible to enforce the ability to statically analyze a transaction, so execution MAY be required to determine the information required to include executing messages.

Static analysis

Note that static analysis is never reliable because even if the top level transaction.to is equal to the CrossL2Inbox, it is possible that there is a reentrant CALL. The block builder SHOULD NOT rely on static analysis for building blocks.

Dependency confirmations

The sequencer MAY include an executing message in a block with any desired level of confirmation safety around the dependency of the message.

Confirmation levels:

  • pre-confirmation: through direct signaling by the block builder of the initiating message.
  • direct-dependency confirmation: verify the inclusion of the initiating message, but not the transitive dependencies.
  • transitive-dependency confirmation: verify the message and all transitive dependencies are included in canonical blocks within the specified safety-view (unsafe/safe/finalized).

When operating at lower-safety confirmation levels, the block builder SHOULD re-validate included executing messages at an increased safety level, before the block is published.


The block builder can include executing messages that have corresponding initiating messages that only have pre-confirmation levels of security if they trust the block builder that initiates.

Using an allowlist and identity turns sequencing into an integrated game which increases the ability for block builders to trust each other. Better pre-confirmation technology will help to scale the block builder set to untrusted actors.

Without pre-confirmations, the block builder cannot include messages of other concurrent block building work.

Pre-confirmations MAY be invalidated, and assumptions around message-validity SHOULD be treated with care.

Streaming pre-confirmations: "shreds"

In the context of low-latency block building, each pre-confirmation may be communicated in the form of a "shred": the most minimal atomic state-change that can be communicated between actors in the system.

In the context of cross-chain block-building, shreds may be used to communicate initiated cross-chain messages, to validate executing messages against.

Shreds may be streamed, and potentially signal rewinds in case of invalidated dependencies.

This block builder feature is in ongoing research, and may be developed and experimented with between block builders without further protocol rules changes.

Direct-dependency confirmation

By verifying the direct dependency the block-builder does not have to implement pre-confirmations, and can rely on its direct view of the remote chain.

The block builder MAY require cryptographic proof of the existence of the log that the identifier points to, if it trusts the remote canonical chain but not its RPC server.

The block builder MAY also trust a remote RPC and use the following algorithm to verify the existence of the log.

The following pseudocode represents how to check existence of a log based on an Identifier. If the value True is returned, then it is safe to include the transaction.

success, receipt = evm.apply_transaction(tx)

if not success:
  return True

for log in receipt.logs:
  if is_executing_message(log):
      id, message = abi.decode(log.data)

      # assumes there is a client for each chain in the dependency set
      eth = clients[id.chainid]

      if eth is None:
        return False

      logs = eth.getLogs(id.origin, from=id.blocknumber, to=id.blocknumber)
      log = filter(lambda x: x.index == id.logIndex && x.address == id.origin)
      if len(log) == 0:
        return False

      if message != encode(log[0]):
        return False

      block = eth.getBlockByNumber(id.blocknumber)

      if id.timestamp != block.timestamp:
        return False

return True

Transitive-dependency confirmation

When operating pessimistically, the direct-dependency validation may be applied recursively, to harden against unstable message guarantees at the cost of increased cross-chain latency.

The transitive dependencies may also be enforced with safe or even finalized safety-views over the blocks of the chains in the dependency set, to further ensure increased cross-chain safety.


If a user does not have ether to pay for the gas of an executing message, application layer sponsorship solutions can be created. It is possible to create an MEV incentive by paying tx.origin in the executing message. This can be done by wrapping the L2ToL2CrossDomainMessenger with a pair of relaying contracts.

Security Considerations

Cross Chain Message Latency

The latency at which a cross chain message is relayed from the moment at which it was initiated is bottlenecked by the security of the preconfirmations. An initiating transaction and a executing transaction MAY have the same timestamp, meaning that a secure preconfirmation scheme enables atomic cross chain composability. Any sort of equivocation on behalf of the sequencer will result in the production of invalid blocks.


Table of Contents

Derivation Pipeline

The derivation pipeline enforces invariants on safe blocks that include executing messages.

  • The executing message MUST have a corresponding initiating message
  • The initiating message that corresponds to an executing message MUST come from a chain in its dependency set
  • A block MUST be considered invalid if it is built with any invalid executing messages

Blocks that contain transactions that relay cross domain messages to the destination chain where the initiating transaction does not exist MUST be considered invalid and MUST not be allowed by the derivation pipeline to be considered safe.

There is no concept of replay protection at the lowest level of abstractions within the protocol because there is no replay protection mechanism that fits well for all applications. Users MAY submit an arbitrary number of executing messages per initiating message. Applications MUST build their own replay protection mechanisms if they are interacting with the lowest level abstractions.

Blocks that contain invalid executing messages are considered invalid by the protocol. The derivation pipeline will never promote them from being unsafe. A block that contains invalid executing messages MUST be replaced by a deposits only block at the same block number.

Depositing an Executing Message

Deposit transactions (force inclusion transactions) give censorship resistance to layer two networks. The derivation pipeline must gracefully handle the case in which a user uses a deposit transaction to relay a cross chain message. To not couple preconfirmation security to consensus, deposit transactions that execute cross chain messages MUST have an initiating message that is considered safe by the remote chain's derivation pipeline. This relaxes a strict synchrony assumption on the sequencer that it MUST have all unsafe blocks of destination chains as fast as possible to ensure that it is building correct blocks.

If a deposit transaction references an initiating transaction that is not yet safe or does not exist, it MUST be dropped by the derivation pipeline.

This inclusion property prevents a class of attacks where the user can trick the derivation pipeline into reorganizing the sequencer.


Safety is an abstraction that is useful for reasoning about security. It should be thought about as a spectrum from unsafe to finalized. Users can choose to operate on information based on its level of safety depending on their risk profile and personal preferences.

The following labels are used to describe both inputs and outputs:

  • unsafe
  • cross-unsafe
  • safe
  • finalized

Inputs correspond to the inputs to the state transition function while outputs correspond to the side effects of the state transition function.

Anything before safe technically uses a "preconfirmation" based security model which is not part of consensus. While useful to have definitions of the default meanings of these terms, they are technically policy and may be changed in the future.

The unsafe label has the lowest latency while the finalized label has the highest latency. A set of invariants must be held true before an input or an output can be promoted to the next label, starting at unsafe.

The initiating messages for all dependent executing messages MUST be resolved as safe before an L2 block can transition from being unsafe to safe. Users MAY optimistically accept unsafe blocks without any verification of the executing messages. They SHOULD optimistically verify the initiating messages exist in destination unsafe blocks to more quickly reorganize out invalid blocks.

unsafe Inputs

  • MUST be signed by the p2p sequencer key
  • MAY be reorganized
  • MUST be promoted to a higher level of safety or reorganized out to ensure liveness

unsafe inputs are currently gossiped around the p2p network. To prevent denial of service, they MUST be signed by the sequencer. This signature represents the sequencer's claim that it built a block that conforms to the protocol. unsafe blocks exist to give low latency access to the latest information. To keep the latency as low as possible, cross chain messages are assumed valid at this stage. This means that the remote unsafe inputs are trusted soley because they were included in a block by the sequencer.

An alternative approach to unsafe inputs would be to include an SGX proof that the sequencer ran particular software when building the block.

cross-unsafe Inputs

  • MUST have valid cross chain messages

cross-unsafe represents the unsafe blocks that had their cross chain messages fully verified. The network can be represented as a graph where each block across all chains are represented as a node and then a directed edge between two blocks represents the source block of the initiating message and the block that included the executing message.

An input can be promoted from unsafe to cross-unsafe when the full dependency graph is resolved such that all cross chain messages are verified to be valid and at least one message in the dependency graph is still unsafe.

Note that the cross-unsafe is not meant to be exposed to the end user via the RPC label. It is meant for internal usage. All cross-unsafe inputs are still considered unsafe by the execution layer RPC.

safe Inputs

  • MUST be available
  • MAY be reorganized
  • Safe block MUST be invalidated if a reorg occurs

safe represents the state in which the cross-unsafe dependency graph has been fully resolved in a way where all of the data has been published to the data availability layer.

finalized Inputs

  • MUST NOT be reorganized based on Ethereum economic security

finalized represents full Proof of Stake economic security on top of the data. This means that if the data is reorganized, then validators will be slashed.

Honest Verifier

The honest verifier follows a naive verification algorithm. That is similar to the block building code that the sequencer follows. The main difference is that the validity of included executing messages is verified instead of verifying possible executing messages before inclusion.

Security Considerations

Forced Inclusion of Cross Chain Messages

The design is particular to not introduce any sort of "forced inclusion" between L2s. This design space introduces risky synchrony assumptions and forces the introduction of a message queue to prevent denial of service attacks where all chains in the network decide to send cross chain messages to the same chain at the same time.

"Forced inclusion" transactions are good for censorship resistance. In the worst case of censoring sequencers, it will take at most 2 sequencing windows for the cross chain message to be processed. The initiating transaction can be sent via a deposit which MUST be included in the source chain or the sequencer will be reorganized at the end of the sequencing window that includes the deposit transaction. If the executing transaction is censored, it will take another sequencing window of time to force the inclusion of the executing message per the spec.

What if Safety isn't Enough?

It is possible that small latency differences may impact the allowance of deposited executing messages if the rule is that the initiating message is safe. A more strict invariant may be introduced:

identifier.timestamp + sequencer_window <= block.timestamp

This says that a sequencer window must elapse before the initiating message can be referenced in an executing message.

Reliance on History

When fully executing historical blocks, a dependency on historical receipts from remote chains is present. EIP-4444 will eventually provide a solution for making historical receipts available without needing to require increasingly large execution client databases.

It is also possible to introduce a form of expiry on historical receipts by enforcing that the timestamp is recent enough in the CrossL2Inbox.

P2P Networking

Table of Contents

A node will optimistically accept a block as unsafe with only a signature by the sequencer. To promote this block to a higher level of safety, it must be sure that the initiating messages exist for all executing messages. A future release may add specific p2p networking components to decrease the latency of this process. This could look like the sequencer signing and gossiping sets of executing messages to nodes of remote chains so that they know exactly what initiating messages to look for. An optimization on this would involve working with commitments to this data so that less data is sent around via p2p.

Security Considerations


Fault Proof

Table of Contents


No changes to the dispute game bisection are required. The only changes required are to the fault proof program itself. The insight is that the fault proof program can be a superset of the state transition function.

Security Considerations


Cascading dependencies

Deposits are a special case, synchronous with derivation, at enforced cross-L2 delay. Thus deposits cannot reference each others events intra-block.

Interop Network Upgrade

Table of Contents

The interop network upgrade timestamp defines the timestamp at which all functionality in this document is considered the consensus rules for an OP Stack based network. On the interop network upgrade block, a set of deposit transaction based upgrade transactions are deterministically generated by the derivation pipeline in the following order:

  • L1 Attributes Transaction calling setL1BlockValuesEcotone
  • User deposits from L1
  • Network Upgrade Transactions
    • L1Block deployment
    • CrossL2Inbox deployment
    • L2ToL2CrossDomainMessenger deployment
    • Update L1Block Proxy ERC-1967 Implementation Slot
    • Update CrossL2Inbox Proxy ERC-1967 Implementation Slot
    • Update L2ToL2CrossDomainMessenger Proxy ERC-1967 Implementation Slot

The execution payload MUST set noTxPool to true for this block.

The exact definitions for these upgrade transactions are still to be defined.

Security Considerations


Token Bridging

Table of Contents


Without a standardized security model, bridged assets may not be fungible with each other. The SuperchainERC20 unifies ERC20 token bridging to make it fungible across the Superchain. It builds on top of the messaging protocol, as the most trust minimized bridging solution.

Unlike other standards, such as xERC20, where users interact with a bridge possessing mint and burn privileges on cross-chain enabled tokens, this approach allows users to call methods directly on the token contract.



The standard will build on top of ERC20 and include the following functions:


Transfer _amount amount of tokens to address _to in chain _chainId.

It SHOULD burn _amount tokens and initialize a message to the L2ToL2CrossChainMessenger to mint the _amount in the target address _to at _chainId.

sendERC20(address _to, uint256 _amount, uint256 _chainId)


Process incoming messages IF AND ONLY IF initiated by the same contract (token) address on a different chain and come from the L2ToL2CrossChainMessenger in the local chain. It will mint _amount to address _to, as defined in sendERC20.

relayERC20(address _to, uint256 _amount)



MUST trigger when a cross-chain transfer is initiated using sendERC20.

event SendERC20(address indexed _from, address indexed _to, uint256 _amount, uint256 _chainId)


MUST trigger when a cross-chain transfer is finalized using relayERC20.

event RelayERC20(address indexed to, uint256 amount);


The following diagram depicts a cross-chain transfer.

  participant from
  participant SuperERC20_A as SuperchainERC20 (Chain A)
  participant Messenger_A as L2ToL2CrossDomainMessenger (Chain A)
  participant Inbox as CrossL2Inbox
  participant Messenger_B as L2ToL2CrossDomainMessenger (Chain B)
  participant SuperERC20_B as SuperchainERC20 (Chain B)
  participant Recipient as to

  from->>SuperERC20_A: sendERC20To(to, amount, chainID)
  SuperERC20_A->>SuperERC20_A: burn(from, amount)
  SuperERC20_A->>Messenger_A: sendMessage(chainId, message)
  Inbox->>Messenger_B: relayMessage()
  Messenger_B->>SuperERC20_B: relayERC20(to, amount)
  SuperERC20_B->>SuperERC20_B: mint(to, amount)


An example implementation that depends on deterministic deployments across chains for security is provided. This construction builds on top of the L2ToL2CrossDomainMessenger for both replay protection and domain binding.

function sendERC20(address _to, uint256 _amount, uint256 _chainId) public {
  _burn(msg.sender, _amount);
  bytes memory _message = abi.encodeCall(this.relayERC20, (_to, _amount));
  L2ToL2CrossDomainMessenger.sendMessage(_chainId, address(this), _message);
  emit SendERC20(msg.sender, _to, _amount, _chainId);

function relayERC20(address _to, uint256 _amount) external {
  require(msg.sender == address(L2ToL2CrossChainMessenger));
  require(L2ToL2CrossChainMessenger.crossDomainMessageSender() == address(this));
  _mint(_to, _amount);

  emit RelayERC20(_to, _amount)


Besides the ERC20 invariants, the SuperchainERC20 will require the following interop specific properties:

  • Conservation of bridged amount: The minted amount in relayERC20() should match the amount that was burnt in sendERC20(), as long as target chain has the initiating chain in the dependency set.
    • Corollary 1: Finalized cross-chain transactions will conserve the sum of totalSupply and each user's balance for each chain in the Superchain.
    • Corollary 2: Each initiated but not finalized message (included in initiating chain but not yet in target chain) will decrease the totalSupply and the initiating user balance precisely by the burnt amount.
    • Corollary 3: SuperchainERC20s should not charge a token fee or increase the balance when moving cross-chain.
    • Note: if the target chain is not in the initiating chain dependency set, funds will be locked, similar to sending funds to the wrong address. If the target chain includes it later, these could be unlocked.
  • Freedom of movement: Users should be able to send and receive tokens in any target chain with the initiating chain in its dependency set using sendERC20() and relayERC20(), respectively.
  • Unique Messenger: The sendERC20() function must exclusively use the L2toL2CrossDomainMessenger for messaging. Similarly, the relayERC20() function should only process messages originating from the L2toL2CrossDomainMessenger.
    • Corollary: xERC20 and other standards from third-party bridges should use different functions.
  • Unique Address: The sendERC20() function must exclusively send a message to the same address on the target chain. Similarly, the relayERC20() function should only process messages originating from the same address.
    • Note: The Factory will ensure same address deployment.
  • Locally initiated: The bridging action should be initialized from the chain where funds are located only.
    • This is because the same address might correspond to different users cross-chain. For example, two SAFEs with the same address in two chains might have different owners. With the prospects of a smart wallet future, it is impossible to assume there will be a way to distinguish EOAs from smart wallets.
    • A way to allow for remotely initiated bridging is to include remote approval, i.e. approve a certain address in a certain chainId to spend local funds.
  • Bridge Events:
    • sendERC20() should emit a SendERC20 event. `
    • relayERC20() should emit a RelayERC20 event.

Future Considerations

Cross Chain transferFrom

In addition to standard locally initialized bridging, it is possible to allow contracts to be cross-chain interoperable. For example, a contract in chain A could send pre-approved funds from a user in chain B to a contract in chain C.

For the moment, the standard will not include any specific functionality to facilitate such an action and rely on the usage of Permit2 like this:

  participant from
  participant Intermediate_A as Initiator
  participant Messenger_A as L2ToL2CrossDomainMessenger (Chain A)
  participant Inbox as CrossL2Inbox
  participant Messenger_B as L2ToL2CrossDomainMessenger (Chain B)
  participant Permit2
  participant SuperERC20_B as SuperchainERC20 (Chain B)
  participant Recipient as to

  from->>Intermediate_A: remoteTransferFrom(..., token, to, chainId, msg, signature)
  Intermediate_A->>Messenger_A: permit: sendMessage(chainId, message)
  Inbox->>Messenger_B: permit: relayMessage()
  Messenger_B->>Permit2: permitTransferFrom(msg, sig)
  Permit2->>SuperERC20_B: transferFrom(from, to, amount)

If, at some point in the future, these actions were to be included in the standard, a possible design could introduce a remoteTransferFrom() function.

Concatenated Action

It is possible to have an additional input bytes _data in both sendERC20() and relayERC20() that would make an additional call to the _to address. This feature could be used for cross-chain concatenated actions, i.e. bridge funds and then do X.

This vertical has much potential but can also be achieved outside the standard in the following way:

  participant from
  participant Intermediate_A as intermediate A
  participant SuperERC20_A as SuperERC20 (Chain A)
  participant Messenger_A as L2ToL2CrossDomainMessenger (Chain A)
  participant Inbox_B as CrossL2Inbox (Chain B)
  participant Messenger_B as L2ToL2CrossDomainMessenger (Chain B)
  participant SuperERC20_B as SuperERC20 (Chain B)

  from->>Intermediate_A: sendWithData(data)
  Intermediate_A->>SuperERC20_A: sendERC20(amount, chainId)
  SuperERC20_A->>SuperERC20_A: burn(from, amount)
  SuperERC20_A->>Messenger_A: sendMessage(chainId, message)
  Intermediate_A->>Messenger_A: sendMessage(chainId, to, data)
  Inbox_B->>Messenger_B: relayMessage(): transfer
  Messenger_B->>SuperERC20_B: finalizeSendERC20(to, amount)
  SuperERC20_B->>SuperERC20_B: mint(to, amount)
  Inbox_B->>Messenger_B: relayMessage(): call
  Messenger_B->>to: call(data)

Adding the call to the standard would remove the dependence on the sequencer regarding the proper tx ordering at the sequencer level, but would also introduce more risk for cross-chain fund transferring, as an incorrectly formatted call would burn funds in the initiating chain but would revert in destination and could never be successfully replayed.

Security Council Safe

Table of Contents

The Security Council (at eth:0xc2819DC788505Aac350142A7A707BF9D03E3Bd03) uses a specially extended Safe multisig contract to provide additional security guarantees on top of those provided by the Safe contract.

Deputy guardian module

The Security Council acts as the Guardian, which is authorized to activate the Superchain Pause functionality and for blacklisting dispute game contracts.

However the Security Council cannot be expected to react quickly in an emergency situation. Therefore the Deputy Guardian module enables the Security Council to share this authorization with another account.

The module has the following minimal interface:

interface DeputyGuardianModule {
   /// @dev The address of the Security Council Safe
   function safe() external view returns(address);

   /// @dev The address of the account which can pause superchain withdrawals by calling this module
   function deputyGuardian() external view returns(address);

   /// @dev Calls the Security Council Safe's `execTransactionFromModule()`, with the arguments
   ///      necessary to call `pause()` on the `SuperchainConfig` contract.
   ///      Only the deputy guardian can call this function.
   function pause() external;

   /// @dev Calls the Security Council Safe's `execTransactionFromModule()`, with the arguments
   ///      necessary to call `unpause()` on the `SuperchainConfig` contract.
   ///      Only the deputy guardian can call this function.
   function unpause() external;

   /// @dev Calls the Security Council Safe's `execTransactionFromModule()`, with the arguments
   ///      necessary to call `blacklistDisputeGame()` on the `OptimismPortal2` contract.
   ///      Only the deputy guardian can call this function.
   /// @param _portal The `OptimismPortal2` contract instance.
   /// @param _game The `IDisputeGame` contract instance.
   function blacklistDisputeGame(address _portal, address _game) external;

   /// @dev Calls the Security Council Safe's `execTransactionFromModule()`, with the arguments
   ///      necessary to call `setRespectedGameType()` on the `OptimismPortal2` contract.
   ///      Only the deputy guardian can call this function.
   /// @param _portal The `OptimismPortal2` contract instance.
   /// @param _gameType The `GameType` to set as the respected game type
   function setRespectedGameType(address _portal, uint32 _gameType) external;

For simplicity, the DeputyGuardianModule module does not have functions for updating the safe and deputyGuardian addresses. If necessary these can be modified by swapping out with a new module.

Deputy Guardian Module Security Properties

The following security properties must be upheld by the DeputyGuardianModule:

  1. The module must correctly enforce access controls so that only the Deputy Guardian can call state modifying functions on the DeputyGuardianModule.
  2. The module must be able to cause the Safe to make calls to all of the functions which the Guardian role is authorized to make.
  3. The module must not be able to cause the Safe to make calls to functions which the Guardian role is not authorized to make.
  4. The module must be safely removable.
  5. The module must not introduce any possibility of disabling the the Safe so that it can no longer forward transactions.
  6. The module must format calldata correctly such that the target it calls performs the expected action.

Liveness checking mechanism

The Security Council's liveness checking mechanism is intended to ensure that any loss of access to a signer's keys is identified and addressed within a predictable period of time.

This mechanism is intended only to be used to remove signers who have lost access to their keys, or are otherwise inactive. It is not intended to be used to remove signers who are acting in bad faith, or any other subjective criteria, such cases should be addressed by governance, and the removal handled via the standard Safe ownership management functionality.

Liveness checking methodology

This is achieved using two types of contracts which the Safe contract has built-in support for:

  1. Guard contracts: can execute pre- and post- transaction checks.
  2. Module contracts: a contract which is added to the Safe by the signers, and thenceforth is authorized to execute transactions via the Safe. This means the module must properly implement auth conditions internally.

The liveness guard

For implementing liveness checks a LivenessGuard is created which receives the signatures from each executed transaction, and tracks the latest time at which a transaction was signed by each signer. This time is made publicly available by calling a lastLive(address)(Timestamp) method.

Owners are recorded in this mapping in one of 4 ways:

  1. Upon deployment, the guard reads the current set of owners from the Safe contract.
  2. When a new owner is added to the safe. Similarly, when an owner is removed from the Safe, its entry is deleted from the mapping.
  3. When a transaction is executed, the signatures on that transaction are passed to the guard and used to identify the signers. If more than the required number of signatures is provided, they are ignored.
  4. An owner may call the contract's showLiveness()() method directly in order to prove liveness.

Note that the first two methods do not require the owner to actually sign anything. However these mechanisms are necessary to prevent new owners from being removed before they have had a chance to show liveness.

The liveness module

A LivenessModule is also created which does the following:

  1. Has a function removeOwners() that anyone may call to specify one or more owners to be removed from the Safe.
  2. The Module would then check the LivenessGuard.lastLive() to determine if the signer is eligible for removal.
  3. If so, it will call the Safe's removeSigner() to remove the non-live signer, and if necessary reduce the threshold.
  4. When a member is removed, the signing parameters are modified such that M/N is the lowest ratio which remains greater than or equal to 75%. Using integer math, this can be expressed as M = (N * 75 + 99) / 100.

Owner removal call flow

The following diagram illustrates the flow for removing a single owner. The verifyFinalState box indicates calls to the Safe which ensure the final state is valid.

    participant User
    participant LivenessModule
    participant LivenessGuard
    participant Safe
    User->>LivenessModule: removeOwners([previousOwner], [owner])
    LivenessModule->>LivenessGuard: lastLive(owner)
    LivenessModule->>Safe: getOwners()
    LivenessModule->>Safe: removeOwner(previousOwner, owner)

    alt verifyFinalState
    LivenessModule->>Safe: getOwners()
    LivenessModule->>Safe: getThreshold()
    LivenessModule->>Safe: getGuard()


In the unlikely event that the signer set (N) is reduced below the allowed minimum number of owners, then (and only then) is a shutdown mechanism activated which removes the existing signers, and hands control of the multisig over to a predetermined entity.

Liveness Security Properties

The following security properties must be upheld:

In the guard

  1. Signatures are assigned to the correct signer.
  2. Non-signers are unable to create a record of having signed.
  3. An owner cannot be censored or griefed such that their signing is not recorded.
  4. Owners may demonstrate liveness either by signing a transaction or by calling directly to the guard.
  5. It must be impossible for the guard's checkTransaction or checkAfterExecution method to permanently revert given any calldata and the current state.
  6. The guard correctly handles updates to the owners list, such that new owners are recorded, and removed owners are deleted.
    1. An ownersBefore enumerable set variable is used to accomplish this, it must be emptied at the end of the checkAfterExecution call.

In the module

  1. During a shutdown the module correctly removes all signers, and converts the safe to a 1 of 1.
  2. The module only removes an owner if they have not demonstrated liveness during the interval, or if enough other owners have been removed to activate the shutdown mechanism.
  3. The module correctly sets the Safe's threshold upon removing a signer.

Note: neither the module nor guard attempt to prevent a quorum of owners from removing either the liveness module or guard. There are legitimate reasons they might wish to do so. Moreover, if such a quorum of owners exists, there is no benefit to removing them, as they are defacto 'sufficiently live'.

Interdependency between the guard and module

The guard has no dependency on the module, and can be used independently to track liveness of Safe owners.

This means that the module can be removed or replaced without any affect on the guard.

The module however does have a dependency on the guard; if the guard is removed from the Safe, then the module will no longer be functional and calls to its removeOwners function will revert.

Operational considerations

Manual validation of new owner liveness

As noted above newly added owners are recorded in the guard without necessarily having signed a transaction. Off-chain validation of the liveness of an address must therefore be done prior to adding a new owner.

Deploying the liveness checking system

The module and guard are intended to be deployed and installed on the safe in the following sequence:

  1. Deploy the guard contract. The guard's constructor will read the Safe's owners and set a timestamp.
  2. Deploy the module.
  3. Set the guard on the safe.
  4. Enable the module on the safe.

This order of operations is necessary to satisfy the constructor checks in the module, and is intended to prevent owners from being immediately removable.

Note that changes to the owners set should not be made between the time the module is deployed, and when it is enabled on the Safe, otherwise the checks made in the module's constructor may be invalidated. If such changes are made, a new module should be deployed.

Modify the liveness checking system

Changes to the liveness checking system should be done in the following manner:

Replacing the module

The module can safely be removed without affecting the operation of the guard. A new module can then be added.

Note: none of the module's parameters are modifiable. In order to update the security properties enforced by the module, it must be replaced.

Replacing the guard

The safe can only have one guard contract at a time, and if the guard is removed the module will cease to function. This does not affect the ability of the Safe to operate normally, however the module should be removed as a best practice.

If a new guard is added, eg. as a means of upgrading it, then a new module will also need to be deployed and enabled. Once both the guard and module have been removed, they can be replaced according to the steps in the Deployment section above.

OP Stack Manager

The OP Stack Manager is a contract that deploys the L1 contracts for an OP Stack chain in a single transaction. It provides a minimal set of user-configurable parameters to ensure that the resulting chain meets the standard configuration requirements.

The version deployed is always a governance-approved contract release. The set of governance approved contract releases can be found on the Optimism Monorepo releases page, and is the set of releases named op-contracts/vX.Y.Z.

Table of Contents


The OP Stack Manager is a proxied contract deployed at 0xTODO. It can be deployed as follows:



Version 1.0.0 of the OP Stack Manager deploys the op-contracts/v1.4.0 contracts release.


The OP Stack Manager is a proxied contract using the standard Proxy.sol contract that lives in the Optimism monorepo. Therefore the OP Stack Manager will have the same interface as the Proxy.sol, in addition to other methods defined in this specification.

The privileged methods of the OP Stack Manager will be held by the L1 ProxyAdmin owner, as specified by the standard configuration.


The deploy method is the only non-view method in the contract. It is used to deploy the full set of L1 contracts required to setup a new OP Stack chain that complies with the standard configuration. It has the following interface:

struct Roles {
  address proxyAdminOwner;
  address systemConfigOwner;
  address batcher;
  address unsafeBlockSigner;
  address proposer;
  address challenger;

function deploy(
  uint64 l2ChainId,
  Roles roles,
  uint32 basefeeScalar,
  uint32 blobBasefeeScalar
) external returns (SystemConfig)

The l2ChainId has the following restrictions:

  • It must not be equal to 0.
  • It must not be equal to the chain ID of the chain the OP Stack Manager is deployed on.
  • It must not be equal to a chain ID that is already present in the ethereum-lists/chains repository. This is not enforced onchain, but may matter for future versions of OP Stack Manager that handle upgrades.

On success, the following event is emitted:

event Deployed(uint256 indexed l2ChainId, SystemConfig indexed systemConfig);

This method reverts on failure. This occurs when:

  • The input l2ChainId does not comply with the restrictions above.
  • The resulting configuration is not compliant with the standard configuration.

Getter Methods

The following interface defines the available getter methods:

/// @notice The logic address and initializer selector for an implementation contract.
struct Implementation {
  address logic; // Address containing the deployed logic contract.
  bytes4 initializer; // Function selector for the initializer.

/// @notice Returns the latest approved release of the OP Stack contracts.
/// @notice Release strings follow semver and are named with the
/// format `op-contracts/vX.Y.Z`.
function latestRelease() external view returns (string memory);

/// @notice Maps a release version to a contract name to its implementation data.
function implementation(
  string memory release,
  string memory contractName
) external view returns (Implementation memory);

/// @notice Maps an L2 Chain ID to the SystemConfig address for that chain.
/// @notice All contracts for a chain can be found from its SystemConfig.
function systemConfig(uint256 chainId) external view returns (SystemConfig);


Batch Inbox Address

The chain's Batch Inbox address is computed at deploy time using the recommend approach defined in the standard configuration. This improves UX by removing an input, and ensures uniqueness of the batch inbox addresses.

Contract Deployments

All contracts deployed by the OP Stack Manager are deployed with CREATE2, with a salt equal to either:

  • The L2 chain ID, or
  • keccak256(bytes.concat(bytes32(uint256(l2ChainId)), contractName)).

The former is used when only a single instance of a given contract is deployed for a chain. The latter is used when deploying multiple instances of a given contract for a chain, which is the case of all Proxy contracts. For these, the contractName is the name of the implementation contract that will be used with the proxy.

This provides the following benefits:

  • Contract addresses for a chain can be derived as a function of chain ID without any RPC calls.
  • Chain ID uniqueness is enforced for free, as a deploy using the same chain ID will result in attempting to deploy to the same address, which is prohibited by the EVM.
    • This property is contingent on the proxy and AddressManager code not changing when OP Stack Manager is upgraded. Both of these are not planned to change.
    • The OP Stack Manager is not responsible for enforcing chain ID uniqueness, so it is acceptable if this property is not preserved in future versions of the OP Stack Manager.

Security Considerations

Chain ID Source of Truth

One of the implicit restrictions on chain ID is that deploy can only be called once per chain ID, because contract addresses are a function of chain ID. However, future versions of OP Stack Manager may:

  • Change the Proxy code used, which would allow a duplicate chain ID to be deployed if there is only the implicit check.
  • Manage upgrades, which will require "registering" existing pre-OP Stack Manager chains in the OP Stack Manager. Registration will be a privileged action, and the superchain registry will be used as the source of truth for registrations.

This means, for example, if deploying a chain with a chain ID of 10β€”which is OP Mainnet's chain IDβ€”deployment will execute successfully, but the entry in OP Stack Manager may be overwritten in a future upgrade. Therefore, chain ID uniqueness is not enforced by the OP Stack Manager, and it is strongly recommended to only use chain IDs that are not already present in the ethereum-lists/chains repository.

Chain ID Frontrunning

Contract addresses for a chain are a function of chain ID, which implies you can counterfactually compute and use those chain addresses before the chain is deployed. However, this property should not be relied uponβ€”new chain deployments are permissionless, so you cannot guarantee usage of a given chain ID, as deploy transactions can be frontrun.

Chain ID Value

While not specific to OP Stack Manager, when choosing a chain ID is important to consider that not all chain IDs are well supported by tools. For example, MetaMask only supports chain IDs up to 4503599627370476, well below the max allowable 256-bit value.

OP Stack Manager does not consider factors such as these. The EVM supports 256-bit chain IDs, so OP Stack Manager sticks with the full 256-bit range to maximize compatibility.

Proxy Admin Owner

The proxy admin owner is a very powerful role, as it allows upgrading protocol contracts. When choosing the initial proxy admin owner, a Safe is recommended to ensure admin privileges are sufficiently secured.

Upgradeability (ABI Changes)

This contract is upgradeable, and breaking changes are expected, as upgrades are required to update the contracts release that is deployed. This is because the required inputs to the deploy method may change as new contract releases are supported. Therefore, if calling this contract from another contract, be sure to account for future breaking changes to the ABI.


Table of Contents

General Terms

Layer 1 (L1)

Refers the Ethereum blockchain, used in contrast to layer 2, which refers to Optimism.

Layer 2 (L2)

Refers to the Optimism blockchain (specified in this repository), used in contrast to layer 1, which refers to the Ethereum blockchain.


Can refer to an L1 block, or to an L2 block, which are structured similarly.

A block is a sequential list of transactions, along with a couple of properties stored in the header of the block. A description of these properties can be found in code comments here, or in the Ethereum yellow paper (pdf), section 4.3.

It is useful to distinguish between input block properties, which are known before executing the transactions in the block, and output block properties, which are derived after executing the block's transactions. These include various Merkle Patricia Trie roots that notably commit to the L2 state and to the log events emitted during execution.


"Externally Owned Account", an Ethereum term to designate addresses operated by users, as opposed to contract addresses.

Merkle Patricia Trie

A Merkle Patricia Trie (MPT) is a sparse trie, which is a tree-like structure that maps keys to values. The root hash of a MPT is a commitment to the contents of the tree, which allows a proof to be constructed for any key-value mapping encoded in the tree. Such a proof is called a Merkle proof, and can be verified against the Merkle root.

Chain Re-Organization

A re-organization, or re-org for short, is whenever the head of a blockchain (its last block) changes (as dictated by the fork choice rule) to a block that is not a child of the previous head.

L1 re-orgs can happen because of network conditions or attacks. L2 re-orgs are a consequence of L1 re-orgs, mediated via L2 chain derivation.

Predeployed Contract ("Predeploy")

A contract placed in the L2 genesis state (i.e. at the start of the chain).

All predeploy contracts are specified in the predeploys specification.

Preinstalled Contract ("Preinstall")

A contract placed in the L2 genesis state (i.e. at the start of the chain). These contracts do not share the same security guarantees as predeploys, but are general use contracts made available to improve the L2's UX.

All preinstall contracts are specified in the preinstalls specification.

Precompiled Contract ("Precompile")

A contract implemented natively in the EVM that performs a specific operation more efficiently than a bytecode (e.g. Solidity) implementation. Precompiles exist at predefined addresses. They are created and modified through network upgrades.

All precompile contracts are specified in the precompiles specification.


A receipt is an output generated by a transaction, comprising a status code, the amount of gas used, a list of log entries, and a bloom filter indexing these entries. Log entries are most notably used to encode Solidity events.

Receipts are not stored in blocks, but blocks store a Merkle Patricia Trie root for a tree containing the receipt for every transaction in the block.

Receipts are specified in the yellow paper (pdf) section 4.3.1.

Transaction Type

Ethereum provides a mechanism (as described in EIP-2718) for defining different transaction types. Different transaction types can contain different payloads, and be handled differently by the protocol.

Fork Choice Rule

The fork choice rule is the rule used to determine which block is to be considered as the head of a blockchain. On L1, this is determined by the proof of stake rules.

L2 also has a fork choice rule, although the rules vary depending on whether we want the safe L2 head, the unsafe L2 head or the finalized L2 head.

Priority Gas Auction

Transactions in ethereum are ordered by the price that the transaction pays to the miner. Priority Gas Auctions (PGAs) occur when multiple parties are competing to be the first transaction in a block. Each party continuously updates the gas price of their transaction. PGAs occur when there is value in submitting a transaction before other parties (like being the first deposit or submitting a deposit before there is not more guaranteed gas remaining). PGAs tend to have negative externalities on the network due to a large amount of transactions being submitted in a very short amount of time.


Transactions in the rollup can be included in two ways:

Submitting transactions for inclusion in a batch saves costs by reducing overhead, and enables the sequencer to pre-confirm the transactions before the L1 confirms the data.


A sequencer is either a rollup node ran in sequencer mode, or the operator of this rollup node.

The sequencer is a privileged actor, which receives L2 transactions from L2 users, creates L2 blocks using them, which it then submits to data availability provider (via a batcher). It also submits output roots to L1.

Sequencing Window

A sequencing window is a range of L1 blocks from which a sequencing epoch can be derived.

A sequencing window whose first L1 block has number N contains batcher transactions for epoch N. The window contains blocks [N, N + SWS) where SWS is the sequencer window size.

The current default sws is 3600 epochs.

Additionally, the first block in the window defines the depositing transactions which determine the deposits to be included in the first L2 block of the epoch.

Sequencing Epoch

A sequencing epoch is sequential range of L2 blocks derived from a sequencing window of L1 blocks.

Each epoch is identified by an epoch number, which is equal to the block number of the first L1 block in the sequencing window.

Epochs can have variable size, subject to some constraints. See the L2 chain derivation specification for more details.

L1 Origin

The L1 origin of an L2 block is the L1 block corresponding to its sequencing epoch.


In general, a deposit is an L2 transaction derived from an L1 block (by the rollup driver).

While transaction deposits are notably (but not only) used to "deposit" (bridge) ETH and tokens to L2, the word deposit should be understood as "a transaction deposited to L2 from L1".

This term deposit is somewhat ambiguous as these "transactions" exist at multiple levels. This section disambiguates all deposit-related terms.

Notably, a deposit can refer to:

We sometimes also talk about user deposit which is a similar term that explicitly excludes L1 attributes deposited transactions.

Deposits are specified in the deposits specification.

Deposited Transaction

A deposited transaction is a L2 transaction that was derived from L1 and included in a L2 block.

There are two kinds of deposited transactions:

L1 Attributes Deposited Transaction

An L1 attributes deposited transaction is deposited transaction that is used to register the L1 block attributes (number, timestamp, ...) on L2 via a call to the L1 Attributes Predeployed Contract. That contract can then be used to read the attributes of the L1 block corresponding to the current L2 block.

L1 attributes deposited transactions are specified in the L1 Attributes Deposit section of the deposits specification.

User-Deposited Transaction

A user-deposited transaction is a deposited transaction which is derived from an L1 call to the deposit contract (a depositing call).

User-deposited transactions are specified in the Transaction Deposits section of the deposits specification.

Depositing Call

A depositing call is an L1 call to the deposit contract, which will be derived to a user-deposited transaction by the rollup driver.

This call specifies all the data (destination, value, calldata, ...) for the deposited transaction.

Depositing Transaction

A depositing transaction is an L1 transaction that makes one or more depositing calls.


The depositor is the L1 account (contract or EOA) that makes (is the msg.sender of) the depositing call. The depositor is NOT the originator of the depositing transaction (i.e. tx.origin).

Deposited Transaction Type

The deposited transaction type is an EIP-2718 transaction type, which specifies the input fields and correct handling of a deposited transaction.

See the corresponding section of the deposits spec for more information.

Deposit Contract

The deposit contract is an L1 contract to which EOAs and contracts may send deposits. The deposits are emitted as log records (in Solidity, these are called events) for consumption by rollup nodes.

Advanced note: the deposits are not stored in calldata because they can be sent by contracts, in which case the calldata is part of the internal execution between contracts, and this intermediate calldata is not captured in one of the Merkle Patricia Trie roots included in the L1 block.

cf. Deposits Specification


TODO expand this whole section to be clearer

In general, a withdrawal is a transaction sent from L2 to L1 that may transfer data and/or value.

The term withdrawal is somewhat ambiguous as these "transactions" exist at multiple levels. In order to differentiate between the L1 and L2 components of a withdrawal we introduce the following terms:

  • A withdrawal initiating transaction refers specifically to a transaction on L2 sent to the Withdrawals predeploy.
  • A withdrawal finalizing transaction refers specifically to an L1 transaction which finalizes and relays the withdrawal.


An EOA on L1 which finalizes a withdrawal by submitting the data necessary to verify its inclusion on L2.

Finalization Period

The finalization period β€” sometimes also called withdrawal delay β€” is the minimum amount of time (in seconds) that must elapse before a withdrawal can be finalized.

The finalization period is necessary to afford sufficient time for validators to make a fault proof.

TODO specify current value for finalization period

Batch Submission

Data Availability

Data availability is the guarantee that some data will be "available" (i.e. retrievable) during a reasonably long time window. In Optimism's case, the data in question are sequencer batches that validators need in order to verify the sequencer's work and validate the L2 chain.

The finalization period should be taken as the lower bound on the availability window, since that is when data availability is the most crucial, as it is needed to perform a fault proof.

"Availability" does not mean guaranteed long-term storage of the data.

Data Availability Provider

A data availability provider is a service that can be used to make data available. See the Data Availability for more information on what this means.

Ideally, a good data availability provider provides strong verifiable guarantees of data availability

At present, the supported data availability providers include Ethereum call data and blob data.

Sequencer Batch

A sequencer batch is list of L2 transactions (that were submitted to a sequencer) tagged with an epoch number and an L2 block timestamp (which can trivially be converted to a block number, given our block time is constant).

Sequencer batches are part of the L2 derivation inputs. Each batch represents the inputs needed to build one L2 block (given the existing L2 chain state) β€” except for the first block of each epoch, which also needs information about deposits (cf. the section on L2 derivation inputs).


A channel is a sequence of sequencer batches (for sequential blocks) compressed together. The reason to group multiple batches together is simply to obtain a better compression rate, hence reducing data availability costs.

A channel can be split in frames in order to be transmitted via batcher transactions. The reason to split a channel into frames is that a channel might be too large to include in a single batcher transaction.

A channel is uniquely identified by its timestamp (UNIX time at which the channel was created) and a random value. See the Frame Format section of the L2 Chain Derivation specification for more information.

On the side of the rollup node (which is the consumer of channels), a channel is considered to be opened if its final frame (explicitly marked as such) has not been read, or closed otherwise.

Channel Frame

A channel frame is a chunk of data belonging to a channel. Batcher transactions carry one or multiple frames. The reason to split a channel into frames is that a channel might too large to include in a single batcher transaction.


A batcher is a software component (independent program) that is responsible to make channels available on a data availability provider. The batcher communicates with the rollup node in order to retrieve the channels. The channels are then made available using batcher transactions.

TODO In the future, we might want to make the batcher responsible for constructing the channels, letting it only query the rollup node for L2 block inputs.

Batcher Transaction

A batcher transaction is a transaction submitted by a batcher to a data availability provider, in order to make channels available. These transactions carry one or more full frames, which may belong to different channels. A channel's frame may be split between multiple batcher transactions.

When submitted to Ethereum calldata, the batcher transaction's receiver must be the sequencer inbox address. The transaction must also be signed by a recognized batch submitter account. The recognized batch submitter account is stored in the System Configuration.

Batch submission frequency

Within the sequencing-window constraints the batcher is permitted by the protocol to submit L2 blocks for data-availability at any time. The batcher software allows for dynamic policy configuration by its operator. The rollup enforces safety guarantees and liveness through the sequencing window, if the batcher does not submit data within this allotted time.

By submitting new L2 data in smaller more frequent steps, there is less delay in confirmation of the L2 block inputs. This allows verifiers to ensure safety of L2 blocks sooner. This also reduces the time to finality of the data on L1, and thus the time to L2 input-finality.

By submitting new L2 data in larger less frequent steps, there is more time to aggregate more L2 data, and thus reduce fixed overhead of the batch-submission work. This can reduce batch-submission costs, especially for lower throughput chains that do not fill data-transactions (typically 128 KB of calldata, or 800 KB of blobdata) as quickly.

Channel Timeout

The channel timeout is a duration (in L1 blocks) during which channel frames may land on L1 within batcher transactions.

The acceptable time range for the frames of a channel is [channel_id.timestamp, channel_id.timestamp + CHANNEL_TIMEOUT]. The acceptable L1 block range for these frames are any L1 block whose timestamp falls inside this time range. (Note that channel_id.timestamp must be lower than the L1 block timestamp of any L1 block in which frames of the channel are seen, or else these frames are ignored.)

The purpose of channel timeouts is dual:

  • Avoid keeping old unclosed channel data around forever (an unclosed channel is a channel whose final frame was not sent).
  • Bound the number of L1 blocks we have to look back in order to decode sequencer batches from channels. This is particularly relevant during L1 re-orgs, see the Resetting Channel Buffering section of the L2 Chain Derivation specification for more information.


L2 Output Root Proposals


The proposer's role is to construct and submit output roots, which are commitments to the L2's state, to the L2OutputOracle contract on L1 (the settlement layer). To do this, the proposer periodically queries the rollup node for the latest output root derived from the latest finalized L1 block. It then takes the output root and submits it to the L2OutputOracle contract on the settlement layer (L1).

L2 Chain Derivation

L2 chain derivation is a process that reads L2 derivation inputs from L1 in order to derive the L2 chain.

See the L2 chain derivation specification for more details.

L2 Derivation Inputs

This term refers to data that is found in L1 blocks and is read by the rollup node to construct payload attributes.

L2 derivation inputs include:

System Configuration

This term refers to the collection of dynamically configurable rollup parameters maintained by the SystemConfig contract on L1 and read by the L2 derivation process. These parameters enable keys to be rotated regularly and external cost parameters to be adjusted without the network upgrade overhead of a hardfork.

Payload Attributes

This term refers to an object that can be derived from L2 chain derivation inputs found on L1, which are then passed to the execution engine to construct L2 blocks.

The payload attributes object essentially encodes a block without output properties.

Payload attributes are originally specified in the Ethereum Engine API specification, which we expand in the Execution Engine Specification.

See also the Building The Payload Attributes section of the rollup node specification.

L2 Genesis Block

The L2 genesis block is the first block of the L2 chain in its current version.

The state of the L2 genesis block comprises:

  • State inherited from the previous version of the L2 chain.
    • This state was possibly modified by "state surgeries". For instance, the migration to Bedrock entailed changes on how native ETH balances were stored in the storage trie.
  • Predeployed contracts

The timestamp of the L2 genesis block must be a multiple of the block time (i.e. a even number, since the block time is 2 seconds).

When updating the rollup protocol to a new version, we may perform a squash fork, a process that entails the creation of a new L2 genesis block. This new L2 genesis block will have block number X + 1, where X is the block number of the final L2 block before the update.

A squash fork is not to be confused with a re-genesis, a similar process that we employed in the past, which also resets L2 block numbers, such that the new L2 genesis block has number 0. We will not employ re-genesis in the future.

Squash forks are superior to re-geneses because they avoid duplicating L2 block numbers, which breaks a lot of external tools.

L2 Chain Inception

The L1 block number at which the output roots for the genesis block were proposed on the output oracle contract.

In the current implementation, this is the L1 block number at which the output oracle contract was deployed or upgraded.

Safe L2 Block

A safe L2 block is an L2 block that can be derived entirely from L1 by a rollup node. This can vary between different nodes, based on their view of the L1 chain.

Safe L2 Head

The safe L2 head is the highest safe L2 block that a rollup node knows about.

Unsafe L2 Block

An unsafe L2 block is an L2 block that a rollup node knows about, but which was not derived from the L1 chain. In sequencer mode, this will be a block sequenced by the sequencer itself. In validator mode, this will be a block acquired from the sequencer via unsafe sync.

Unsafe L2 Head

The unsafe L2 head is the highest unsafe L2 block that a rollup node knows about.

Unsafe Block Consolidation

Unsafe block consolidation is the process through which the rollup node attempts to move the safe L2 head a block forward, so that the oldest unsafe L2 block becomes the new safe L2 head.

In order to perform consolidation, the node verifies that the payload attributes derived from the L1 chain match the oldest unsafe L2 block exactly.

See the Engine Queue section of the L2 chain derivation spec for more information.

Finalized L2 Head

The finalized L2 head is the highest L2 block that can be derived from finalized L1 blocks β€” i.e. L1 blocks older than two L1 epochs (64 L1 time slots).

Other L2 Chain Concepts

Address Aliasing

When a contract submits a deposit from L1 to L2, its address (as returned by ORIGIN and CALLER) will be aliased with a modified representation of the address of a contract.

Rollup Node

The rollup node is responsible for deriving the L2 chain from the L1 chain (L1 blocks and their associated receipts).

The rollup node can run either in validator or sequencer mode.

In sequencer mode, the rollup node receives L2 transactions from users, which it uses to create L2 blocks. These are then submitted to a data availability provider via batch submission. The L2 chain derivation then acts as a sanity check and a way to detect L1 chain re-orgs.

In validator mode, the rollup node performs derivation as indicated above, but is also able to "run ahead" of the L1 chain by getting blocks directly from the sequencer, in which case derivation serves to validate the sequencer's behaviour.

A rollup node running in validator mode is sometimes called a replica.

TODO expand this to include output root submission

See the rollup node specification for more information.

Rollup Driver

The rollup driver is the rollup node component responsible for deriving the L2 chain from the L1 chain (L1 blocks and their associated receipts).

TODO delete this entry, alongside its reference β€” can be replaced by "derivation process" or "derivation logic" where needed

L1 Attributes Predeployed Contract

A predeployed contract on L2 that can be used to retrieve the L1 block attributes of L1 blocks with a given block number or a given block hash.

cf. L1 Attributes Predeployed Contract Specification

L2 Output Root

A 32 byte value which serves as a commitment to the current state of the L2 chain.

cf. Proposing L2 output commitments

L2 Output Oracle Contract

An L1 contract to which L2 output roots are posted by the sequencer.


A validator is an entity (individual or organization) that runs a rollup node in validator mode.

Doing so grants a lot of benefits similar to running an Ethereum node, such as the ability to simulate L2 transactions locally, without rate limiting.

It also lets the validator verify the work of the sequencer, by re-deriving output roots and comparing them against those submitted by the sequencer. In case of a mismatch, the validator can perform a fault proof.

Fault Proof

An on-chain interactive proof, performed by validators, that demonstrates that a sequencer provided erroneous output roots.

cf. Fault Proofs

Time Slot

On L2, there is a block every 2 second (this duration is known as the block time).

We say that there is a "time slot" every multiple of 2s after the timestamp of the L2 genesis block.

On L1, post-merge, the time slots are every 12s. However, an L1 block may not be produced for every time slot, in case of even benign consensus issues.

Block Time

The L2 block time is 2 second, meaning there is an L2 block at every 2s time slot.

Post-merge, it could be said that the L1 block time is 12s as that is the L1 time slot. However, in reality the block time is variable as some time slots might be skipped.

Pre-merge, the L1 block time is variable, though it is on average 13s.

Unsafe Sync

Unsafe sync is the process through which a validator learns about unsafe L2 blocks from the sequencer.

These unsafe blocks will later need to be confirmed by the L1 chain (via unsafe block consolidation).

Execution Engine Concepts

Execution Engine

The execution engine is responsible for executing transactions in blocks and computing the resulting state roots, receipts roots and block hash.

Both L1 (post-merge) and L2 have an execution engine.

On L1, the executed blocks can come from L1 block synchronization; or from a block freshly minted by the execution engine (using transactions from the L1 mempool), at the request of the L1 consensus layer.

On L2, the executed blocks are freshly minted by the execution engine at the request of the rollup node, using transactions derived from L1 blocks.

In these specifications, "execution engine" always refer to the L2 execution engine, unless otherwise specified.